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Researcher’s note: why this study? 
 
 
At some point in 1999, I was asked to investigate the cause of a positive blood 
culture in a surgical patient. Very early on in that investigation it became clear 
that the cause of the positive blood culture, and the patient’s life-threatening 
blood stream infection, was the infusion which had been prepared on the ward 
by a nurse. A staff nurse became curious as to what I wanted with the patient’s 
temperature and infusion charts. It soon also became clear to the nurse that not 
only had an infusion caused the problem, but she was the nurse that had 
prepared the infusion. She was devastated; almost hysterical. She made me 
watch her procedure. What became obvious to me was that the organisation 
was asking her (and all nurses) to undertake a procedure that could not, to any 
degree, be guaranteed to prevent patients becoming seriously ill as a 
consequence of microbial contamination of infusions. This thesis is part of 
ongoing work to fulfil a promise to do all I could to ensure that nurses would not 
be put in such a position. 
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Abstract 
A review of the literature on blood stream infections caused by contaminated 
intravenous infusates which are prepared in clinical care settings found that this 
common nursing procedure poses at times a significant and life-threatening risk to 
patients. The guidance and regulations surrounding the preparation of intravenous 
drugs in clinical care settings suggests that this procedure is extremely complex 
and poses many different potential hazards to patients. This thesis set out to 
determine how the infection risks are being addressed in practice by asking the 
questions: ‘What is the system of intravenous drug preparation in clinical care 
settings in NHS Scotland?’ and, ‘How does it work in practice?’  
 
Several data sources were utilised: six locations, in specialities where the literature 
identified significant outbreaks had occurred, were examined for potential 
contamination risk. Observations (78) of infusate preparations were undertaken 
and, where available, written procedures were compared with observed practices. 
Finally, analyses were made of 71 questionnaires, completed by the nurses who 
prepare intravenous drugs, regarding their opinions of the procedures’ safety and 
when they perform redundancy checks.   
 
The conclusion of this study is that the system of preparing intravenous drugs in 
clinical care settings by nurses is, as a consequence of potential infusate 
contamination, error-prone and unreliable. The reasons for this conclusion are now 
detailed. 
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o Due to a lack of mandatory environmental standards, and the provision of 
poor environments, there is a risk of infusate contamination from 
environmental sources and consequently, a risk to patients of infusate-
related blood stream infections (IR-BSI).  
o Some in use equipment poses contamination risks to patients’ infusates. 
Equipment that could reduce the contamination risk is not always available 
and in some instances such safety-enhancing equipment has been 
removed. 
o There are no complete written procedures which mirror what is done in 
practice. At present, from a human-factors perspective, it is not easy for the 
nurse to do the right thing, or to be sure exactly what is the right thing to do. 
o The procedure, in practice, has the required elements of an aseptic 
procedure, but the execution of the procedure is more often not performed 
aseptically.  
o The procedure of intravenous drug preparation as observed is mainly an 
interrupted aseptic procedure and as such the recommencement of the 
aseptic procedure requires repeated hand hygiene. 
o The nurses’ opinions of safety vary, as did their assessment of the infection 
risk to their patients, but it is clear that intravenous drug preparation is not a 
much-loved nursing procedure and some nurses find it very stressful. 
o There is no asepsis quality control built into the system. Aseptic steps are 
the least likely to be performed as a redundancy check compared to the 
mandatory checks of ‘right patient, right drug and right dose’. 
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o The information available to the nurses, from the drug companies, from the 
makers of equipment and from national agencies does not identify with 
sufficient clarity the infection risks, or detail how to negate them.  
 
Suggestions for improvement to the six procedures and environments are clear 
once the procedure steps are colour-coded as either aseptic or non-aseptic; 
validity testing of these improvements is however, still needed. 
 
The systems’ vulnerabilities observed in this research appear to stem from a chain 
of external influences including an underestimation of the problem size and the 
actions needed to prevent it in evidence-based guidelines and mandatory 
guidance. This leads to poor recognition of the risk of IR-BSI in clinical practice. 
The problem of infusate contamination causing IR-BSIs is further compounded by 
the fact that it is not caused by a single organism and does not always present as 
a disease in real time, that is, over the lifetime of the infusion. As a consequence, 
this presents surveillance difficulties in terms of definitions, data collection and 
analysis.  
 
Finally, although the diagnosis of a blood stream infection for an individual patient 
remains relatively easy, it is not easy to recognise a contaminated infusate as the 
origin of the problem. All these challenges make both the recognition of the 
problem and agreement on prevention strategies, extremely challenging.  
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In summary, the main conclusion of this thesis is that the preparation of infusates 
in clinical care settings, which occurs approximately 3,000,000 times a year in 
NHSScotland, is from an aseptic perspective, error-prone and unreliable. 
Recommendations to optimise patient safety include, changing the procedure 
locally and, with the utmost urgency, the production of minimum environmental 
standards. The results of this study are relevant to all hospitals in Scotland and 
throughout the United Kingdom where the current regulations apply and similar 
procedures are performed. 
 20 
 
1 Introduction 
This thesis consists of 14 chapters in which the reasons for research into aseptic 
preparation of intravenous drugs are made, the methods to undertake the research 
are described and the results detailed. The discussion provides an evaluation to 
conclude that the system is at present more error-prone than reliable.  
 
This chapter provides a synopsis of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents an 
understanding of the size of the potential problem. Details are specified as to the 
number of intravenous procedures performed each year in Scotland, the potential 
sources of contamination, as well as how micro-organisms in infusates cause 
serious life-threatening, infusate-related blood stream infections (IR-BSI). The 
unique properties of micro-organisms that most frequently cause IR-BSI are also 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the justification for this research, specifically, there appears to 
be a clear hazard to patients from the status quo, it is difficult to recognise infusate 
contamination as a cause of a blood stream infection (BSI), the opportunities for 
asepsis failure are numerous, and current guidance is extensive, yet insufficiently, 
focused on quality or IR-BSI prevention. Additionally, the system on paper at least, 
is extremely complex.  
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Chapter 4 provides an evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses and relevance of 
different approaches to risk and error causation to the thesis.  This evaluation 
leads to the development of a methodological framework. Although risk perception 
and risk assessment are considered relevant to the thesis, the chapter concludes 
that the assessment and methodological approach best suited to assess the 
system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs is a systems approach to 
human error, combined with high-reliability theory, patient safety and human 
factors. Understanding and measuring the safety culture related to intravenous 
drug preparation procedures is also considered critical to the success of the thesis 
in understanding the system of aseptic preparation.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 are brief chapters. Chapter 5 describes the methodological 
framework used in the thesis. Patient safety is considered compromised from the 
inherent dangers in the procedure recognised in the literature and the guidance. 
The system is considered vulnerable because it is designed by, and reliant on, 
humans. From a systems approach to human error the need to identify unsafe acts 
and latent conditions that provoke errors are identified. The examination of the 
system is considered the means by which to identify what is required to improve 
safety. Human factors are involved in making sure that system changes make it 
easy for the healthcare workers (HCWs) to do the right thing. Chapter 6 specifies 
the research questions which are: What is the system of aseptic drug preparation 
in clinical care settings? And, How does it work in practice?  
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In Chapter 7 an explanation is given of the rationale for selecting each of the 
methods used in this thesis to answer the research questions. To reduce bias, 
triangulation of different data collection methods was required. Ready-to-use data 
collection tools were not available for this study. Four different data sources were 
utilised, namely, the assessment of locations where intravenous drugs are 
prepared, observations of the preparations of intravenous procedures being 
performed, comparison of written procedures with observed procedures and a 
survey to identify the HCWs’ opinions on safety and to determine when 
redundancy checks are performed. Sampling for this thesis was done by 
identifying the most common clinical settings from which outbreaks have been 
reported in the literature. Five such clinical specialities were identified: neonatal 
and adult intensive care units, haematology-oncology units, vascular surgery 
wards and medical wards. It was decided to use one ward from each of these 
specialities with an additional pilot ward of an adult intensive care unit. The study 
took place in one NHS board in Scotland which is responsible for a third of all 
healthcare in Scotland. Details of the ethical and research governance permissions 
obtained are also provided in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 8 contains the results which are presented individually and collectively. 
What the results show is that although there is a single training programme and a 
single training manual, there are 6 different procedures performed. The risk of 
infusate contamination varies between individual wards based on the 
environments, the equipment, the drugs and diluents used. No ward had a written 
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procedure which reflects in its entirety the procedure as performed in practice. For 
each of the individual areas an assessment of potential risk of asepsis failure is 
made along with suggestions for improvements to reliability. The procedures in all 
six locations contained contamination risks that are unrecognised as such by the 
nurses. All but 2 of the aseptic procedures are interrupted by steps that are not 
aseptic. In order to illustrate the interrupted nature of the procedures, and identify 
where the procedure should recommence with hand hygiene, each procedure is 
shown with colour-coding steps as either aseptic or non-aseptic.  
 
The data from the HCWs’ opinions of safety survey shows a safety culture that has 
characteristics of safety, such as a willingness to report errors as well as 
characteristics of safety vulnerability including erroneous assumptions of safety 
and a lack of feedback.  Chapter 8 continues with the collective between-ward 
redundancy checks data which shows that asepsis checks are performed least 
frequently of all the redundancy checks. An evaluation of all the information 
available to the nurses who prepare the drugs indicates that the nurses are not 
well served by information provided from a variety of organisations including 
pharmaceutical companies and the World Health Organization. Infection risks in 
the available information are not well highlighted. A system profile is produced 
from the combined results showing that it is nurses who perform this common, 
safety-critical procedure in clinical care settings in Scotland. What is also 
concluded overall is that the system of aseptic drug preparation is more error-
prone than reliable.  
 24 
 
Chapter 9 provides detailed discussion of the results and the identified variations 
between the procedures, specifically, variations in use of gloves and filters and 
seeks explanations for this in the published literature. There is discussion of the 
results from the Location Assessments, the observed procedures and the nurses’ 
opinions of safety data. This chapter provides analysis of why the system is 
vulnerable and why such variation exists. There is discourse on the differences 
between the regulations in the United Kingdom which are limited, and the United 
States regulations, where there are stringent environmental controls and a 
requirement for end-product testing are provided. A chain of external influences 
that impact on the safety of this procedure are identified and discussed. These 
influences include: a lack of recognition of the problem in national guidance, 
difficulties in extracting information in the literature, difficulties in diagnosis of a 
clinical case, difficulties in surveillance and a poor understanding of the 
significance of the problem as a clear hazard to patients. It is concluded that the 
primary factor as to why the preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care 
settings poses such risks, and is without sufficient safeguards, is that the problem 
has been, and still is, considered rare. Such guidance as there is in Scotland does 
not recognise the infection risks from such high-risk drugs as multi-dose vials, 
long-term infusions (>12hours) and lipid-based drugs and as a consequence 
neither do the ward staff. Additionally, the minimum standard for the environmental 
conditions under which such procedures should be performed is not specified.  
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Chapter 10 lists the conclusions from the totality of the results and shows that the 
system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs in near patient settings is 
unreliable and lacks quality control. The cause of this unreliability is in the main 
outwith the hospital, where there are no specified environmental regulations and 
no requirement for ongoing quality control of the product. Unless the system of 
aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs is changed, it will continue to be under-
diagnosed, under-investigated and under-reported. Suggestions for improvements 
are given for individual wards, but all require validation. 
 
The recommendations from the findings of this thesis (Chapter 11) are wide-
reaching and include recommendations for local procedure modifications, the need 
for equipment experts and for environmental risk assessment experts. With regard 
to national guidance, there is a need for a specification of environmental and 
product quality control standards in order to ensure the safety of patients when 
preparing intravenous drugs in clinical care settings. The research agenda is set to 
clarify the risk of infusate contamination and to reduce it. At present, the risk of 
error in this procedure cannot be accurately enumerated.   
 
The final three chapters contain the glossary, references and appendices. The 
next chapter commences with an evaluation of the problem contaminated infusates 
and its potential size. 
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2 Aseptic Intravenous Drug Preparation 
In this chapter data are given on the frequency with which the preparation of 
intravenous drugs is undertaken in clinical care settings. The opportunities for 
asepsis failure during this procedure, and precisely how intravenous drugs can 
cause IR-BSIs and catheter contamination, are also explained. The unique nature, 
properties and origin of some of the common micro-organisms that cause IR-BSI is 
specified; this includes how some of these organisms can grow in nutritionally poor 
conditions. The chapter also includes information on how illness can be caused by 
living micro-organisms and by toxins released on their death. The factors that 
determine whether an IR-BSI or catheter contamination will occur are in addition 
discussed. Finally, how cross-transmission in a healthcare setting can cause IR-
BSI is specified. 
 
Aseptic preparation and administration of intravenous drugs is a common, yet 
inherently dangerous, clinical procedure performed in the main by nurses in near-
patient areas. A comprehensive survey of practices in a university hospital found 
that only 25% of intravenous drugs were prepared an aseptic pharmacy suite – the 
remainder were prepared in clinical care settings (Beaney and Goode 2003). A 
point prevalence survey found that 28% of inpatients received one or more 
intravenous drugs each day (Taxis and Barber 2003). This concurs with a national 
prevalence study of hospital associated infections, which found that 31% of 
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patients had a peripheral vascular access device (Reilly et al. 2007). Extrapolating 
data for Scotland, and using acute occupied bed days for 2006 as the denominator  
(Health Protection Scotland 2007), it is estimated that in Scotland approximately 
3,000,000 intravenous drugs are prepared in clinical areas each year, and, around 
700,000 are prepared in aseptic pharmacy departments.  
 
2.1  The opportunities for drug error in NHS Scotland 
The opportunities for any type of drug error in this common procedure are 
numerous. There are potential errors of: wrong drug, wrong dose, wrong diluent, 
wrong route, or precipitate formation, poor mixing with administration of foreign 
body, for example, glass, or undissolved drug  (Maki and Ringer 1991, Munro et al. 
2003, Crowley et al. 2004, Cousins et al. 2005). There are also potential 
administration errors of wrong patient, too rapid an administration rate or air-
embolism (Santell and Cousins 2005). Drug errors are acknowledged to be a 
significant worldwide healthcare problem (Smith 2004: 14). High-profile drug 
errors, which resulted in deaths, have prompted government ministers to take 
action and produce policies with an objective to cut drug errors by 40% (Dept. of 
Health 2000). Throughout NHSScotland it is policy that all drug errors, including 
near misses, should be reported. However, the Audit Commission acknowledges 
that because of variations in definitions, reporting arrangements and actual 
reporting, the true number of drug errors is unknown (Audit Commission 2001: 20). 
The national focus of drug error prevention thus far has been on the most common 
and obvious types of errors, and those that have the highest profile, for example, 
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the erroneous lethal intrathecal injection of vincristine (Dept. of Health 2000, Audit 
Commission 2001). 
 
The focus of this thesis is another category of drug error that is less obvious - a 
failure of asepsis - which like all the errors listed previously, is potentially fatal 
(Vidal et al. 2003, Vonberg and Gastmeier 2007). This thesis will present several 
related arguments for the need for research into a systematic analysis of the safety 
and reliability of aseptic preparation of drugs in clinical care settings. Before 
presenting these arguments, an explanation of the mechanisms of asepsis failure 
will be given.  
 
2.2      Asepsis failure: the mechanisms and micro-organisms  
A failure of asepsis at any stage during preparation may lead to contamination of 
the infusate and potentially to the patient developing a blood stream infection 
(BSI). Pathogenesis arises following direct infusion of micro-organisms into the 
blood stream, and/or, low level contamination of infusate causing intra-luminal 
contamination of the catheter enabling biofilm formation with a BSI arising at some 
later date (Linares et al. 1985, Donlan 2001).  Biofilm forms on any surface in 
contact with moisture – including all medical devices. Biofilm development begins 
when infused micro-organisms adhere to the surface of the catheter and protect 
themselves by the production of extracellular polymers. These polymers protect 
the micro-organisms from not only antibiotics infused through the catheter, but also 
from phagocytes. Over time the biofilm increases in size and complexity and 
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eventually small numbers of micro-organisms float off from the catheter surface 
entering the blood stream and resulting in a BSI (Donlan 2001). In addition to 
causing a BSI, in a small proportion of patients, some micro-organisms will 
metastasise and cause infections in other organs, particularly the heart 
(Giamarellou 2002).    
 
The degree of contamination, and consequently patient ill health, will be dependent 
on three factors: 
o The type of micro-organisms that contaminate the infusate. 
o The extent to which the drug/diluent will support and encourage microbial 
growth.  
o The degree of microbial contamination, which is dependent on the number 
of organisms in the initial contamination and duration of infusion. 
Factors that mitigate against a BSI developing, including the use of a filter and the 
early removal of the catheter, will be discussed later. The three factors affecting 
the degree of contamination will be discussed individually: 
 
2.2.1 Micro-organisms and endotoxin  
A variety of micro-organisms can contaminate infusates and cause BSIs, including: 
Gram-negative micro-organisms, which are mainly part of the normal gut flora, 
other Gram-negative micro-organisms, which are mainly free living environmental 
micro-organisms, parasites that cause diseases such as malaria, and, most 
notably, blood borne viruses. Table 1 gives samples of the most common micro-
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organisms causing BSIs from infusates. The environmental Gram-negative micro-
organisms listed in Table 1 are renowned for their ability to grow well in 
nutritionally poor intravenous solutions  (Gilat et al. 1958, Felts et al. 1972, Maki 
and Martin 1975). Experimental laboratory studies have found that heavily 
contaminated infusates, (106 micro-organisms per ml) did not appear cloudy to the 
naked eye (Gilat et al. 1958, Felts et al. 1972, Maki and Martin 1975, Macias et al. 
2005). Consequently, for nurses preparing drugs there are no visual clues when 
infusates are contaminated. What this table further illustrates is that IR-BSI is not 
caused by a single organism; a consequence of which is that laboratory based 
surveillance and monitoring of the problem is extremely difficult and currently not 
done locally or nationally. 
 
Table 1    Common micro-organisms that cause IR-BSI 
Category Examples of micro-
organisms 
References 
Gram-negative bacilli 
Part of normal gut 
flora / found in 
environment 
Klebsiella spp 
Enterobacter spp 
Serratia spp 
(Felts et al. 1972, Maki and 
Martin 1975, Ostrowsky et al. 
2002, Siegman-Igra et al. 2005, 
Pan et al. 2006, Gillespie et al. 
2007) 
Environmental Gram- 
negative bacilli 
Mainly free living 
environmental micro-
organisms 
Stenotrophomonas 
maltophilia 
Burkholderia cepacia 
Non-aeroginosa 
pseudomonads  
 
(Felts et al. 1972, Hsueh et al. 
1998, Nasser et al. 2004, 
Centers for Disease Control 
2005, Centers for Disease 
Control 2006) 
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Table 1    Common micro-organisms that cause IR-BSI 
Gram-positive cocci  Staph. aureus  
Coagulase negative 
staphylococci 
(Krumholz et al. 1994, 
Kuehnert et al. 1997, Langevin 
et al. 1999) 
Parasites Plasmodium 
falciparum 
(Al-Saigul et al. 2000, Jain et 
al. 2005) 
 
Blood borne viruses 
(BBV) 
Hepatitis B virus 
Hepatitis C virus 
 
(Katzenstein et al. 1999, 
Centers for Disease Control 
2003, Williams et al. 2004, 
Macedo de Oliveira et al. 2005) 
 
The durability of these micro-organisms is further illustrated by researchers who 
found that Pseudomonas putida in heparinised saline could survive refrigeration for 
up to 35 days (Perz et al. 2005) and Burkholderia cepacia has the ability to grow in 
distilled water (Spencer 1995). These environmental micro-organisms that cause 
infusate contamination can arise from periodic contamination of the potable water 
supply and subsequent contamination of the healthcare environment (Koerner et 
al. 1997, Rogues et al. 2007, Cholley et al. 2008, Livni et al. 2008).  
 
When micro-organisms, in particular the Gram-negative bacilli, are destroyed they 
still pose a further risk by releasing endotoxin from the break-up of their cell wall. 
Once in the blood stream endotoxin can induce a high fever, reduce blood 
pressure and cause disruption in the coagulation of the blood, leading to possible 
haemorrhaging within the tissues. Endotoxin is considered to be the principal 
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component of Gram-negative BSI responsible for initiating the patho-physiological 
processes resulting in the clinical features of Gram-negative sepsis and septic 
shock. Endotoxin can be present in an infusate in the absence of live micro-
organisms (Chapman and Iredell 2008).  
 
Gram-positive micro-organisms such as Staphylococci spp, which are the main 
cause of catheter-related BSIs, (Coello et al. 2003) can - and do - contaminate 
infusates (van Grafhorst et al. 2002). However, possibly because of their inability 
to grow in the infusates they have been implicated less as a source of IR-BSI 
(Sitges-Serra et al. 1984, Langevin et al. 1999, van Grafhorst et al. 2002). The 
vascular catheter however, can be seeded with Gram positive micro-organisms 
through contamination of the infusate. The extent to which this causes catheter 
related BSI at some time in the future is unknown. 
 
2.2.2 Drugs that support and encourage microbial growth 
Some drugs containing lipids, such as propofol, have been implicated in many 
outbreaks (Veber et al. 1994, Bennett et al. 1995, Halkes and Snow 2003, 
Trepanier and Lessard 2003). Lipid drugs can temporarily inhibit phagocytosis, and 
this, combined with any microbial contamination, can have a serious outcomes for 
patients (Krumholz et al. 1994, Langevin et al. 1999). 
 
Heparin, a frequently used anticoagulant, can pose an infusate risk in several 
ways. Heparin is given as a long-term infusion (12-24 hours) or as a flush to 
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maintain catheter patency following administration of a drug. Most importantly 
however, heparin supports microbial growth. Heparin has been implicated in 
several IR-BSI outbreaks when given as a continuous infusion, as well as when 
administered as a flush solution to maintain a vascular device patency (Al-Saigul et 
al. 2000, Centers for Disease Control 2005, Siegman-Igra et al. 2005, Gershman 
et al. 2008, Yang et al. 2008, Blossom et al. 2009). There have even been reports 
of heparinsed antibiotic lock solutions being contaminated (Safdar and Maki 2006). 
 
2.2.3 The degree of microbial contamination   
The duration of the infusion, which includes the time from preparation to completed 
administration, can also influence when and if a BSI will occur (Krumholz et al. 
1994, Langford 2000). Longer administrations of infusions, over 12-24 hours, 
provide even very few micro-organisms with sufficient time to multiply to significant 
numbers thereby enabling a BSI to occur within the life-time of the infusion. As 
stated previously, rapid growth of some Gram-negative micro-organisms in 
infusion solutions has been demonstrated. One organism per ml of a Klebsiella 
spp inoculated into dextrose yielded a mean 1.11 X 105 micro-organisms per ml 
after 24 hours at room temperature (Maki and Martin 1975).  Similarly, very early 
on in infusion therapy, during an investigation into a case series of IR-BSIs, it was 
shown that 10-20 causative micro-organisms inoculated into Darrow’s solution at 
room temperature resulted in 6-8 million micro-organisms per ml 48 hours later 
(Gilat et al. 1958). Therefore, if an infusate is contaminated and administered over 
a 12-24 hour period, very few micro-organisms can proliferate and cause an IR-
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BSI within the lifetime of the infusion. The higher the inoculum, the earlier the IR-
BSI will manifest. Bolus infusions, or short duration infusions, with low level 
microbial contamination may not cause a IR-BSI immediately but, as stated 
previously, can contaminate the catheter surface and facilitate biofilm formation 
and, provided the catheter remains in situ, cause catheter-related BSI at a later 
date.  Thus it can be concluded that there is no safe level of microbial 
contamination of infusates.  
 
There are several possibly mechanisms for infusates to become contaminated in 
clinical care settings involving:  
• Cross-transmission from healthcare worker (HCW) to patient  
• Cross-transmission from patient-to-patient via HCW 
• Cross-transmission from the environment-to-patient due to HCW actions or 
inactions.   
 
These mechanisms are described in Table 2. What this table also illustrates is that 
IR-BSI can (and has been) caused by contamination arising from a variety of 
sources. Additionally, when such contamination occurs it is not easily detectable to 
the person preparing the infusate. 
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Table 2   Infusate contamination cross-transmission 
Cross-transmission from HCW to Patient 
A HCW infected with a BBV cuts his/her finger, which 
bleeds into an open ampoule. The drug along with the 
BBV is then drawn up and administered to the patient. 
(Parker 1995) 
Hand (artificial nail) contamination during preparation, 
contaminating the infusate directly. 
(Gordin et al. 2007) 
Cross-transmission from Patient-to-Patient via HCW 
“Double-dipping” A needle used on a patient infected with 
a BBV or a parasite, enters a drug vial. The drug (and 
BBV or parasite) is then subsequently used on one or 
more patients. 
(Al-Saigul et al. 
2000, Centers for 
Disease Control 
2003, Jain et al. 
2005, Macedo de 
Oliveira et al. 2005) 
Reuse of the same administration sets which have 
become contaminated on serial patients. 
(Halkes and Snow 
2003) 
Cross-contamination during processing of radio-
pharmaceutical specimens used for myocardial perfusion 
studies – transmission of BBVs. 
(Patel et al. 2006) 
Cross-transmission from the environment to patients due to 
HCW (actions / inactions) or environmental limitations 
Contamination during preparation, either from an 
environmental source, such as, splash contamination from 
a tap, contaminated surface used to prepare drugs, poor 
hand hygiene or poor aseptic technique, resulting in either 
a single patient episode, or if the contamination involves a 
vial which is subsequently reused, then in multiple 
patients becoming infected. 
(Hsueh et al. 1998, 
Centers for Disease 
Control 2005, Jain 
et al. 2005, Centers 
for Disease Control 
2006, Pan et al. 
2006, Gillespie et 
al. 2007). 
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Table 2   Infusate contamination cross-transmission 
Contamination of the drug from the outside of the drug vial 
or ampoule. 
(Zacher et al. 1991) 
Failure to, or inadequate, decontamination of the hub pre-
administration of the drug resulting in infusion of the 
micro-organisms contaminating the hub, as well as the 
infusate. 
(Sitges-Serra et al. 
1984, Sitges-Serra 
et al. 1985, Sitges-
Serra et al. 1985, 
Doit et al. 2004, 
Nasser et al. 2004, 
Livni et al. 2008) 
Active contamination of an access point by use of 
contaminated antiseptics for aseptic vascular catheter 
procedures, that is, contaminating the hubs before 
infusing the drug. 
(Heo et al. 2008) 
Illegal tampering of hanging infusates to get access to 
opiates introducing micro-organisms in to the infusate in 
the process. 
(Ostrowsky et al. 
2002) 
Intrinsic contamination (that occurs in the manufacturer’s premises) is not being 
considered in this thesis except where evidence from intrinsic contamination can 
be extrapolated and related to extrinsic contamination. 
 
2.3      Chapter 2 summary  
In this chapter it has been shown that the opportunities for asepsis failure when 
preparing intravenous infusions are vast. Additionally, some of the micro-
organisms that cause IR-BSI have unique properties that enable them to grow well 
in nutritionally poor solutions, without visible detection. Factors such as the size of 
contamination and duration of infusions can determine whether an IR-BSI occurs 
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during the life-time of the infusion or at a later date. The specifics of cross-
transmission as reported in the literature and in Table 2 show how IR-BSI can 
occur. The next chapter will further elucidate from the literature evidence that 
justifies the need for additional research into the system of aseptic preparation of 
intravenous drugs in clinical care settings. 
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3 Justification for this Research Proposal 
This chapter will set out and discuss the evidence supporting the need for a study 
into procedures for the aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs. These reasons 
are summarised as:  
 
• There appears to be a clear hazard to patients from infusate contamination  
• It is difficult to recognise infusate contamination as a cause of BSI  
• The opportunities for asepsis failure are numerous  
• Current national guidance is extensive yet insufficiently focused on asepsis 
failure with no requirement for ongoing quality control  
• The system of aseptic preparation, on paper at least, is extremely complex.  
 
3.1      Hazard to patients from infusates 
The assessment of a clear hazard to patients comes in the main from, published 
case reports, outbreak reports, systematic reviews of outbreaks and 
epidemiological evidence. A systematic review of worldwide drug-related 
outbreaks between 1990 and 2005, identified 128 reports of non-blood product 
related outbreaks involving 2,250 patients (Vonberg and Gastmeier 2007). In these 
outbreaks the majority of contamination occurred in drugs prepared in near-patient 
areas. A significant number of these outbreaks (64/128) involved multi-dose vials 
(or vials that were designated single-use being used more than once). The 
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drugs/infusions that are most commonly reported as the source of the 
contamination are heparin (flush or infusion) and lipid drugs/solutions such as 
propofol or intralipid. The mortality from outbreaks of contaminated substances 
varied in the review from 0 – 25% (Vonberg and Gastmeier 2007).  This is 
probably still an underestimate as many of the patients infected with a BBV, which 
may result in a fatal outcome over time, would not have been included in these 
data.   
 
Outbreaks are perhaps the most visible consequence of infusate contamination 
and IR-BSI. A recent investigation into an outbreak of Enterobacter aerogenes 
BSIs in a neonatal intensive care unit focused quickly on infusates as the possible 
cause. This was because one of the patients had only been born approximately 2 
hours before becoming symptomatic, and the only intervention in that time had 
been an infusion (Narayan et al. 2009). In all in this outbreak, a total of 10 babies 
developed IR-BSI over a 14 day period.  Three babies died. The repeated use of 
saline bags as a multi-dose diluent, contaminated with Enterobacter aerogenes 
was thought to be the origin of the outbreak (Narayan et al. 2009). That the 
potential for outbreaks is almost ubiquitous was revealed in another study of 1,093 
ward prepared infusates, which found a contamination rate of 0.9%; and two cases 
of IR-BSIs (Macias et al. 2008). The authors concluded that ‘endemic infusate 
contamination may be a present danger’ (Macias et al. 2008: 48). It is the 
environmental Gram-negative micro-organisms detailed in Table 1 that were the 
commonest pathogens in this study (Siegman-Igra et al. 2005).   
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There are additional reports that suggest infusate contamination may be implicated 
in causing IR-BSI, although causality was not demonstrated. Several authors have 
reported an increase in Gram-negative sepsis after antibiotics for Gram-positive 
infections (Victor et al. 1994, Ubeda et al. 1998, van Houten et al. 2001). This 
could be contamination of the infusate (the antibiotic), or the heparin flush used 
after antibiotic infusion to prevent clotting in the catheter lumen, or some, as yet 
unidentified, associated procedure. It is not necessarily a weakness on the part of 
the outbreak investigators or of the studies in not confirming the causes; often by 
the time the organism is identified in a patient’s blood, the infusate is no longer 
available for sampling. 
 
There are other outbreak reports in which there was one category of infection 
outcome (BSI), where the organism was a Gram-negative bacillus or poly-
microbial Gram negative bacilli, (often of an environmental source), where the 
patients were either in an intensive care or haematology-oncology unit, where the 
infections were associated with vascular access device usage and poor aseptic 
practices were found, for example, identified use of multi-dose vials and no other 
plausible transmission routes found (Boktour et al. 2006, Kilic et al. 2007, Erbay et 
al. 2008, Kallen et al. 2008, Kilic et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2008, Mikulska et al. 2009, 
Nadkarni et al. 2009). These reports implicate infusates as the access route for the 
micro-organisms gaining entry into the patients’ blood. One such example, an 
investigation into an outbreak of Alcaligenes xylosoxidans BSIs in an oncology 
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outpatient setting, identified gross breaches in infection prevention protocols 
including, insertion of catheters without gloves, storage of pre-filled syringes in the 
hood, use of open-undated multi-dose vials, storage of non-hygienic materials in 
the chemotherapy preparation hood and failure of routine hand washing (Kim et al. 
2008). In this outbreak, twelve patients acquired a BSI, nine before the 
investigation commenced (Kim et al. 2008). 
 
Evidence that hand contamination is not, as is usual, the main infection control 
suspect came in a study showing that the Gram-negative bacilli found on HCWs’ 
hands were not associated with those found in patients’ blood (Larson et al. 2005).  
 
The World Health Organization produced sound guidance on safe single-use 
injection devices; the document suggests that the problem of non-aseptic 
preparations is worldwide, not just affecting the third world (World Health 
Organization 2007). This is confirmed by a report on 4 large hepatitis B and 
hepatitis C virus outbreaks, affecting more than 350 people, resulting from what 
was classified as unsafe injection practices, which occurred in outpatient settings 
in the United States (Centers for Disease Control 2003).   
 
The final evidence that there is a clear hazard to patients from near-patient 
preparation comes from the epidemiological studies of the micro-organisms listed 
in Table 1. There is evidence from national centres and other epidemiologists that 
these micro-organisms have been increasing in recent years (Health Protection 
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Agency 2003, Vidal et al. 2003, Health Protection Agency 2005, Albrecht et al. 
2006, Wu et al. 2006, Health Protection Agency 2007).  
 
All of the studies in this section are relatively recent and many occur in modern 
health services. It is clear that BSIs as a consequence of asepsis failure and 
infusate contamination are life-threatening and current. The implication is that 
there is a clear hazard to patients’ safety from the status quo.   
 
3.2      Recognition of infusate contamination as a cause of BSI  
Despite the infusate-related outbreak reports discussed previously, it is often 
difficult to relate a BSI back to a contaminated infusate, particularly if the infusion 
has been completed. The contaminated substances outbreak review noted that 
contamination ‘might not even be noticed if only a few patients are affected on the 
ward’ (Vonberg et al. 2007: 19). It does not seem intuitive that BSIs caused by 
poor intravenous procedures could go relatively undetected. However, many of the 
patients who require intravenous infusates are already sick and are generally 
vulnerable to infections; the majority of BSIs occur in intensive care units, 
haematology or renal units (Edgeworth et al. 1999, Zaidi et al. 2001, Jugo et al. 
2002, Coello et al. 2003, Gulati et al. 2003, Ozkocaman et al. 2006). It seems that 
only something exceptional will alert staff to a possible contaminated infusate. A 4-
year review of BSIs and risk factors was undertaken when a cluster of BSIs was 
found to be associated with heparin pumps (Siegman-Igra et al. 2005). These 
researchers found that 6% (96 patients) had a BSI for which the only identified risk 
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factor was an intravenous catheter. In response to this study by Siegman-Igra et 
al. (2005), other investigators reported similar findings, that is, IV-heparin pump 
related BSIs in multiple patients (Peiris et al. 2006). 
 
Even more difficult to detect, however, is a delayed-onset IR-BSI. Infusate 
contamination can, as stated previously, cause biofilm production and 
consequently the time from infusion to symptoms extends. Investigations into a 
multi-state outbreak of Serratia marcescens found that the majority of 162 cases 
were identified within days of exposure although 2 patients developed IR-BSI 
weeks after exposure (Blossom et al. 2009). During one outbreak of BSIs caused 
by Alcaligenes xylosoxidans, the causative organisms was found in the  biofilm of 
catheters (Kim et al. 2008). That biofilm formation causes delayed-onset BSIs was 
demonstrated clearly during a multi-state outbreak of heparinised saline flush 
contaminated intrinsically (at the manufacturers) with Pseudomonas fluorescens. 
With 47 cases indentified the outbreak control team found the cause of the 
outbreak and instigated a product recall. The product recall was successful, 
however, a further 33 cases were identified post-product recall.  These delayed-
onset IR-BSI cases were identified between 84 and 421 days after their last 
exposure to the contaminated heparinised saline (Gershman et al. 2008).   
 
What the Gershman et al. (2008) study shows is that depending on the degree of 
infusate contamination, the time to symptom development varies, from instantly, to 
possibly several months after drugs have been administered. Therefore, unless 
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there is an identified contamination incident, such as occurred in the Gershman et 
al. (2008) outbreak, it can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to trace back 
contamination to a single contaminated infusate. The Gershman et al. (2008) 
outbreak report is not unique. During investigations into a poly-microbial outbreak 
of 27 IR-BSIs in an outpatient setting caused by contaminated saline bags used as 
multi-dose diluents (accessed via a dispensing valve), investigators found that the 
median time between date of last infusion and date of onset of symptoms was 5 
days [range 3-14] (Watson et al. 2005).  Rapid growth of micro-organisms pre-
administration and delayed-onset BSI was further demonstrated in investigations 
into a cluster of BSIs an outpatient setting, caused by the contaminated artificial 
fingernail of one nurse. The nail was used to open a vial of heparin. The heparin 
flushes were all made up at the same time but administered through the day. 
Patients who received the flush in the afternoon were symptomatic immediately 
where as those who received the flush in the morning were symptomatic over 
several days (Gordin et al. 2007). Others have also reported the phenomena of 
delayed-onset BSI following infusate contamination (Souza Dias et al. 2008, Mauri 
et al. 2009). 
 
 
3.3      The opportunities for asepsis failure  
With approximately three million drugs prepared in near patient-areas in Scotland’s 
hospitals every year, and with no requirement for continuing quality control of the 
infusates, the nurses or the environments, the opportunity for asepsis failures in 
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performing this procedure are vast. Even a 0.5% contamination rate would mean a 
150,000 contaminated infusates administered in Scotland each year with an 
unknown number causing IR-BSI. 
 
It is difficult to estimate precisely how much contamination occurs; however, 
several studies that have looked at different parts of the procedure indicate that 
asepsis failures are common. In a reliable, if small, environmental study, which 
followed standard microbiology methods (using air sampling and contact plates), 
researchers found that 10/10 surfaces where drugs were prepared in near-patient 
areas were contaminated (Beaney and Goode 2003). In a systematic review of 
published studies on all errors in intravenous drug preparation and administration, 
poor aseptic technique, and environmental contamination were noted to be 
frequently found (Crowley et al. 2004). Many of the micro-organisms listed in Table 
1 can survive for long periods in the inanimate environment (Kramer et al. 2006), 
as well as in fluids (Langford 2000). A microbiological contamination rate of 0.9% 
was found in a study of in-use of 227 multi-dose vials (Mattner and Gastmeier 
2004). In one outbreak involving 8 children, Burkholderia cepacia was identified in 
condensate in the underside of plastic stoppers covering infusate vials. This vial 
condensate contained 105 micro-organisms per ml of Burkholderia cepacia (Doit et 
al. 2004). Adequate decontamination of the vial tops before withdrawing the 
contents would have prevented contamination of the infusate, and the patients’ IR-
BSIs.  
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In a large (over 950 syringes sampled), well-designed study significant differences 
were identified in syringe contamination rates comparing infusates prepared in a 
pharmacy suite and in intensive care units. Syringes prepared from 10-ml 
ampoules in the intensive care units had a median contamination rate of 22%, 
compared with pharmacy-prepared contamination rates of 1% (p<0.001) (van 
Grafhorst et al. 2002). Staphylococci were the main organisms identified in the 
study; the authors noted that infusate contamination might be the source of 
subsequent staphylococcal catheter-related BSI. Contamination rates were much 
lower when glass vials were used – this was postulated to be due to vials requiring 
fewer manipulations (van Grafhorst et al. 2002). In another well designed study 
which observed 100 nurses preparing infusates, drawing up fluids, and a further 
100 nurses preparing infusates with several manipulations, Worthington et al. 
(2001) were able to demonstrate considerable variation in aseptic technique and 
significant contamination rates (8%). Higher infusate contamination rates were 
associated with greater required manipulations in the procedure (Worthington et al. 
2001).  A systematic review of microbial contamination of infusates prepared in 
clinical areas identified an overall 5% contamination rate (95% CI; 0.8% to 13.1%) 
(Austin and Elia 2009).  Most conclusively, however, in a multi-centre (3 European 
countries including the UK), non-participant observational study, researchers found 
at least one deviation from aseptic technique in each of 299 observations (Cousins 
et al. 2005). Although there was the possibility of observer bias – different 
observers in different countries - what should be noted was that this was a 
volunteer population that had agreed to being observed. Consequently, this could 
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be an underestimate of general aseptic performance with the possibility that non-
volunteers might not perform ‘so well’ and that, when unobserved, practice might 
be different. The study did not identify which aspects of the aseptic technique 
procedure were missed. In conclusion therefore, not only are the opportunities for 
asepsis failure, subsequent infusate contamination and BSI as a consequence 
immense, whenever aseptic practice has been observed the performed 
procedures was less than optimal to prevent contamination. 
 
3.4     Current national guidance  
A variety of specialists, organisations and authorities have produced guideline 
documents with the objective of increasing patient safety and reducing the risks of 
BSI as a consequence of asepsis failure (NHS Executive 1996, Audit Commission 
2001, O'Grady et al. 2002, Royal Pharmaceutical Society 2005, Nursing and 
Midwifery Council 2006, National Patient Safety Agency 2007, Pratt et al. 2007, 
World Health Organization 2007, Healthcare Commission 2007a). However, for the 
majority of these documents, asepsis failure prevention is not the only, or more 
importantly the main, objective. As a consequence the lack of coverage and 
degree of importance of asepsis failure emphasised in these documents appears 
insufficient to achieve patient safety.  
 
3.4.1 Infection control guidance 
The United Kingdom’s Dept of Health commissioned epic guidelines on the 
prevention of central venous catheter infections ignores infusate contamination 
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entirely in its synopsis of the causes of central line infections (Pratt et al. 2001, 
Pratt et al. 2007). The search terms used to produce these evidence-based 
guidelines do not include ‘infusate’, and there is no discussion of infusate-related 
BSI. The US Centres for Disease Control (CDC) guidelines state in the section on 
pathogenesis that ‘rarely infusate contamination leads to CR-BSI [catheter-related 
blood stream infection]’ (O’Grady et al. 2002: 5). Although the guideline cites 293 
references in total, there is only one reference provided to support this statement: 
and this is from a book published in 1982. Neither of these two guidelines, from 
which many local hospital policies are based, appears to fully recognise the 
problem of asepsis failure causing infusate contamination. Infusates are 
recognised as a more common cause of sepsis in the developing world (Hsueh et 
al. 1998, Verghese et al. 1998, Wu et al. 2006). To illustrate how this national 
guidance is duplicated through current research, in a meta-analysis of randomised 
control trials of the efficacy of vancomyin-containing lock or flush, a group of 
researchers (Safdar and Maki 2006) failed to identify the contamination risks from 
flush solutions (Worthington et al. 2001, Centers for Disease Control 2006, Held et 
al. 2006).  Because their meta-analysis only included randomised control trials it 
excluded outbreak reports of contaminated antibiotic-lock solutions causing 
infusate-related BSI (Held et al. 2006); including the contamination reports would 
have added critical information to the evaluation.  
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3.4.2 Pharmaceutical guidance 
The first report on aseptic preparations in the NHS was The Breckenridge Report 
published in 1976, which identified several problems and variation in training, 
documentation, information, and most crucially stated that ‘strict asepsis could 
never be assured in a ward setting’ Zavery et al. (2005: 3).  The Audit Commission 
(2001: 64) recommended in 2001 that ‘…the practice of making-up aseptic 
preparations on hospital wards should be stopped’. This recommendation has 
never been accepted as such. Government health departments have not issued 
mandates, for example, Health Department Letters to chief executives telling them 
to stop the practice in their facilities.  
 
The Healthcare Commission (2007a) advocates regular competency checking for 
staff, regular reviews of training and regular quality control for those aseptic 
pharmacies that are not licensed – without ever specifying what is meant by the 
terms ‘regular’. Also, there is no recommendation for quality control of clinical care 
settings. In this guidance, Trusts are correctly advised to source out ‘high-risk’ 
medicines yet in the document there is no definition of what is meant by ‘high-risk’ 
(Healthcare Commission 2007a). The Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) in an 
A-Z sheet on medicines management, does not include hand hygiene or the term 
aseptic technique (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2006). Another guideline on the 
safe and secure handling of medicines, includes sections on intravenous drugs 
and their preparation, but does not include warnings on multi-dose vials, heparin or 
advocate hand hygiene (Royal Pharmaceutical Society 2005).  The need for 
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aseptic preparation is specified in this document, yet precisely how to do this is not 
discussed.  
 
Pharmaceutical companies provide information leaflets with every drug supplied 
for intravenous infusion. There are no national standards with regard to the 
information on what is required to ensure that the drug is aseptically prepared. The 
drug information leaflet can be written primarily for the patient as the audience, or 
the HCW. Some leaflets have separate patient sections and HCW sections. There 
is no specific section on any leaflet dedicated to the HCW who will compound the 
drug. The information on HCW risks provided by drug companies was examined 
closely in this study and was found to be in general difficult to read and with limited 
infection prevention information. 
 
There are standards, licensing and monitoring arrangements for infusates 
produced in aseptic pharmacy suites, as well as the environments in which they 
are produced (NHS Executive 1996). However, the problem is that no such 
standards and guidelines exist for drugs prepared in clinical care settings [in 
England]. In 2002, a good practice statement was produced for the NHS in 
Scotland (CRAG 2002). This document includes a definition of ‘high-risk’, ‘where 
the hazard associated with preparation is likely to have serious consequences for 
the patient or operator’ (CRAG 2002: 6). Examples of high-risk drugs that should 
be made up in an aseptic suite include cytotoxic, intralipids and intrathecal drugs. 
Not all high-risk drugs are recognised in this document, of note heparin, long-term 
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infusions and multi-dose vials are not included. The document advocates a multi-
professional risk assessment of each clinical area where drug preparation is to 
take place. There is a recommendation for ‘planned, regular, audit of personnel, 
environments and procedures involved in near patient areas’ and a time 
specification, every 12-18 months (CRAG 2002: 19). Although the CRAG (2002) 
guidance had the objective of devising good practice statements related to, 
amongst other things, the environment, and recommends planned regular audit of 
the environment, there are no standards for a safe environment provided within the 
document (CRAG 2002). The authors conclude that research is required to 
establish validated environment standards (CRAG 2002). Microbiological testing of 
the environment and of infusates is also not advocated. This document is clearly a 
big step forward; however, the extent to which these recommendations have been 
implemented, if at all, is unknown.   
 
This review of national guidance from a variety of national bodies therefore does 
not provide clear guidance on the prevention of asepsis failure.   
 
3.5      Aseptic preparation procedures 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in a work competence statement for 
the preparation of injectable medicines, details 20 actions, incorporating a further 
33 points that should be taken prior to each drug being prepared and administered. 
As for hand hygiene, it merely advocates compliance with local policy (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2007).  Complexity in any system increases the risk of 
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failure by increasing the opportunities for failure. If a procedure has 50 steps, and 
each step is completed correctly 95% of the time, then only 6% of the procedures 
will be completed correctly (Croteau and Schyve 2000: 185). The 53 points 
identified by the NPSA omit the 6 steps in hand hygiene, and if hand hygiene is 
required a further twice during the procedure, then the procedure for the 
preparation and administration of IV drugs is, according to the NPSA at least 68 
steps long – and very complex. Although the converse is also true, an inadequate 
number of steps can also lead to system failure; the emphasis needs to be how 
simple the procedure can be whilst still containing sufficient steps to negate 
omission of a critical step.  
 
In addition to the complexity derived from the number of procedural steps, 
individual drugs can have particular mixing and administration requirements. There 
are risks associated with cross-reaction and precipitation, which means that for 
any given drug requiring a 68 step preparation, there will be additional and specific 
variations in practice required for safe administration. 
 
With regard to patient safety during intravenous drug preparation procedures, 
there needs to be quality control and systems analysis to ensure that the 
procedures are effective, clear and as simple as possible. Additionally, any 
required standards must be capable of being achieved with the available resources 
(Pronovost et al. 2006). 
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Apart from the complexity of the procedure, there appears to be a good deal of 
advocacy of aseptic technique without clarification of precisely what it is – though 
this has been specified outwith a national guideline (Rowley 2001, Rowley and 
Sinclair 2004). The NPSA competency statement states that ‘a non-touch 
technique is avoiding touching areas where bacterial contamination may be 
introduced’ NPSA (2007: 3). The aseptic non-touch technique advocated by 
Rowley (2001) also focuses the procedure on non-contamination of key parts. 
However, as already alluded to, contamination can occur with an aseptic non-
touch technique if the antiseptic or drug is already contaminated, or if splash 
contamination occurs during the preparation of the procedure – regardless of a 
non-touch technique (CRAG 2002).  
 
With regard to the procedure itself therefore, there appears to be a lack of clarity of 
exactly what aseptic preparation requirements are. Worryingly for nurses, in a 
pseudo light-hearted analysis of the cause of infusate contamination of regional 
analgesia akin to a game of Cluedo®, one editor wrote: “The nurse unwittingly did 
it, in the pre-induction room, with a contaminated infusate” (Horlocker et al. 2008: 
1095). Unwittingly or not, this situation is not acceptable to either the nurse or the 
patient. 
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3.6      Chapter 3 summary 
The discussions in this chapter have identified that research into the system of 
aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs is warranted because:  
• There appears to be a clear hazard to patient safety from the status quo  
• It is difficult to identify infusate contamination as a cause of BSI 
• The opportunities for asepsis failure are numerous  
• Current national guidance is not focused on asepsis failure  
• The system of aseptic preparation is extremely complex. 
 
Research into the aseptic preparation of drugs in clinical care settings with the 
objective of understanding the systems involved, their reliability and the error-
prone potential were clearly indicated from this review.  
 
The next chapter explores theories of risk and error causation to aid the study 
design. 
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4 The Development of a Methodological Framework for 
this research 
The key to understanding the system aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs is 
understanding the risks and the errors inherent within the procedure, and what is 
done, or not done, to negate them. Policies and procedures are underpinned by 
broader theoretical models and even when they are claims to ‘theoretical’ 
approaches this is rarely the case. Therefore, in this chapter there will be a brief 
discussion of the strengths, weaknesses and relevance of different approaches 
and theories related to risk and error for their use within a methodological 
framework for this thesis.  Although risk perception and risk assessment are 
considered relevant to the thesis, the chapter concludes with the assessment that 
the methodological approach best suited to assess the system of aseptic 
preparation of intravenous drugs is a systems approach to human error, combined 
with high-reliability theory, patient safety and human factors approaches. 
 
To begin, there needs to be an understanding of what is meant by risk and error as 
used in this thesis. Whereas a hazard can be considered as anything that might 
cause harm, a risk is the probability that harm (human or mechanical) actually 
results from the hazard (Health and Safety Executive 2006: 2). An error is an 
action that could lead to harm being realised. Risks and errors are therefore 
closely inter-linked. There are two paradigms related to the perception of risk by 
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individuals, a) the psychometric and b) the social and cultural which will be 
discussed along with an introduction on the societal perception of risk, including 
the relevance of a managerial approach to the thesis.  
 
4.1      The risk society 
It has been argued that there is a natural and inevitable transformation of an 
industrial society to a risk society as a consequence of the production of hazards 
beyond which society is prepared to accept (Beck 1996).  What results after 
hazards and dangers become recognised is ‘the task of redefining previously 
attained standards (of responsibility, safety, control, damage limitation and 
distribution of the consequences of loss), with reference to potential dangers’ Beck 
(1996: 29).  This can also be seen in healthcare settings related to infection 
prevention. An increase of healthcare associated infections emerged as a 
consequence of ever more risky ‘industrialised’ healthcare interventions, which 
developed without sufficient safeguards and controls. Through personal 
experience and press reports these infections became visible to the public. 
Politicians were made aware that the pubic viewed these infections as 
unacceptable and avoidable. Other healthcare tragedies, such as the increased 
mortality following cardiac surgery in Bristol, have resulted in a similar reactions 
(Dept. of Health 2001). The response from the UK Departments of Health has 
been the setting of standards, targets and the mandatory publishing of outcome 
rates, for example, surgical site infections and rates of Clostridium difficile 
infection. In addition, Departments of Health are now in pursuit of a desirable, if 
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perhaps, unattainable ‘zero tolerance’ to negative healthcare outcomes (Duerden 
2009, Warye and Granato 2009). The procedure discussed in this thesis is as yet 
in the ‘industrial state’ and will remain there until as Beck (1996: 29) states ‘the 
problems produced by it exceed the basis of societal conceptions of security’.  
Perceived risk of IR-BSI is, for this procedure, relevant to the HCW in that the 
patient is probably unaware there is an infection risk. The degree to which the 
HCWs perceives the risk to the patient of an IR-BSI, or a personal risk as a result 
of the consequences (disciplinary and legal) that a contaminated infusate could 
result and be traced back to their procedure, is unknown. The concept of a 
transforming society in respect of risk, although not of direct utility to the 
methodological framework of this thesis, provides a useful understanding of the 
position of aseptic drug preparation with regard to detectable and perceived risks. 
As an alternative to the HCWs’ perceptions of risk a managerial approach, requires 
evaluation.  
 
4.1.1 A managerial approach: high, mid and low level 
An illustration of the move from an industrialised society to a risk society is given in 
the investigations into major catastrophes, such as Piper Alpha, Three-Mile Island 
and The Herald of Free Enterprise which revealed the degree to which 
management acts and decisions directly and indirectly contributed to the events 
(Kemeny et al. 1979, Pate-Cornell 1993, Hurst 1998).  As a consequence, 
legislation to make corporate leaders personally accountable was introduced 
(Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007). In a review of the 
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role of managerial leadership in determining workplace safety, O’Dea et al. (2003), 
suggest that although the moral case for safety has been established, the financial 
one has not. Safety will not gain primacy whilst it continues to compete for 
attention with production, costs and other targets.  There have been arguments put 
forward that attention should be directed more on leaders to improve their 
behaviours with a consequent hope of improving patient safety (Flin and Yule 
2004).  At the various level of management, high, middle or low, there are different 
responsibilities. For example, high-level management might set the overall 
objective and a budget. Middle and lower management levels will be responsible 
for seeing the object is reached and within the budget. The chosen approach for 
this thesis is not, however, managerial. This is because although managers / 
leaders clearly have a direct and indirect influence in the achievement of corporate 
goals and safety, in relation to this thesis, the problem has yet to be significantly 
recognised as such by healthcare professionals and as a consequence it can not 
therefore be expected to be so acknowledged by their non-clinical managers.  
 
Having briefly discussed risk in the context of society as a whole, and a possible 
managerial approach, an evaluation of the anthropological (social and cultural 
paradigm) approaches to understanding risk will now be given. 
 
4.2      The social approach to risk  
The behaviour of the HCWs in relation to how they undertake the aseptic 
procedure can alter infection risks. These risks could arise not as a consequence 
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of objective data within the system, but more as a consequence of choice of the 
individual or collective HCWs.  It has been argued that risk can be best understood 
as a social construct (Gabe 1995: 11). As stated previously, those perceiving risk 
as a consequence of this procedure will be those performing it. The procedure 
could be collectively perceived by HCWs and thus performed as at a social level. 
For example, if the lead nurse emphasises that the infection risk is so low as to be 
insignificant and does not complete accepted aseptic steps, junior nurses are likely 
to do similar especially, if there is no accessible evidence that this lax approach 
causes any detectable patient harm.    
 
Models have been developed to understand and explain behaviour by reference to 
the individual’s perceptions of the involved risks. Such approaches have been 
used in infection control. The Health Belief Model has been applied to try to 
understand why HCWs hand hygiene practices were low, and whether, by 
understanding risk perceptions, better strategies to improve compliance could be 
devised (Pittet 2004). The understanding that was gained from the application of 
this social construct assisted in the recognition and development of the World 
Health Organization’s (WHO) hand hygiene guidance, the purpose of which was to 
inform those who promote hand hygiene of the most likely approaches to 
successfully alter attitudes and behaviour of staff towards hand hygiene (Pittet et 
al. 2009). 
 
 60 
Understanding HCWs’ beliefs of the risk will be important in this study. Although 
the behaviour of HCWs may be partially socially constructed, the procedure itself 
contains objective data that could have greater impact on performance and the risk 
to the patient of receiving an IR-BSI. This objective data includes the environment, 
the equipment and information available to the HCW; therefore as a consequence, 
using a socially constructed model would be inadequate by itself to determine how 
the system works.  
 
4.3      Cultural Theory 
The Cultural Theory (of risk) originated from the work of anthropologist Mary 
Douglas (Douglas 1992). Cultural theorists recognise that culture is ‘part of the 
essential nature of an organisation’ (Cooke 2009: 261). Culture is considered to be 
influenced by two dimensions, the degree of hierarchy, known as the ‘Grid’ and the 
degree of social cohesion ‘Group’. Different types of grid-group values result in 
different perceptions of risk and different behaviours when dealing with them. For 
example, if an organisation had a high grid and low group position, it would result 
in one with strong organisation control, but where individuals were isolated with 
few shared values.  Whilst Cultural Theory is a successful means of understanding 
how and why individuals and organisations are structured and behave as they do 
towards various risks, for this thesis, it will not aid in identifying what the system is 
per se as it omits an objective assessment of the risks from the built environment, 
the drugs and from the behaviours of the HCWs therein. Discussions on 
measuring safety culture and climate will be discussed later. 
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Having assessed the relevance of the social and cultural paradigms to this thesis, 
the second, the psychometric paradigm, will now be evaluated. 
 
4.4      Psychological approaches to risk and its measurement 
The psychological approach to risk focuses on individuals perceptions of risk 
rather than the social and cultural environment in which risk perceptions are 
formed’ (Abraham 2009). The psychometric measurement of risk perception, 
emerged as a means of understanding the variations of risk as perceived by the 
lay public and scientists (Abraham 2009). Key findings amongst the work on risk 
perception were that: 
o Risk perception could be measured and predicted.  
o The perception and toleration of risk by individuals was found to be 
associated with, amongst other variables, the degree of benefit gained from 
the risk and the degree to which the risk was voluntary (Slovic et al. 2004). 
[For example, car drivers take risks every time they get in a car, but these 
risks are outweighed by the personal benefits of driving a car. Conversely, 
even thought the risk of a nuclear accident is much lower than the risk of 
accident from driving a car, taking that risk is not in the control of the 
individual, and consequently deemed less acceptable to them].  
 
Risk perception measurements are subjective; they are relevant to this thesis as 
HCWs’ behaviour may be dependent on the perceived risk of an IR-BSI to the 
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patient, the perceived risk of an IR-BSI being traced to their performance and the 
perceived benefit of aseptic technique to negate the risk. However, prior to 
identifying these subjective perceptions of risk, there is a requirement to identify 
the objective elements in the system which may impact more greatly on the 
outcomes of the procedure, that is, sterile or non-sterile infusates. Other than the 
subjective assessments of perceived risk, there are objective measures of risk that 
are used in risk management and risk reduction. The utility of these approaches 
will now be discussed. 
  
4.5      Risk assessment methods 
It has been argued that decisions about risk and safety involve choices between 
alternatives (Fischhoff et al. 1981). In order to make these choices there needs to 
be assessment; various assessment methods have evolved to enable people to 
make the best choices. For the process of aseptic drug preparation, assessments 
need to be cognisant of: what level of environmental and procedure contamination 
precautions are required to achieve a sterile infusate, or at least an infusate that is 
unlikely to cause harm to patients. This thesis is asking, in effect, if the procedure 
of aseptic intravenous drug administration has an acceptable level of risk for both 
patients and the HCWs who perform it. An understanding of the objective methods 
used to evaluate risk is therefore, of service to this work. The specific question of 
whether aseptic preparation as it is currently performed is safe, or at an acceptable 
safety level, is akin to the generic question: ‘how safe is safe enough?’, asked by 
Fischhoff et al. (1981: 6) and the logical follow-on question: ‘how can an 
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acceptable risk level can be determined?’ According to Fischhoff et al. (1981: 53) 
risk assessments should be based on seven specific criteria. These criteria are 
whether the modality is: comprehensive, logically sound, practical, open to 
evaluation, politically acceptable, compatible with institutions and conducive to 
learning. Fischhoff et al. (1981) also asserts that all methods of risk assessment 
can be divided into three types: Professional Judgement, Bootstrapping and 
Formal Analysis. A brief explanation of these types and their applicability to this 
thesis given the criteria above are summarised as follows:  
Professional judgement relies on the experience and expertise of 
professionals who use the process. Although professional judgements are 
most-considered most trustworthy for routine events, they are criticised for 
not including judgements of those who are receiving the outputs of the 
procedure, in this case the patients  (Fischhoff et al. 1981: 78). For aseptic 
drug preparation procedures there is not just one group of health 
professionals involved. All healthcare specialities involve HCWs who 
prepare and infuse intravenous drugs as an integral part of whatever health 
speciality they are from. Although present in every ward and clinical area, 
there is no single group of intravenous drug specialists in Scotland who 
‘own the process’ and who hence make the professional risk decisions. 
Decisions on who will prepare the infusions and what equipment they are 
allowed to use, appear to lie more with health service managers who govern 
the procedures’ budget rather than the professionals who perform the 
procedure. Hence professional judgement alone as a method of assessing 
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risk-decisions is insufficient for this thesis, but may contribute to an 
understanding of the issues. 
 
Bootstrapping assumes ‘that an adjustive process has produced a nearly 
optimal balance of risks for a social or natural environment’ (Fischhoff et al. 
1981: 100). There is a formal analysis process within bootstrapping but this 
is considered superficial and incomplete (Fischhoff et al. 1981: 100). 
Additionally, Fischhoff et al. (1981: 97) states that ‘when clarity is lacking, 
bootstrapping offers no decision rule’. Potentially erroneous assumptions of 
safety for aseptic drug preparation procedures have already been 
recognised in this thesis and the situation can be said to be far from clear. 
Hence the procedure can thus far can be said to have evolved through a 
bootstrapping model, in that it is a procedure that is considered safe enough 
without having taken full understanding of the evidence of the potentially 
catastrophic patient dangers reported in the literature (Nasser et al. 2004, 
Mikulska et al. 2009, Nadkarni et al. 2009). Although bootstrapping perhaps 
describes the status of the thesis procedure is, it would not be a suitable 
method to detail the current risks or their assessments. The aseptic aspects 
of the thesis procedure have never been critically and completely assessed 
as being a risk, therefore, what is required now is a formal measure of 
system analysis. 
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Formal analysis: formal analysis consists of 4 steps: 
• The decision problem is defined and then all potential options and 
their consequences are listed. 
• The relationships between the options and their alternatives are 
defined. Complex problems are decomposed into component parts. 
Probabilistic assessments are made against each of these parts. 
• All consequences are evaluated by some common unit, which could 
be money or for the purposes of this thesis, infusate contamination or 
infusate related blood stream infection. 
• Robust testing of the process, for example, sensitivity analysis. 
 
It has been argued that formal analysis is ‘open and sound’ Fischhoff et al. 
(1981: 119).  Using a formal process has many advantages, but for this 
thesis the main problem from the execution of the procedure perspective is 
in defining the problem itself, that is, the contamination risk potential and the 
opportunity for contamination to cause IR-BSI. Aseptic drug preparation 
procedures like all healthcare procedures are dynamic and the 
contamination risk potential varies in different settings because the 
procedure varies, and the environmental risks vary. This makes the 
allocation of a single risk value problematic.  
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In order to determine their relevance to this thesis, there will now be a discussion 
and evaluation of three types of formal (risk) analysis, Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis, Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, and Socio-Technical 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment. 
 
4.5.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)  
FMEA is a tool designed for prospective systems analysis and systems 
improvement through risk assessment. The FMEA process produces a risk priority 
number for individual potential errors in a system using a three variable equation; 
where each variable is scored from one to ten (Marx and Slonim 2003, 
Stalhandske et al. 2003).  The first action in a FMEA is for a team to identify all the 
potential problems that could arise when the system is working. Once this is done 
a numerical risk value is produced for how the likelihood of occurrence of each of 
the potential failures might occur, how severe the event might be should the failure 
occur, and how likely it is that the failure might be detected if it occurred. The 
FMEA score is calculated by multiplying the outcome severity score, the 
occurrence likelihood score and the likelihood failure detection score. The 
likelihood score of occurrence is calculated from both the literature and 
experience; this, however, implies that the literature is unbiased and that 
experience is both complete and is reliably quantifiable. There are a few key 
problems with this approach: firstly, it appears to apply to a static system when in 
reality systems continuously evolve and are subject to variations in, for example, 
number of tasks to be done, the time available to complete the tasks and variations 
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in equipment being utilised. Evolution of systems in this thesis could involve new 
drugs, new diluents, new legal restrictions, new connections or more complex 
mixing regimens. This could necessitate a new or modified FMEA every time the 
system evolved.  The second problem with FMEA is that those assessing the 
system will do so from the perspective of local experience, which may be 
incomplete and not reflect the entire universe of potential problems experienced by 
workers in other places (Marx and Slonim 2003). These authors also suggest that 
FMEA can only identify errors as single events and not in combinations or a series 
of errors: FMEA does not include a way to examine if error ‘a’ was followed by 
error ‘b’ in another part of the system. 
 
To carry out a FMEA once potential single failures are identified, the team can 
either act to reduce the probability of the failure occurring or introduce redundant 
safety steps to mitigate the effects of failure (Marx and Slonim 2003).  
 
There is evidence to suggest that a FMEA enables those who perform procedures 
to stand back and critically analyse the systems’ processes and eliminate any 
obvious hazards. A FMEA has been applied to the topic area of this study – 
intravenous drug preparation procedures (Apkon et al. 2004). However, the 
researchers in the Apkon et al. (2004) study failed to identify asepsis failure as a 
possible error, and recommended extended hang times in order to reduce errors 
associated with replacing infusions. The evidence cited to corroborate the safety of 
this recommendation is two papers, one of which is not related to prepared drugs 
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but administration sets for sterile fluids. None of the many papers identifying 
infusate-related BSI as a significant problem and long infusion times as a 
contributory factor are included in the Apkon et al. (2004) FMEA. The application of 
a FMEA process as in the Apkon et al. (2004) study may have resulted in a 
reduction in one recognised common medication error, but it has also resulted in 
increased risk of IR-BSI by erroneously recommending hang times of 72 hours. It 
is clear that healthcare delivery is inherently dangerous and that tools such as 
FMEA routinely applied could make it safer. However for this thesis procedure, a 
FMEA analysis alone would be insufficient with which to profile and understand the 
system.  
 
4.5.2 Healthcare FMEA (HC-FMEA)  
HC-FMEA has evolved from FMEA and includes a ‘Hazard Scoring Matrix’ this 
involves the calculation of the probability of an incident occurring (frequent, 
occasional, uncommon and remote) with the severity or effect of the incident 
should it arise (catastrophic, major, moderate or minor) (DeRosier et al. 2002, van 
Tilburg et al. 2006). HC-FMEA is a 5-step process that uses a team to interrogate 
a process. This involves a graphic flow diagram and the Hazard Score Matrix. 
Decisions are made based on the vulnerability of identified potential problems 
(DeRosier et al. 2002, van Tilburg et al. 2006).  Like the non-healthcare version, 
HC-FMEA also seems to apply to linear and static systems. There are obvious 
strengths to the process, clearly, it is always useful to review critically a system 
and remove or change obvious steps that might lead to failure. But there are 
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weaknesses in this process too. It seems illogical to suggest that one failure 
category will always cause one type of serious outcome – and thereby always 
score the same. For example, the same asepsis failure in drug preparation will 
cause a range of outcomes from none to death, depending on the degree or 
asepsis failure, the type and number of micro-organisms on the hands of the HCW 
or in the environment at the time the drug was being prepared, and the duration 
time of the infusion. The key factor that could continuously change the risk 
calculations is the variation in the day to day conditions of work. For example, in 
extremely busy times HCWs have to evolve and adapt systems to make them as 
safe as possible based on the availability or restriction of resources. It is difficult to 
see how HC-FMEA or FMEA could anticipate all potential errors, particularly as 
systems are dynamic and continuously evolve. Consequently, having undertaken a 
HC-FMEA may lead HCWs to assume a false sense of security and safety with 
regard to the systems they operate. 
 
4.5.3 Socio-Technical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (ST-PRA)  
ST-PRA is another tool designed for prospective system safety analysis, (Marx 
and Slonim 2003). Although it is applied prospectively, in effect it is of most use in 
those systems that are considered to be most vulnerable to error.  ST-PRA is 
described as a top-down tool; a hybrid between FMEA and decision support 
models. To visualise risk, faults trees are drawn from a single top error, for 
example, delivering the wrong drug to a patient. The basic events that can lead to 
this top error are mapped, where the errors are consequent on earlier errors, this is 
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indicated. Probability estimates are added to the basic events. This is a team task 
and grounded in experience – this has to be the case as for all estimates of risk as 
there are no published data on which to rely. The authors acknowledge that there 
may be limited information, but that the estimates must be arrived at.  Once the 
tree is completed the team can then intervene to make the system safer, either by 
introducing redundant steps of double-checking, creating forcing functions 
designed so the system cannot be bypassed. ST-PRA has been used to reduce 
wrong-drug errors in long-term care facilities (Conrow Comden et al. 2004), these 
authors state that ST-PRA can identify systemic and behavioural elements that 
increase or reduce the risk of drug error.  Again the analysis of systems using ST-
PRA seems to negate context.  None of the nine events or gates identified 
everything that could lead to a drug error, includes sub-optimal staffing or 
distraction both of which have been implicated as causes of errors (Conrow 
Comden et al. 2004). Others have also identified limitations to ST-PRA, including 
the potential for naïve analysis, reliance on expert estimation, presumption of 
binary statistics and tunnel vision (Wreathall and Nemeth 2004). ST-PRA clearly 
has advantages over FMEA. However, if during intravenous drug preparation 
errors are not visible and not easily recognised by operators it is difficult to see 
how error frequency, essential to ST-PRA, is to be calculated. The key element, a 
precursor to a ST-PRA or HC-FMEA, is to identify the assumptions or safety that 
the operators work under. For example, if infusate contamination is considered as 
only remotely possible, then their estimates of risk will be dangerously wrong, and 
the HCWs may be less likely to perform advocated safety procedures involving 
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hand hygiene or wrongly assume the sterility of multi-dose vials which are easily 
contaminated. 
 
This brief review of methods of risk assessment has considered the possibility of 
this approach to evaluate the safety of the system of aseptic preparation of 
intravenous drugs. None of the three types of risk assessment discussed above 
provides, in itself, a sufficiently robust method with which to describe the system of 
aseptic drug preparation. Although this is one procedure by title, the procedure 
varies in how it is done in the individual clinical settings, and how the environments 
add or detract additional contamination risks. Defining the problem of 
contamination is at present difficult and a better understanding of the procedure as 
it is performed and risks within different clinical settings is a necessary step before 
a formal risk analysis can be undertaken.    
 
Thus far in this chapter although relevant the risk assessment methods reviews 
and reviews of the two paradigms of risk perception (social and cultural, and 
psychometric) have not identified an approach or theory which would assist in 
identifying the system of aseptic drug preparation. The chapter now continues with 
discussions on approaches and theories of error causation.  
 
4.6      Error causation theory development 
The understanding and development of theories and approaches of error 
causation has progressed through four recognisable periods over the latter part of 
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the twentieth century  (Wiegmann et al. 2002).  In the first – the technical period – 
errors were identified as resulting from mechanical and technical failures, largely 
as a consequence of the preceding rapid mechanical and technical industrial 
developments. As the mechanical / technical equipment itself became more 
reliable, the second phase – human error stage – focused on the operators as the 
cause of failures. Logically as neither the machines nor the humans worked 
independently of each other, during the third stage – the sociotechnical period – 
research focused on the study of the interactions of both humans and machines 
together. The latest and current period according to Wiegmann et al. (2002) has 
developed following recognition that humans do not interact with machines in 
isolation but within a context; and that context is the organisational culture.  It 
seems credible that another epoch has now evolved that of error prevention 
through the adoption of high-reliability characteristics (Hudson 2003, Wilson et al. 
2005, Carroll and Rudolph 2006, Tamuz and Harrison 2006). The progression of 
error causation theories has followed an iterative and developmental style, but 
each new period did not result in an older theory being immediately and completely 
discarded. Consequently, some aspects of the theoretical approaches from all of 
these periods remain in use. It seems clear, however, that to understand the 
system of preparing intravenous drugs, the thesis will need to cover the technical, 
human and cultural factors which make up the system.  A brief summary of how 
one error theory has been developed over time will be given. 
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4.6.1 From humans causing errors to systems being culpable  
Heinrich (1950), in an early publication on industrial accident prevention, put 
forward several important axioms. These axioms have been - and continue to be - 
developed by, for example, Reason (1990), Dekker (2006) and Vincent (2006). 
The first key axiom was that injuries occur because of accidents, accidents occur 
because of unsafe acts of individuals or machines, unsafe acts occur because of 
the fault of a person and this is provoked by the social environment (Heinrich 1950: 
10). These factors were illustrated as dominos; the first one to fall brought the next 
one down.  Another axiom is ‘the foundation of major injury’, which states that for 
every injury caused by an unsafe act there are over 300 near misses (Heinrich 
1950: 25).  Although it is acknowledged in the text that each type of category has 
its own base pyramid size, the key principle is that there are always many near 
misses for every major injury.  
 
Heinrich (1950: 36) places blame on individuals to a far greater extent than is done 
today. Unsafe acts were, for example, categorised as ‘improper attitude, lack of 
knowledge, physical unsuitability and improper mechanical or physical 
environment’. More recently in what is a more logical system-centred approach 
Reason (1990: 207) suggests that the causes of unsafe acts should be 
categorised based on whether the acts were intended or unintended. Unintended 
actions are considered to be due to latent conditions within the system and not 
wilful actions of an individual. Violations, that is, deliberate acts, are considered to 
be a minor cause of failures and sometimes an ultra-safe act (Amalberti et al. 
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2006). Only by understanding the latent conditions, such as the organisation and 
culture, current conditions of work and system defences, can there be an 
understanding of why errors occur.  For example, according to Dekker (2006: 70) 
‘A large part of understanding human error is about understanding in detail the 
situation in which the human was working; about the tasks he or she was carrying 
out; about the tools that were being used.’   
 
Heinrich’s (1950: 25) ‘foundation of major injury’ is pyramidal in shape, and implies 
that for every 300 no-injury accidents there are considered to be 29 minor injuries 
and 1 major injury . Although no precise size of the pyramid base is accepted 
today, this axiom is still considered valid. It is the basis for recognised need both to 
report and to understand near misses as a means of preventing major injuries. 
This brief discussion of the development of error theory shows that the theory has 
evolved from an initial focus on the individual, to a focus on the system, and that 
understanding is essential to understanding how to prevent major injuries. 
Therefore, according to Dekker (2006: 226) identifying human error should not be 
the end of the investigation, but the beginning. Further in-depth explanation of this 
approach will be discussed presently, but first, a review of other error causation 
theories and approaches is required. 
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4.7      Review of other error causation theories and approaches  
4.7.1 Systems Engineering  
Systems engineering (SE) is a useful multi-disciplinary approach; it is concerned 
with optimising the performance of any given system in the pursuit of clearly 
agreed goals. SE is achieved by identifying the desired state and the present state, 
then identifying all the ways that the desired state can be achieved and finally 
determining and deploying the most efficient means of getting to the desired state.  
SE is an effective means of improving systems; however as critics have noted, it 
tends to treat humans as ‘components to be engineered’ (Jackson 2003: 62). The 
thesis procedure is complex and appears to rely almost exclusively on HCWs for 
successful execution. Consequently, as SE does not appear to take sufficient 
cognisance of the human perspective, this has been rejected an approach for use 
in this thesis. 
 
4.7.2 Socio-technical systems  
Socio-technical systems (STS) developed as a consequence of the dilemmas 
faced in comprehending systems composed of people and technical systems in 
various contexts (Coiera 2007).  This included the recognition that humans 
interacting with machines resulted in unpredictable outcomes – undesired as well 
as un-designed. Although STS is an organisational approach, it is also used to 
understand and optimise any system work design.  This thesis procedure fits within 
the definition of a complex socio-technical system in that in any given environment 
they have multiple goals, involve multiple interacting parts and parties, and are 
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complex social structures which encompass uncertainties alongside complex 
technology. The work is highly specialised, and a variety of tools and information 
are used. The use of medical devices (seen as synonymous with the term 
technology) has been recognised as a leading case of adverse events in 
healthcare (Balka et al. 2007). Following a review of the literature on governance, 
Balka et al. (2007) advocated that greater emphasis on socio-technical systems’ 
issues is required to reduce adverse events associated with medical devices. 
These authors suggest that the socio-technical tradition gives primacy to the social 
contexts in which humans interact with technology. An STS approach sees 
healthcare as a real life happening, a social process, and through which formative 
evaluation can be made to guide improvements in system design (Berg et al. 
2003). However, despite its advocates, it has been difficult to visualise this 
approach as a process to be followed for this thesis or to identify the ability of an 
STS approach to determine error-prone and high-reliability characteristics, that is, 
to achieve the thesis aims; therefore, as an approach, STS is considered 
unsuitable.  
 
4.7.3 Normal Accident Theory  
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) draws on empirical evidence that all systems 
designed and run by humans are error-prone and subject to failure of any part 
(Perrow 1999, Tamuz and Harrison 2006). Therefore, according to NAT, accidents 
can be seen as ‘normal’ or inevitable for the system: even if they are not 
acceptable to the operators or customers or, as in this case, to HCWs and 
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patients. Criticism of NAT starts with its name. There is a growing body of injury 
prevention and public health advocates who argue against using the term 
‘accidents’ because the term implies, without supporting evidence, that events 
were unforeseen and unpreventable (Doege 1978, Evans 1993, Doege 1999, 
Davis and Pless 2001, Tamuz and Harrison 2006). So strong is this new ire 
against the use of the word accidents that the British Medical Journal has banned 
it, and the Accident and Emergency Journal has been renamed the Emergency 
Medical Journal (Davis and Pless 2001). In this thesis it has been established that 
the mechanisms for infusate contamination are known, and any consequent sepsis 
should be considered preventable; therefore, in this thesis the term ‘accident’ will 
be avoided. 
 
In NAT, systems are analysed for their degree of complexity / linearity and their 
degree of coupling; which denotes not just the system’s vulnerability to fail, but 
also the type of failures to which they are vulnerable, for example, tightly coupled, 
complex systems are prone to catastrophic failures, whereas loose, linear systems 
are more vulnerable to component failures. The scale of complexity or linearity is 
identified, for example, from the degree of variation in the system procedures and 
the obviousness and immediacy with which errors can be identified whilst the 
systems are operating. Results from thesis, and from the literature review, show 
that there are difficulties in recognising failures whenever they manifest.  
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4.7.4 Root Cause Analysis  
This thesis is evaluating the system and practice of aseptic preparation of 
intravenous drugs because the literature suggests it could be error-prone and as a 
direct consequence, could cause BSIs. It could be argued therefore that an 
incident analysis tool, such as Root Cause Analysis (RCA), would be useful for 
profiling the system. An RCA tool is designed to answer 3 questions: what 
happened, why did it happen and what can be done to prevent it happening again 
(Reason 2000).  A presumed IR-BSI could be used as the sentinel event from 
which to work backwards to profile the system. Single cause analysis tools have 
their critics because they imply there is a single root cause and not the multiple 
chains of causes that have been identified by others (Vincent et al. 2004, Dekker 
2006). Identifying a root cause is considered to be just a point at which the 
investigator decides to stop, and nominate the origin of an error (Dekker 2006: 77). 
This seems a reasonable argument and since all healthcare is undertaken from 
finite government resources and policies, all root cause analyses could ultimately 
and ubiquitously (albeit ineffectively and erroneously) blame the government. 
Studies on the effectiveness of RCA in reducing risk and improving safety are 
scant and it has been suggested that the investment in RCA has thus far not 
resulted in demonstrable reductions in harm (Wu et al. 2008). Other critics of RCA 
suggest that the pursuit of safety is not about identifying the causes of individual 
errors but about making systems robust in the face of human and operational 
hazards (Reason 2000). 
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Thus far the only approach that is relevant to the thesis is the systems approach to 
human error. A more in-depth review of this work and its relevance to the theory 
will now be given.  
 
4.8      Human Errors 
According to Dekker (2006: 226) ‘human error is the inevitable by-product of the 
pursuit of success in an imperfect, unstable, resources-constrained world’. Reason 
(2000) suggests that there are two ways to understand human error; firstly from 
the perspective or the person and secondly from the perspective of the system. 
The personal perspective is the traditional view which focuses on the person who 
committed the last act before failure occurred. This view would assert that the 
people, the operational frontline workers, who commit these errors, do so as a 
consequence of not following rules or not taking appropriate action (Reason, 
2000). The counter view to this approach is a systems error approach. The theory 
here is that humans are fallible and therefore expected to err. This is a view also 
asserted in Normal Accident Theory by Perrow (1999: 9). Errors are the result of 
systemic latent conditions set up in the environment, the procedures, the 
equipment, and the organisation and culture. Investigations of high-profile system 
failures have identified that systems seldom fail because of a single error; rather it 
is a series of errors which occur consecutively that eventually result in failure 
(Reason 1990, Vincent et al. 1998, Reason 2000, DeRosier et al. 2002, Vincent et 
al. 2004, Dekker 2006). The long numbers of recommendations following 
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investigations of any kind confirm this. Even the term ‘lessons learned’ to be 
included following all outbreaks is in the pleural. This systems approach to 
understanding human errors, which as discussed earlier was developed from 
earlier theories, is considered the most relevant theory and approach for this 
thesis. Exactly why Human Error Theory is so relevant will now be described.    
 
4.8.1 Human Error Theory   
Reason’s Human Error Theory is summarised as: 
‘Errors are consequences rather than causes, having their origins not so 
much in the perversity of human nature as in the upstream systemic 
failures. 
‘Adverse events are caused by a combination of active failures and latent 
conditions.’  Reason (2000: 768). 
• Active failures are the unsafe acts committed by the people who are in 
direct contact with the patient or the system – they take the form of slips, 
lapses, mistakes and violations.  
• Latent conditions are the inevitable “resident pathogens” within the 
system. They arise from decisions made by management, they cause 
adverse events in two ways; firstly by producing error-provoking 
conditions and secondly by creating weaknesses within the system that 
may lay dormant for some considerable time.  (Reason, 2000: 769).   
 
 81 
Reason (2000) provides a model, the Swiss Cheese Model of Systems Accidents, 
to aid in the understanding of how human errors occur in a systems approach. In 
this model all systems has defensive layers which are represented by slices of 
emmental cheese. When there are holes in all the defence layers a pathway for a 
system failure is present. The following statements expand the understanding of 
the Swiss Cheese Model of Systems Accidents.   
• All systems have defences, barriers and safeguards to prevent potential 
victims (patients) and assets from local hazards  
• All defences contain weaknesses  
• Holes appear in the defensive layers  
• The presence of holes in one layer does not normally cause a bad outcome. 
When holes appear in all of the layers then and a pathway through the 
holes can be made – a failure occurs. 
Reason (2000: 768). 
 
In trying to provide a more complete image of potential failure, Reason (2000: 769) 
suggests that it is useful to consider the holes in the cheese not in fixed positions, 
but as ones which open, close and reopen in different places and at different 
times. This means that errors in one category could appear for a time and 
disappear followed by, or concurrent with, other types of error. Thus solutions to 
‘fill the holes in the cheese’ can never be considered either simple or concluded – 
and systems should not be considered as completely examined or completely safe 
following individual inspection at a fixed point of time. 
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The premise that systems contain weaknesses is shared by others who investigate 
errors and systems. For example, in agreeing with the fragility of systems, Dekker 
(2006: 16) sates that: 
‘Systems are basically unsafe. People in them have to create safety by tying 
together the patchwork of technologies, adapting under pressure and acting 
under uncertainty. 
 
‘Safety is never the only goal in systems. Multiple interacting pressures and 
goals are always at work. There are economic pressures, pressures that 
have to do with schedules, competition, customer service and public image.  
Trade-offs between safety and other goals sometimes have to be made 
when there is uncertainty and ambiguity. Goals other than safety are easy 
to measure. How much people borrow from safety to achieve those goals is 
very difficult to measure.’   
 
Dekker (2006: 227) also asserts that since no one sets out to chop the wrong limb 
off, or overdose a patient, investigators must understand why (and how) actions 
made sense to practitioners at the time they were performed. Even though the 
arguments are presented in slightly different ways, there is some overlap here 
between the work of Dekker (2006) and Reason (1990, 2000). Both advocate 
trying to understand the data that are available to the operator, and what the data 
indicates to the operator during procedure. Dekker (2006: 96) advocates using 
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these data to understand why the operator performs as s/he does, and Reason 
(1990: 199) to identify the systemic weaknesses in the journey to a failure.  
 
In progressing the work of Reason (1990), a framework for analysing risk and 
safety has been produced (Vincent et al. 1998), and updated (Vincent 2006). This 
framework illustrates the latent conditions of the organisation and culture and the 
current conditions of work that can provoke errors and violations and the active 
failures related to unsafe care delivery practices that exist in a system. The 
number of failures that occur will be dependent on the presence and robustness of 
defences and barriers to stop any failure occurring.  
 
A systems approach to human errors offers what thus far appears to be the most 
useful framework with which to understand and describe a system’s reliability and 
error-prone nature. This approach includes an evaluation of the organisation and 
culture, the current conditions of work and all the resources available and 
unavailable to the HCWs who perform the procedure, as well as the system 
defences. This systems approach to human error was designed to understand 
what within a system provokes humans to err, in doing so it does what this thesis 
set out to do – understand the system its resilience as well as the error-prone and 
reliability characteristics therein. Figure 1 illustrates how IR-BSI might arise 
through a contaminated infusate caused by latent conditions in the organisation 
and culture and the current working conditions which provoke unsafe acts and 
without system defences lead to contaminated infusates.  
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Figure 1  Organisation Accident Model for Intravenous Drugs Preparation  
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Having identified Human Error Theory and the Swiss Cheese Model and the most 
useful approach to understanding the error-prone nature of the system of aseptic 
drug preparation, both the latent conditions (organisation and culture, current 
working conditions) and the active failures which include the defences will now be 
discussed in detail. This will begin with the most important latent condition; the 
Organisation and Culture. 
 
4.8.2 Latent conditions - Organisation  
Latent conditions which can provoke active errors arise because managers and 
designers of systems do not assume that their decisions could lead to errors and 
failures by front line HCWs (Leape, 1994). As errors and failures are not seen as 
inevitable, there is nothing in the system design to prevent or absorb them (Leape 
1994). Another factor that prevents optimal design in a system is that organisations 
frequently have other goals that compete with safety, causing, as a consequence, 
fallible design decisions (Cook and Woods 1994, Carroll and Rudolph 2006). In 
NHSScotland one can consider the following as competing goals alongside patient 
safety: financial budget constraints, waiting list targets, time in accident and 
emergency on a trolley targets and reducing bed occupancy targets.  
 
The decision to allow nurses to perform aseptic drug preparation procedures in 
clinical care settings was driven by three factors: the need to reduce junior doctor 
hours, the expense associated with preparation in a pharmacy and the relatively 
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cheap availability of nurses. It was not primarily a decision based on patient safety. 
If patient safety was paramount for drug preparation, one would expect to find 
during the examination of the systems, evidence that managers were mindful that 
the systems they designed or were responsible for, could fail; as a consequence 
there would be quality control to demonstrate defect rates and to recognise 
promptly signs of system failure – none of which were found in this thesis. Other 
organisation / system design errors, which set up the current conditions of work 
can manifest as deficiencies in training programmes, ignorance of the system, 
inadequate numbers of HCWs available to undertake the procedures, 
inadequacies in ongoing monitoring of performance, allocation of poor resources 
and poor procedures.  
 
The organisation is responsible for setting the standards of quality control. 
Newhouse et al. (2005: 45) considers one of the most salient points in such 
evaluation to be whether the end product is free from error. End product evaluation 
could also be included as part of the system feedback. However, although a 
defective end product indicates that one or more of the production processes are 
awry, this is different from being able to detect a problem as it arises, in real-time. 
No such evaluation was found in this thesis. 
 
4.8.3 Latent conditions – Safety culture 
As discussed earlier, the safety culture in which HCWs work is recognised as 
being critical to safety and in determining whether errors occur. Crucial to the 
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safety culture is whether HCWs feel safe in reporting errors and near misses 
(Cuschieri 2003, Hudson 2003, Vincent et al. 2004, Tighe et al. 2006). It is only by 
studying and understanding error reports that the system can be modified to 
improve safety (Cuschieri 2003, Hudson 2003, Vincent et al. 2004, Tighe et al. 
2006). If HCWs feel that punitive actions will result when they report an error or 
system fault, they may be tempted not to report. The attitude of managers towards 
this information is crucial to system safety (DeRosier et al. 2002). Hierarchical 
cultures have been found to be less safe as operators are too scared to report 
identified errors (Risser et al. 2000: 241). As an example, in two recent wrong site 
operations some HCWs in the theatre knew the wrong limb was being amputated 
but were too intimidated to inform the surgeon (Personal Communication). 
Systems become reliable when errors are accepted and expected and lessons are 
learned (Vincent et al. 1998, Glendon et al. 2006: 110).  
 
The term ‘vulnerable system syndrome’ has been defined (Reason et al. 2001: 
ii21). This is said to exist when three interacting and self-perpetuating elements 
are in place, namely: ‘the blaming of front-line individuals when things go wrong, 
denying the existence of systemic error-provoking weaknesses, and the blinkered 
pursuit of productive financial indicators’ (Reason et al. 2001: ii21). Hence 
vulnerable system syndrome is the combination of three latent conditions that 
make the staff who directly deliver patient care doomed to fail – and, ironically – 
take the blame for the system’s failures. 
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For the safety culture to be measured, and that measurement altered, there has to 
first be agreement on the definition and validation of measurement tools. In a 
thorough review of published definitions of safety culture and safety climate 
(Wiegmann et al. 2002) the following definition was advocated: 
‘Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and 
public safety by everyone in every group at every level of an organisation. It 
refers to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal 
responsibility for safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety 
concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and 
organisational) behaviour based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be 
rewarded in a manner consistent with these values.’ Wiegmann et al. (2002: 
8). 
 
Safety culture measures are taken at one point in time and are therefore 
considered to be a snapshot of the state of safety providing an indicator of the 
underlying safety culture (Cox and Flin 1998). A measure of the safety culture has 
been described as the safety climate in order to distinguish between the more 
enduring (safety culture) and the variable (safety climate).   
 
The definition of safety climate was advocated as: 
‘Safety climate is the temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to 
commonalities among individual perceptions of the organisation. It is 
therefore situationally based, and refers to the perceived state of safety at a 
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particular place at a particular time, it is relatively unstable and subject to 
change depending on the features of the current environment or prevailing 
conditions.’ Wiegmann et al. (2002: 10). 
For ease of reading in this study, the term safety culture will be used to denote a 
single measure arising from the HCWs’ opinions of procedure safety. The next 
section will discuss measurement of the safety culture.  
 
4.8.4 Measuring the safety culture 
Although as Davies et al. (2000) argue, the nature of the organisational culture has 
a bearing of the safety of the organisation and on performance therein, exactly 
how to measure ‘culture’ this is not well established. The report on the 1994 
Chernobyl explosion for the first time cited a poor safety culture as a factor 
contributing to the catastrophe (Cox and Flin 1998). Since Chernobyl, there has 
been much research to try to understand what safety culture is and how if at all, it 
can be measured and improved (Flin et al. 2006, Flin 2007).  At present results 
from studies are small in nature with limited over-time repetition and with even 
more limited correlation evidence of a good safety culture and positive patient 
outcomes (Scott et al. 2003, MacDavitt et al. 2007).  However, there is more 
evidence of a poor safety culture being associated with negative outcomes. For 
example, a review of wrong site surgeries found various unsafe behaviours 
amongst surgeons, including a failure of formal communication, performance of 
tasks when fatigued and a non-compliance with established protocols (Dagi et al. 
2007). In the field of healthcare safety culture measurement, validation of tools is 
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developing. In a cross-sectional survey of nearly 11,000 HCWs in 203 clinical 
settings, researchers identified a six factor model of measuring safety that could be 
used to measure attitudes to patient safety across organisations and settings. The 
six factors were the: working conditions, team working climate, safety climate, 
perceptions of management, job satisfaction and stress recognition (Sexton et al. 
2006). Although this work was done at the level of the organisation or clinical 
setting, it seems reasonable to assume the factors remain relevant at the level of a 
single procedure and, that with minor adaptation, can be used to measure the 
safety culture in clinical areas related to aseptic intravenous drug preparation 
procedures.  
 
The latent conditions which comprise the organisation and culture set the scene in 
which the procedure is performed and errors and safety are either present or 
absent. The next slice of the Swiss Cheese Model is the current conditions of 
work, which includes more variable criteria, including the procedure complexity, the 
staff available, how the conditions can provoke errors and how within a system 
they can be measured; this is covered in the next section.   
 
4.8.5  Current Working Conditions  
Current working conditions can provoke errors in a variety of ways. For example, 
there may be insufficient human resources on a given day to undertake the 
procedure correctly, the environment may not be conducive to the procedure being 
performed aseptically, and the operators on duty may not be competent in 
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undertaking the tasks (Reason 1990, Vincent et al. 1998). Specifically for drug 
preparation, poor current working condition failures could include: too few staff to 
perform the tasks, patients who have create a distracting environment, clinical 
leaders not stressing the importance of hand hygiene or not insisting on cleaning 
the environment before the procedure occurs. Error detectability will be discussed 
in more depth, as will a system profile to enable the current working conditions in 
the thesis procedure to be identified. Communication, a critical current working 
condition in the prevention of errors, will also be discussed separately. 
 
4.8.6 Current Working Conditions – Error detectability / system feedback 
The detectability of errors that may or may not occur throughout the procedure is 
provided to the operator via feedback. For feedback to be of use it should be in 
real-time, that is, as it happens. If slips or lapses occur during a procedure and 
they are immediately visible to the operator, actions can be taken from preventing 
failures occurring. For example, if bacteria on entering an infusate coloured it blue, 
it would be obvious to the HCW that an error had occurred and that the infusate 
was contaminated and must not be infused. The only visible detectable errors by 
the operator in this system are for the drug and diluent volume and presence of 
precipitation. The ability of the operator to detect any slips or lapses should they 
occur was examined in the thesis. This includes the time taken for errors to 
become detectable, that is, during preparation, during administration or post 
administration. Determining the information/feedback available to the operator 
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whilst the procedure is being performed was fundamental to assessing the 
defences of the system. 
 
4.8.7 Current Working Conditions – Procedure complexity 
It seems logical to assume that the more steps there are in a procedure, the more 
opportunities exist for error in recollection, and the more opportunities for 
distraction and consequently slips and lapses. (The contrary is also true – too few 
steps in a procedure can also induce failures). It has been argued that omission 
errors are the most common type of human error (Reason 2002). As already 
alluded to, the number of steps in this procedure could be as high as 68; in 
addition there can be variation in diluent, drug, acceptable volumes, order of 
administration and drug-specific actions pre and post administration. Variability of 
input reduces simplicity and can greatly influence the reliability of the procedure 
(Spath 2000: 207); the degree of simplicity / complexity in these thesis procedures 
will be considered. Complexity has been described as ‘the enemy of safety’ 
(Woods et al. 2007: 462). The procedures’ complexity will increase the procedures’ 
error-prone risk.  In describing any procedure therefore, an understanding of its 
inherent complexity is also required. 
 
4.8.8 Current Working Conditions – A procedure profile 
To understand the current working conditions related to the procedure, the 
procedure itself requires profiling. In an attempt to expand operative safety beyond 
patient factors and the technical skills of the surgeon, and to provide a basis for 
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assessing interventions, an ‘operation profile’ was devised (Vincent et al. 2004). 
This profile includes: the surgical team, procedures, operative events, 
communication, technical skills, team performance, decision-making and the 
operative environment; that is, all of Vincent’s (2006) contributory factors. The 
operation profile was adopted as a term to characterise the full range of factors 
that have been implicated in surgical outcome in the peri-operative period. Table 3 
shows the comparisons between the profile written by Vincent et al. (2004) and a 
procedure profile for aseptic drug preparation based on the known elements from 
experience and published national guidance. The aseptic drug preparation 
procedure profile also includes communication error categories devised by Lingard 
et al. (2004) and as discussed in the next section. Also Included in Table 3 are the 
written procedures and checklists. There is growing evidence that the use of 
checklists can reduce omission errors – which as already stated are the most 
frequent human error type (Reason 2002). In a recent review, checklist use in the 
intensive care unit, particularly to reduce catheter related blood stream infections, 
was extremely effective (Hales and Pronovost 2006). The checklist used by Hales 
et al. (2006) detailed all the steps to be followed for safe and aseptic insertion of a 
catheter. It was monitored and completed by an observer and not the operator. 
During this thesis, all tools available to the HCWs were looked for, including 
checklists to memory aid and reduce omission errors – none were found. 
Checklists can facilitate standardisation of a system. If it is standardised, that is, 
always performed the same way, then according to Vincent (2006: 181) it has 
greater reliability by reducing human fallibility. Combining variability of input with 
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variability in operators may make it difficult for standardisation of the thesis 
procedures.  One vital component to the understanding of the safety of any system 
is an understanding of the communications of the people working in it, which is 
discussed further in the next section. 
Table 3    Operation Profile with the Study Profile  
Operation Profile Aseptic Drug Procedure Profile 
Patient factors 
Principal complaint  
Co-morbidities 
ASA, BMI, Age 
Patient factors 
Vascular devices used 
Drugs to be infused 
The Surgical Team 
o Personnel 
o Experience of previous work 
together 
o Familiarity with procedure 
o Fatigue, sleep loss, stress etc. 
The Infusion Team 
o Who is involved  
o Sufficient numbers of competent staff 
o Experience of previous work together 
o Training and competency (initial; 
continuing) 
o Familiarity with procedure 
o Stress 
Processes and Procedures 
o Adequacy of notes and 
management plan 
o Consent and preparation 
o Anaesthetic procedures 
Processes and Procedures 
o Written procedures 
o Checklists 
o Rules for various situations  
o Procedures performed 
Key operative events 
o Blood loss 
o Minor and major complications 
o Error compensation and recovery 
Key procedural events 
o Inability to do procedure as written 
o Complications, for example,  
precipitation 
o Error compensation and recovery 
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Table 3    Operation Profile with the Study Profile  
Operation Profile Aseptic Drug Procedure Profile 
Flow of information following patient  
Adequacy of notes and consent 
Specific communications during the 
procedure 
Hand over 
Flow of information 
Availability of data during the procedure 
Confirmation of completion 
 Communication (opportunities & 
performance) 
Occasion  Content Purpose Audience 
Technical skills 
Ratings of good general surgical 
practice 
Ratings of operation practice specific 
steps 
Identification of specific technical 
errors 
Technical skills 
Practice as per procedure 
Inclusion of steps crucial to asepsis 
Deviations from procedures 
Team performance and leadership 
Leadership 
Coordination between team members 
Willingness to seek advice and help 
Responsiveness to flexibility 
Team support for the operator 
Who manages the team 
What data is used to evaluate the system 
(error reports, quality control, reflective 
procedure review) 
Leadership support  
Support from team members 
Willingness to seek help and advice 
Decision making and situation 
awareness 
Patient limitations 
Operation limitations 
Decision making and situation awareness 
Patient limitations 
Operator limitations 
Team limitations 
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Table 3    Operation Profile with the Study Profile  
Operation Profile Aseptic Drug Procedure Profile 
Surgeon’s limitations  
Team limitations 
The Operative Environment 
Availability and adequacy of 
equipment 
Availability of notes, records 
Noise and lighting 
Distractions 
The Preparation Environment 
Cleanliness 
Availability and adequacy of equipment 
Access to key information; procedures, 
drug information 
Access to key equipment 
Noise and lighting 
Distractions 
Is it easy to do the procedure right 
Interruptions: Phone calls, messages, 
outside theatre events, etc. 
Interruptions: Phone calls, messages, 
multi-tasking, other events 
 
4.8.9 Current Working Conditions – Communication  
Sentinel events in healthcare have been defined as the occurrence of 
unanticipated death or serious injury, regardless of cause (Carrico and Ramirez 
2007). Investigators found that 60% of sentinel events in American hospitals 
involved communication errors (for some procedures it is as high as 80%), 
(Herndon 2005, Joint Commission on Accreditation in Hospitals Organization 
2007). The aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs requires communication 
between different HCWs and as a consequence was considered worthy inclusion 
in the thesis.  Communication during the thesis procedure involves: the HCW 
performing the procedure and the prescriber, the pharmaceutical company, the 
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ward manager, co-HCWs involved in any redundancy checks and, of course the 
patient. Lingard, et al. (2004), categorised communication errors in an operating 
theatre. This framework has been adapted as a guide to assess the quality of 
communication within the systems in this thesis (Table 4).  
Table 4      Categories of communication error  (Lingard et al. 2004)) 
Category Explanation Example 
Occasion 
Failure 
Problem in the situation 
or context of the 
communication 
Asking if asepsis was maintained after a 
drug has been infused. 
Content 
Failure 
Insufficient or inaccuracy 
in the information being 
transferred. 
Asking for a drug to be given without 
detailing the dose or the route or 
infusion time.  
Audience 
Failure 
Gaps in the composition 
of the group engaged in 
the communication. 
Discussions between doctors on the 
preparation requirements of a new drug 
and omitting to include the nurse who 
will prepare the drug in the discussions.  
Purpose 
Failure 
Communication events 
in which the purpose is 
unclear, not achieved or 
incomplete. 
Two nurses discuss that drugs need 
prepared for a specific time. No one 
confirms that they will take responsibility 
for doing this. 
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It is clear that both the opportunities for communication that occur, and the 
effectiveness of the communication given and received, need to be assessed. 
 
Having discussed the latent conditions which can provoke error producing 
weaknesses - making up the organisation and culture and the current conditions of 
work - the next section will focus on the active failures which,  as stated previously, 
are the unsafe acts committed by the people who are in direct contact with the 
patient or the system. Active failures take the form of slips, lapses, mistakes and 
violations.  
 
4.8.10  Active failures in the delivery of care  
Active failures are the unsafe acts performed by operators in practice and are 
usually the last acts that happen before the system fails (Figure 2.) In this thesis 
active failures include, for example, failure to perform hand hygiene, splash 
creation during preparation or the reuse of a contaminated single-use vial.  
According to Reason (1990: 206) unsafe acts are either intended actions or 
unintended actions. Intended actions have 3 basic error types: skill based, rule 
based and knowledge based. Skill based errors occur as slips and lapses due to 
attention capture through distraction or preoccupation. Rule based errors are due 
to either the poor application of a good rule, or the application of a wrong rule. 
Lastly, knowledge-based errors occur after a failure has occurred and when none 
of the known rules are considered applicable (Reason 1990: 86).    
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Figure 2    Unsafe Acts and basic error types (Reason 1990: 207) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Reproduced with permission Cambridge University Press) 
 
Skill-based errors are errors that arise in the execution of a procedure. They can 
arise as a consequence of any event, which disrupts the procedure including 
external distractions and internal preoccupation, for example, waiting for a drug to 
arrive, or delayed readiness of the patient, personal worries or stress. This is 
known as environmental capture – the operator who had been focused on the 
scheme or task in hand, fails on resumption after an interruption or delay to 
execute as it had been planned (Reason 1990: 71). The introduction of the use of 
red tabards by nurses doing drug rounds, literally as a ‘do not disturb’ notice to 
colleagues, is a method which aims to reduce the risk of medication errors caused 
by environmental capture (Scott et al. 2010). The communication errors discussed 
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in Table 4, fit into this category of error, in that they represent slips and lapses in 
attention and arise in the execution of a procedure and before a failure occurs. 
 
Rule-based errors occur in two ways, either the application of a bad rule or a poor 
execution of a good rule. For rule-based errors to arise there must be rules. As the 
preparation of intravenous drugs are long established procedures, it would seem 
reasonable to assume that potential errors have been anticipated and prepared 
for, and there are as Reason (1990: 65) describes, if <this> situation then, that 
<action> rules or solutions available. Therefore, not only do the procedures of how 
to prepare infusions need to be available to the operator, but a series of rules that 
anticipate known failures and provide corrective actions should also be present. 
For example, to recognise and stop an IR-BSI, the following rule should be 
present: if during the administration of an infusate prepared on a ward, a patient 
unexpectedly becomes pyrexial, stop the infusion and immediately seek medical 
help.   
 
Knowledge-based errors are errors that arise in addressing failures that had not 
been anticipated. Consequently, there are no accepted or specified ways to 
resolve the failure. Knowledge-based errors occur in a series, since no rules are 
specified in the given situation, various actions are tried to seek a solution until, if 
at all, an effective action is found. In essence it is the presence of knowledge-
based errors, the ‘not knowing what is not known’ which arise in a different 
formats, that substantiate the criticisms of FMEA, HC-FMEA and ST-PRA in earlier 
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sections and further emphasise possible flaws in such methodologies. If there are 
no rules to lead the HCW to stop an infusion when a patient develops symptoms of 
an IR-BSI, then it could be expected that the patient will continue to be infused with 
micro-organisms until such time as either the infusate is complete or the HCW 
eventually considers the infusate as the possible cause and turns it off. 
 
Unlike the active failures where the unsafe act was an unintended action, 
violations are active failures that they were intended by the operator, and as such 
they merit discussion separately. 
 
4.8.11 Active Failures – Violations 
Some active failures are violations, that is, deliberate attempts to deviate from a 
protocol. These violations according to Reason (1990: 195) are classified on the 
basis of intention: that is, the intention to commit a violation, and the intention to 
cause harm to the system (patient). It does not seem logical to anticipate that 
violations with the intent to cause harm will be committed in the presence of 
observers.  Perversely, violations can on occasion be the safest option for the 
patient, for example, on finding a patient’s morphine infusion pump had been 
administered too quickly and the patient was about to suffer a respiratory arrest, 
the safest option would be for the nurse to violate regulations and administer an 
antidote in advance of calling the doctor and having a prescription written pre 
administration. 
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Some violations become routine, such as when HCWs deliberately fail to perform 
hand hygiene when it is advocated. Following an extensive hand hygiene 
campaign, and when HCWs knew their hand hygiene practice was being 
observed, they still performed hand hygiene only 73% of the time (Randle et al. 
2006). It would be impossible to separate violations from genuine omissions in this 
thesis. However, it was agreed that the researcher would make interjections if 
patients were considered at risk. For example, an interjection would be made if the 
researcher identified that prepared infusions were likely to be contaminated; no 
such interjections were, however, required.   
 
4.8.12  System Defences and Barriers 
Although errors may occur as a result of the latent conditions or as unsafe acts, 
failures can still be prevented if the system is well defended. For aseptic drug 
preparations there are three types of system barriers or defences that could be 
used to reduce aseptic failure risk these are: forcing functions, bacterial filters and 
redundancy checks. An automatic stop or forcing function can protect systems by 
routinely indicating that there have been breaches in procedures and forcing the 
operator to take appropriate actions. For example, if water in a modern autoclave 
does not reach the correct temperature, the doors lock and force the operator to 
call the engineer. As a consequence non-sterile packs will not be placed on 
shelves ready for use. The degree of automation that assists the operator to 
produce a safe sterile product in drug preparation procedures in this thesis has to 
be established. 
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The second type of system defence is a physical barrier of a filter capable of 
removing any infusate contamination without degrading any drug. Filters are 
available which can eliminate not just the micro-organisms but also endotoxin 
released from dead micro-organisms (Baumgartner et al. 1986, Horibe et al. 1990). 
Arguments have been put forward that in-line filters are necessary and there is 
evidence to support their use (Vanhaecke et al. 1989, Curran et al. 1999, Curran et 
al. 2000, Ball 2003). It should be noted that not all filters are capable of filtering 
endotoxin (Grobner et al. 2007). However, as previously stated, filters are not 
recommended in national (or international) guidelines, there appears to be no 
appetite, or more importantly budget, for their purchase. In this thesis filters were 
found to be in use correctly, ineffectively and not at all.  
 
4.8.13 System Defences - Redundancy Checks 
A redundancy is any duplication in procedural step introduced to increase the 
likelihood of it being completed successfully. Redundancies are built into a system 
to minimise the risk of errors. Some steps in a procedure may be considered so 
important or error-prone that they require a crosscheck to ensure they have been 
done.  A frequently heard crosscheck is that issued by pilots once an aeroplane 
has landed ‘Doors to manual and crosscheck’. In drug administration, a 
crosscheck that the patient is the person the prescription is written for is an 
accepted essential safety step. Reason (1990: 77) argues however, that certain 
features of the environment will with experience become increasingly significant 
 104 
while others will be considered less error-prone, though this may not in fact be the 
reality of the situation. For example, if aseptic failure is not perceived as a 
significant risk, there may be no redundancy checks required on the aseptic steps 
of drug administration procedures.  Crosschecking cannot make a system error-
proof. Failures can still happen in crosschecked procedures as there can be 
confusion in what precisely is being crosschecked and role-hierarchy could affect a 
junior’s willingness to speak up when an error is identified (Patterson 2007).  
 
4.9     Human Error Theory Summary 
In taking a systems approach to errors and identifying that failures arise due to a 
combination of both latent conditions and active failures, Reason (1990) and 
Vincent (2006) have provided an approach that can determine the error-prone 
nature of a system. This is because, included in the assessments are the objective 
elements of a system such as the equipment, the methods, the resources and the 
subjective elements. The later include the culture and perceptions of risk, as 
discussed earlier. Therefore, to analyse the system of aseptic drug preparation 
and how it could lead to contaminated infusates, there must be analysis of the 
latent conditions and of how the workers perform the procedure. Although human 
error theory has utility in identifying the error-prone nature of a system, other 
theories are also necessary to identify reliability. The next section will discuss how 
High Reliability Theory and how patient safety and human factors approaches; can 
be used to determine the reliability of a system.  
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4.10     High-Reliability Theory  
Beyond systems being reliable, a new focus on high-reliability has been defined for 
those organisations that have key characteristics. These characteristics are: a 
preoccupation with failure, a reluctance to simplify interpretations of events, 
sensitivity to operations, a commitment to resilience and deference to expertise 
(Weick et al. 1999: 81). These characteristics denote mindfulness and lead to the 
capability to discover and manage unexpected events, thus leading to high-
reliability.  What in essence Weick et al. (1999) are saying is that only by always 
being watchful and mindful of the fallible nature of the system can it be protected 
and operators prepared for and manage the unexpected. This seems intuitively 
correct because, if HCWs do not expect that splash contamination could pose a 
contamination risk for infusates (and patients) then, according to high-reliability 
theory, they will not act to prevent splash contamination during preparation. High-
reliability is not synonymous with infallibility. Unanticipated interactions among 
system components which lead to system failures can never be completely 
forecast, averted or designed away (Tamuz and Harrison 2006).  This is another 
warning of moving holes in slices of cheese. Evidence of the presence of these 
high-reliability characteristics will be looked for in this thesis. 
 
4.11 Patient Safety Research  
Patient safety is a growing research domain and indeed a movement for 
healthcare system change within healthcare organisations (Altman et al. 2004, 
Newhouse and Poe 2005, Runciman et al. 2006, Balka et al. 2007). Although there 
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were claims early on that iatrogenic disease caused more suffering than from all 
traffic collisions or industrial injuries (Illich 1974), it was not until 1999 and the 
publication of the Institute of Medicine’s report suggesting that there were between 
44,000-98,000 preventable deaths occurring in the US health care system every 
year, that patient safety was recognised as being seriously and routinely 
compromised (Institute of Medicine 1999).  The Institute of Medicine’s report was 
followed by reports into high-profile NHS systems’ failures such as the Bristol 
Cardiac Surgery Inquiry. In summing up the failures of Bristol, Vincent (2006: 19) 
commented that: ‘although routine, highly-skilled and complex, healthcare could be 
substandard to the point of being dangerous.’   
 
The surgeons in Bristol had data which showed that performance in Bristol was 
worse than comparable centres; however, their poor results were erroneously 
explained away as the result of case mix. As recognised by Newhouse et al. 
(2005: 47), healthcare improvement requires continuous measurement, feedback, 
systems redesign and increased cooperation amongst HCWs. The Institute of 
Healthcare Improvement was instigated just to make healthcare safer for patients. 
Through campaigns designed to save 100,000 lives and avoid 5 million adverse 
events using rapid cycle testing, this movement has successfully progressed 
(Wachter and Pronovost 2006).  The understanding of the error-prone nature of 
healthcare implicit in the movement was useful in developing the methodological 
framework of this thesis. Healthcare organisations have only just begun to see 
themselves as similar to the nuclear industry and aircraft industry; that is, as a 
 107 
safety-critical organisation. The Scottish Patient Safety Programme launched in 
2008 for all healthcare in Scotland, is a partnership with the Institute of Healthcare 
Improvement and has bold aims to reduce patient harm, including a reduction in all 
cause mortality by 30%. 
 
Patient safety, although not a new concept, it is only relatively recently 
acknowledged as being the most important underlying premise of all healthcare. 
The characteristics of patient safety have been defined as follows:  
‘Patient safety is concerned primarily with the avoidance, prevention and 
amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from healthcare 
itself. It should address events that span the continuum of ‘errors’ and 
‘deviations’ to ‘failures’. 
Patient safety emerges from the interaction of the components of the 
system. It is more than the absence of adverse outcomes and is more than 
avoidance of identifiable ‘preventable’ errors of occurrences. Safety does 
not reside in a person, device or department. Improving safety depends on 
learning how safety emerges from the interaction of the components.  
Vincent (2006: 14). 
 
These concepts are relevant to this thesis because the thesis is about 
understanding one system in healthcare so that there can be avoidance, 
prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes of infusate sepsis due to 
contamination which occurs during the preparation and administration of 
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intravenous drugs. Vincent (2006: 15) also argues that the reduction of harm 
should be the primary goal and that patient safety should not be equated with 
merely preventing errors unless the errors in question are potential sources of 
harm.  
 
4.11.1 Human Factors  
Human factors are the relationship between human beings, the equipment they 
use and the environments in which they work; this includes the procedures they 
have to undertake. The system’s design and organisational characters that 
influence behaviour for the purpose of minimising errors and optimising output are 
the essence of human factors study (Stranks 2007: 108).  In a curriculum for 
medical students on patient safety, the WHO has defined human factors as ‘the 
study of all the factors that make it easy to do the work in the right way’ (World 
Health Organization 2009).  
 
The objective in human factors science is to understand what is preventing the 
HCW from doing the right thing and to make it easy for the HCW to do the right 
thing. As such, human factors can be said to be the overarching approach in use in 
this study. Human factors principles that enable HCWs to do the right thing 
include: standardisation, simplicity, safety, consideration of the interactions of 
people, equipment and environment and crucially understanding when, why and 
how things may go wrong (Norris 2009).  Examples of human factors that may 
make it difficult to achieve aseptic drug preparation could include: number of 
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procedure steps, poor environment, and difficulty in identifying the sterility of 
components. Conversely, making it easy for the HCW to do the right thing could 
involve; use of technology to reduce the number of steps, better labelling of 
products and the use of checklists. 
 
4.12 Chapter 4 summary 
In this chapter, theories and approaches to risk perception, risks assessment, error 
causation, high-reliability and patient safety were discussed and evaluated for their 
potential utility to the thesis. The theories and approaches which were evaluated, 
but rejected included: Cultural Theory, a management approach, Systems 
Engineering, Socio-technical Systems, Normal Accident Theory, Failure Modes 
Effects Analysis, Healthcare Failure Modes Effects Analysis and Socio-Technical 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment. These approaches were all characterised by a too 
narrow focus with which to view a complex dynamic system and this was the main 
reason for their rejection.  
 
The theories and approaches that were considered to be of more utility to the 
study and discussed in-depth were; Human Error Theory, High Reliability Theory 
and Patient Safety research, including Human Factors. Human Error Theory, from 
a systems approach, asserts that failures arise not because of the unsafe acts of 
individuals but because of latent conditions in the system including the 
organisation and culture and the current working conditions. Measuring the safety 
culture was seen as crucial to identifying the procedure’s error-proneness. The 
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human error approach to understanding why people do as they do is of value to 
this thesis because it considers not only unsafe acts, but also the latent conditions 
that are capable of provoking errors. However, it is not the only theory that is 
required for the thesis. High Reliability Theory includes the characteristics with 
which to identify the reliability within a system and assessing a system’s reliability 
is also considered essential to describing it. Healthcare in Scotland is today set 
with patient safety as the priority context. The growing evidence base from patient 
safety research, which includes human factors, is also considered to be of value to 
this thesis in describing the system of aseptic intravenous drug preparation 
procedures.    
 
From all these theories and approaches discussed in this section the 
methodological framework used for this thesis will be summarised in the next 
chapter. 
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5 The Methodological Framework used in this Thesis 
In this brief chapter the methodological framework used in this thesis is detailed. 
To understand the system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical 
care settings, aspects of the system that are both error-prone and reliable need to 
be identified. As a consequence of the evaluations in the previous chapter, the 
methodological framework for use in the thesis is in the domain of Human Error 
Theory, High Reliability Theory, Patient Safety and Human Factors and is made up 
of the following specifics: 
• Patient Safety: Healthcare, and in particular intravenous drug preparation, is 
inherently dangerous (Verghese et al. 1998, Institute of Medicine 1999, 
Stelfox et al. 2006, Vonberg and Gastmeier 2007). 
• Patient Safety: Healthcare can be made safer by measuring and 
understanding performance and changing systems to make them more 
reliable, thereby reducing the distance between the desired goals and the 
achieved outcomes (Newhouse and Poe 2005). 
• Human Error: All systems designed by humans are fallible. Failures arise 
through a combination of unsafe acts performed by frontline workers and 
latent conditions in the system’s design. By identifying the latent conditions 
(organisation and culture and the current conditions of work) and how the 
HCWs perform the procedure, the error-prone nature of a system can be 
determined. (Reason 1990, Vincent et al. 1998, Reason 2000, Vincent et al. 
2000, Vincent et al. 2004, Vincent 2006). 
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• Safety Culture: The safety culture within an organisation and within the 
clinical area is critical to the safety of the patients and staff therein. To 
measure the safety culture related to this procedure, six domains have been 
identified as critical to that measure: working conditions, team working 
climate, safety climate, perceptions of management, job satisfaction, 
working conditions and stress recognition (Sexton et al. 2006). 
• Patient Safety and Human Error: Certain characteristics in a system can 
make it more error-prone, for example, complexity, variation in input, role 
confusion, lack of feedback, tight-coupling, time constraints, hierarchical 
culture, poor safety culture and erroneous assumptions of safety (Cook and 
Woods 1994, Spath 2000, Hudson 2003, Pronovost et al. 2006).   
• High-Reliability Theory: Certain characteristics in a system can make it 
safer, for example; sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, 
deference to expertise, reluctance to simplify and preoccupation with failure 
(Hudson 2003, Carroll and Rudolph 2006, Tamuz and Harrison 2006). 
• Human Factors: Understanding the system from a human factors 
perspective will identify what is required to enable the HCW to do the right 
thing (World Health Organization 2009).  
In this brief chapter the methodological framework utilising Human Error, High 
Reliability, Patient Safety and Human Factors has been detailed.  The next chapter 
contains the research question and objectives for the thesis. 
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6 Research Questions  
In this chapter the research question and the overall objectives for the thesis are 
set out. The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate the system of preparation of 
intravenous drugs in clinical care settings in NHSScotland in order to identify how 
error-prone and how reliable the system is. The thesis is informed by the 
methodological framework. From the previous sections, the following emerge as 
the research questions and objectives. 
 
6.1      Research Questions 
(1) What is the system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs in 
clinical care settings in Scotland? 
(2) How does the system work in practice? 
6.2      Research Objectives 
To produce a profile of the system of preparation of intravenous drugs in 
near patient areas in Scotland 
• To identify the system’s reliability characteristics  
• To identify the system’s error-prone characteristics  
• To identify the challenges that HCWs face in ensuring asepsis during the 
preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care settings in Scotland. 
The next chapter provides a discussion on the evaluation and selection of various 
methods that were required to answer the research questions. 
 114 
7 Methods 
In this chapter the rationale for using the selected data collection methods will be 
given. As no single sampling method was deemed sufficient to answer the 
research questions, different data sources were selected; these data collection 
sources and methods facilitated triangulation of the data, making the data more 
robust and less subject to bias.  
 
To identify the system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs, the following 
methods were identified as necessary:  
• Observational assessments of each location  
• Observations of drug preparations in practice  
• HCWs’ opinions of safety and when redundancy checks are performed 
• A comparison of written procedures with observed procedures.  
 
Six clinical settings where the literature had identified an infusate outbreak risk 
were selected for the research. As no existing tools were identified as being 
suitable, four data collections tools were devised. Details of how these tools were 
devised are given in this chapter.  Also in this chapter, the sampling frame and 
recruitment process are described. The ethical and research governance 
considerations and procedures are given. The chapter begins with a review of the 
possible data sources. 
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7.1      Data Collection Methods Selection 
The thesis set out to answer the questions: ‘What is the system of aseptic 
preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care settings in Scotland? And ‘How 
does it work in practice?’  The thesis was informed by the methodological 
framework. To complete this thesis, a variety of different data sources could have 
been used. The possible sources of data for this thesis included: 
• The operators who carry out the procedure 
• The nurses in charge of those who carry out the procedures 
• The environments in which the procedures are performed 
• The equipment (including guidelines / policies / checklists) to aid the 
procedure 
• Data monitoring and feedback on the system 
• Error reporting on the system 
 
Data for this thesis could have been collected, for example, by asking HCWs about 
their practices, by observing HCWs practices, by surveying the environment, or 
examining written evidence about practice or performance.  There are advantages, 
disadvantages and potential biases to all the various methods available for 
collecting the data (Parahoo 1997, Bowling 2002).  It is also well-recognised that 
merely measuring a research phenomenon can impact on the phenomenon being 
measured and thus bias the results (Heisenberg 1930).  For example, asking 
HCWs what they do using a semi-structured questionnaire might yield biased 
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information in that there may be a difference from what HCWs say they do from 
what they actually do. In addition, it is recognised that observer bias can arise 
when HCWs being observed change there practice as a consequence of the 
presence of a researcher (Parahoo 1997: 313, Bowling, 2002: 154). Discussing the 
procedures with HCWs whilst they are performing them has already been 
recognised in this review as a source of potential environmental capture and 
consequently a cause of omission error (Reason 1990: 71). Asking HCWs to 
describe the facilities or interruptions may generate a personal biased perspective. 
For example, a HCW may be so accommodating of poor facilities or accepting of 
frequent interruptions as normal, that such facilities and events might not be 
recognised as potential error precursors, when to an unbiased eye this would be 
recognised as the situation. Another important source of bias is from the 
researcher. Observer bias arises when, as a result of preformed opinions, what is 
recorded as occurring is different to what occurred (Bowling 2002: 154). To reduce 
this source of bias, the first ward study took place observed by a research expert.  
A debrief on the methods used in pilot study took place. There was agreement not 
to change the methods but some improvements in preparation were identified. 
 
There are accepted methods that can minimise the risk of bias being introduced as 
a consequence of measuring by non-participant observation. For example, it has 
been shown that those being observed cannot maintain a change in practice as a 
consequence of being observed for long periods, in effect they return to ‘type’ 
(Parahoo 1997: 313). Therefore, in this study sufficient numbers of observations of 
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drug preparation procedures were required to minimise bias. None of these 
methods used in isolation would have provided sufficient data to answer the 
research questions. Observations of practice alone would have provided data on 
what was done, but not if it was being done as the procedure was written. 
Observations of practice alone would not have identified the context in which care 
was delivered or identification of any HCWs’ assumptions of safety.  
 
Kimchi et al. (1991) defined the term triangulation to describe a research method 
that uses multiple means of data collection, theory or analysis. The term is derived 
from the methods of finding an unknown third point from two known points, for 
example, as used in distance finding when map making. Triangulation in research 
has more recently been defined as ‘the combination of two or more data sources, 
investigators, methodological approaches, theoretical perspectives or analytical 
methods within the same study’ (Thurmond 2001: 253).  
 
Triangulation has been advocated in nursing research because it negates or 
minimises potential bias inherent in all single methods (Kimchi et al. 1991). In this 
thesis there was no single data source that could have been used to answer the 
research question and therefore triangulation from multiple data sources was 
required.  Triangulation of methods was used to verify data collected from different 
sources, minimise bias and to ensure that sufficient data was collected to answer 
the research question. This triangulation of data involved four different sources – 
detailed in the next section.  
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The four data sources used to answer the research question were as follows: 
• Assessments of locations where the procedures are performed  
• Observations of aseptic drug preparation procedures  
• Survey of HCWs’ opinions on safety and when they performed redundancy 
checks 
• Comparison of written procedures with observed procedures. ‘Written 
procedures’ includes all the information available to the HCW for the 
purposes of achieving asepsis during drug preparations which was 
examined. 
 
Reason’s (1990) error categorisation (Figure 2) also provides useful information for 
the data collection. First, the researcher must observe the operator and not 
interrupt. Interruptions could cause distraction and could provoke skill-based 
errors. Secondly, communication before observing the procedure must not cause 
the operator to be anxious because, if the operator is preoccupied on what the 
researcher observes and reflect on this, similar slips and lapses due to 
environmental capture could arise.  Finally, since distraction may be a part of the 
normal context in which operators perform such tasks, it must be looked for. A 
working environment that is full of operator distractions would be considered as 
skill-based and error-prone.  
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7.2      Data Collection Tools 
No existing validated or un-validated tools were found in the literature that could 
have been used for this thesis. Consequently, data collection tools were devised 
for each of the data sources.  The design of the tools was influenced from related 
research in the literature, from the extant national guidance and from the 
researcher’s experience in performing the procedure and writing guidelines for 
them (CRAG 2002, Lingard et al. 2004, Vincent et al. 2004, Nursing and Midwifery 
Council 2006, National Patient Safety Agency 2007).  
 
7.2.1 Data Collection Tool 1 – Location Assessment 
The Location Assessment tool was devised by adapting the procedure profile 
produced by Vincent et al. (2004) and illustrated in Table 3. The Location 
Assessment was designed to identify the environmental factors related to the 
procedure, including: regulatory framework for aseptic drug preparation, area 
design of where drugs are prepared, types of patients and drugs commonly used, 
whether high-risk drugs such as heparin was used, what facilities available to the 
HCW, what training was provided and what quality control was ongoing (Appendix 
1). This data collection tool was administered by the researcher with the nurse in 
charge of the clinical area in the clinical area where the intravenous drugs are 
prepared. 
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7.2.2 Data Collection Tool 2 – Observations of procedures 
The data collection tool for the observation of each individual procedure was 
prepared from national guidance of the advocated steps for a safe procedure, and 
from the researcher’s professional experience of preparing drugs (CRAG 2002, 
Nursing and Midwifery Council 2006, National Patient Safety Agency 2007). The 
advocated steps in the procedure were listed with space for comment on exactly 
how the procedure was performed (Appendix 2). 
 
The assessment of any microbial contamination was based on the following 
summary of evidence (Table 5). 
Table 5   The evidence supporting the method of assessing the microbial risks 
in the observed study procedures 
Potential 
contamination 
sources 
Potential cross-transmission route  
and subsequent infusate contamination 
Supporting 
Evidence 
 
Hands 
 
Contamination of hands at any point in the 
procedure will facilitate contact transmission of 
micro-organisms to any subsequent environment or 
equipment surface. 
(World 
Health 
Organization 
2009) 
Surfaces used 
to prepare 
A contaminated surface used to prepare infusates 
could through contact transmit contamination to 
(World 
Health 
 121 
Table 5   The evidence supporting the method of assessing the microbial risks 
in the observed study procedures 
drugs equipment or hands that will subsequently through 
further contact transfer the micro-organisms to the 
infusate. 
Organization 
2009) 
Equipment 
contamination 
Cross-transmission to equipment can arise by 
contact with a contaminated surface (human, 
environmental or other equipment), thus facilitating 
subsequent transfer to an infusate. 
(Kramer et 
al. 2006) 
Access points 
to diluents / 
drug vials 
Diluent access points that are not sterile will be 
contaminated through exposure to the air or 
contact; if not decontaminated they will provide 
microbes with entry to the diluent/drug and thereby 
contaminate an infusate. 
(Zacher et al. 
1991) 
Re-use of drug 
vials 
Contamination will arise over time with the re-use 
of multi-dose or single-use vials. This will enable 
the direct transfer micro-organisms to any infusate 
prepared after contamination has occurred. 
(Mattner and 
Gastmeier 
2004) 
Contaminated 
antiseptic 
Antiseptics are weak disinfectants and unless 
sterile and single-use can become contaminated 
and subsequently contaminate environments, 
hands, skin or vial tops and thus an infusate. 
(Nasser et al. 
2004) 
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Table 5   The evidence supporting the method of assessing the microbial risks 
in the observed study procedures 
Droplet 
contamination  
Equipment, hands, drugs or diluents exposed to 
water spray can become contaminated with 
microbes which can subsequently contaminate an 
infusate. 
(Nasser et al. 
2004) 
Long term 
infusates 
Infusates administered over 12 hours will provide 
micro-organisms with sufficient time to multiply to 
cause IR-BSI during the life-time of the infusate. 
(Maki and 
Martin 1975) 
Airborne 
dissemination 
(related to the 
degree of drug 
exposure to air)  
Any drug/diluent ampoule or equipment part in 
contact with any drug/diluent, which is open to the 
air during preparation has the potential to be 
contaminated from the myriad of microbes which 
are present in air all of the time. The amount of 
contamination being proportionate to the amount of 
contamination in the air and duration of exposure. 
(Eickhoff 
1994) 
 
 
7.2.3 Data Collection Tool 3a – HCWs’ opinions on safety  
The third data collection tool (Appendix 3a), asks for the HCWs’ opinions on safety 
of the aseptic drug procedures and was developed from validated tools produced 
to measure the safety culture in clinical settings. The science of measuring safety 
in a clinical setting is considered immature (Pronovost et al. 2006). The majority of 
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safety culture tools are designed to measure organisation-wide safety culture 
(Scott et al. 2003, Singer et al. 2003, Pronovost et al. 2006, Sexton et al. 2006). 
Although some have been modified to measure safety in clinical units (Koornneef 
2006), none have yet been devised to measure safety culture related to the 
research procedure. The majority of these safety culture tools use a Likert scale to 
generate quantitative data (Colla et al. 2005, Makary et al. 2006, Modak et al. 
2007, Wisniewski et al. 2007). 
 
To devise a safety culture measurement tool for the research procedure, existing 
tools were reviewed. Six domains of safety previously identified and included in the 
methodological framework, by Sexton et al. (2006) were all recognised as relevant 
to the study; these domains of safety were: team worker climate, safety climate, 
perceptions of management, job satisfaction, working conditions and stress 
recognition. The HCWs’ opinions of safety tool (Appendix 3a) begins with three 
statements that measure the safety culture by assessing the HCWs assumptions 
of safety and the working conditions,  that is,  
When preparing drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure. 
When preparing drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure. 
The procedures for preparing drugs on this ward are simple. 
 
The first 2 of these statements relate to the safety culture and the last statement 
pertains to the working conditions. The remaining statements were designed to 
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measure the safety culture by canvassing the degree to which the HCWs consider 
the procedure safe based on the domains of safety  (Sexton et al. 2006) Table 6.  
 
Table 6    Statements from the HCWs’ Opinions of Safety (safety culture) 
Criterion  Measuring 
The resources, (time, people, equipment) on this ward 
makes it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 
Working conditions 
The environment, (space, cleanliness, lack of clutter) 
on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 
Working conditions 
The distractions and interruptions on this ward make it 
difficult to prepare IV drugs safely 
Working conditions 
I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 
performance 
Safety culture 
I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns 
regarding IV drug preparation on this ward 
Safety culture 
I can prepare IV drugs on this ward without distraction 
or interruption 
Working conditions 
Asepsis failure is a safety priority on this ward Perceptions of 
management 
If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation, I 
would always report it 
Safety culture 
There is good support on this ward for those who Teamwork culture 
 125 
Table 6    Statements from the HCWs’ Opinions of Safety (safety culture) 
Criterion  Measuring 
prepare intravenous drugs 
To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report 
errors 
Safety culture 
Preparation of IV drugs is stressful Stress Recognition 
Preparation of IV drugs gives me job satisfaction  Job satisfaction 
 
Evaluations of the scores on the Likert scare were used to determine if HCWs who 
prepare intravenous drugs consider the procedures safe and consider the 
likelihood of failure low. Such assumptions of safety can be poor indicators of 
reliability as it is only by acknowledging the propensity to fail that the system can 
become reliable (Hudson 2003, Carroll and Rudolph 2006, Tamuz and Harrison 
2006). 
 
7.2.4 Data Collection Tool 3b – Operators stated redundancy checks 
The last part of the HCW survey relates to the redundancy checks that the HCWs 
perform when undertaking the thesis procedures. Again there was no tool 
identified from the literature that could have been used or adapted. To produce this 
data collection tool, the procedure of intravenous drug preparation was broken 
down into the component parts, and at each step in the procedure, the HCW was 
asked to note if they performed a redundancy step. Data from this part of the 
thesis was compared to that observed and that required by the written procedures. 
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The data showed where redundancy checks are present in aseptic and non-
aseptic parts of the procedures. This data collection tool is Appendix 3b. 
 
No data collect tool was devised for the comparison between written and observed 
procedures. This would have been devised from the wards’ procedures. 
 
 
 
7.2.5 Validity of the Data Collection Tools 
None of the three data collection forms (Appendix 1, 2, 3a, 3b) have been field 
tested – though a pilot study was performed. The data collection tools were 
examined to ensure that the data collected would answer the research question 
and that they have face validity. The criteria measured by the tools were compared 
to the characteristics identified from the literature that denote error-prone or high 
reliability features. These characteristics were designated as: error-prone 
characteristics (EPC), high-reliability characteristics (HRC) or system profile 
characteristics (SPC). The characteristics within each of these data collection tools 
were compared against the characteristics identified from the literature to ensure 
that they are incorporated in at least one, and preferably more than one, of the 
data collection tools, facilitating triangulation of the data from different sources. 
Table 7 shows with an ‘X’ which characteristics were measured by each of the 
tools. 
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Table 7 lists all the EPC, HRC and SPC that were required in the thesis and shows 
which of the data collection streams they were identified from.  
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Table 7      Error-prone, high-reliability and system profile characteristics  
 
Location 
assessment 
Preparation 
observations 
Safety opinions / 
Redundancy 
checks 
Written 
materials 
EPC – Reliance on humans X X  X 
EPC – Complexity X X  X 
EPC – Variation in input X X  X 
EPC – Role Confusion X  X  
EPC – Lack of feedback X X X X 
EPC – Tight coupling X X   
EPC – Time constraints  X X  
EPC – Hierarchical culture   X X 
EPC – Poor safety culture   X  
EPC – Erroneous 
assumptions of safety 
  X X 
HRC – Sensitivity to 
operations 
 X X  
HRC – Deference to expertise X X X  
HRC  - Commitment to 
resilience 
  X  
HRC: Reluctance to simplify  X X  
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Table 7      Error-prone, high-reliability and system profile characteristics  
 
Location 
assessment 
Preparation 
observations 
Safety opinions / 
Redundancy 
checks 
Written 
materials 
HRC: Preoccupation with 
failure 
  X  
SPC: Latent conditions / 
failures 
X X X X 
SPC: Current working 
conditions 
X X   
EPC: Unsafe acts  X X  
EPC: Absence of system 
defences 
X X X X 
SPC: End product testing X X   
 
Having determined the data collection tools to be used, the remaining sections of 
the chapter will discuss the population and sampling as well as the ethics and 
research governance. 
 
7.2.6 Summary of mixed methodology being used 
In order to answer the research questions: what is the system of aseptic 
preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care settings in Scotland and how does 
it work in practice? - a mixed methods approach to obtain both qualitative and 
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quantitative data was used. This approach was chosen because a holistic system 
description requires both numerical data and qualitative data. Merely counting the 
presence or absence of phenomena would not have achieved the research aims. 
Similarly, qualitative data alone would not have identified with sufficient clarity the 
opinions of safety or redundancy checks. Therefore, where the phenomena were 
more suited to being described numerically, then a quantitative approach was used 
to complement the qualitative data.   
 
Mixed methods research is seen as a complement to traditional qualitative or 
quantitative research and provides a pragmatic solution to the limitations offered 
by either method applied individually. Proponents suggest the approach results in 
a more complete analysis (Cresswell et al. 2004, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
2004).  It has also been argued that a mixed methods approach enables the 
researcher to tackle both practice and policy issues (as was required in this study) 
from both the standpoint of numbers and narratives (Borkan 2004).  However, 
others have warned that adding quantitative data, or trying to quantify qualitative 
data results in a loss of depth and flexibility (Driscoll et al. 2007). This argument 
has been countered by those who suggest that the application of mixed methods 
benefits the study provided that there is recognition of the pitfalls that could arise 
when results from both methods were not in agreement (Borkan 2004, Cresswell 
et al. 2004). In this study where the observed results differed from the reported 
results explanations were looked for. For example, reported safety opinions did not 
match the researcher’s observed risk assessment from the procedure. This was 
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shown to be not a result of untrue reporting, but of an unrecognised understanding 
of risk from the procedure as performed. 
 
Qualitative data was gained from the location assessments where the nurses 
described their wards, how they operated and how they produced the infusates. 
This data was then complemented with qualitative data from observations of how 
the nurses actually used the environment, the equipment and the information 
available to them. Additionally, the qualitative data included the descriptions of the 
context in which they worked including any distractions and risks from concurrent 
procedures performed by colleagues. This qualitative data was combined with 
quantitative data which was gained from the survey of opinions of safety and the 
survey of where redundancy checks were performed. Further quantitative data was 
gained from comparisons of the observed procedures with the written procedures, 
that is, comparing what was done with what was specified to be done.   
 
Consequently, this mixed methods approach produced both qualitative and 
quantitative data and reduced the potential bias sources inherent in all forms of 
research. The data generated which were mainly qualitative, described the 
elements of a system in detail rather than enumerated the presence or absence of 
particular system elements to answer the research questions: what is the system 
of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care settings in Scotland and 
how does it work in practice? 
.  
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7.3     Population and Sample 
Three different populations were identified:  
• The environment, that is, the clinical settings where the procedures were 
preformed 
• The HCWs in each of the clinical settings who prepared the intravenous drugs 
• The drugs prepared in each of the settings. 
 
It was anticipated that each individual clinical setting would have up to 20 HCWs 
who could prepare many different drugs for intravenous use throughout any given 
day. The total population of clinical settings where HCWs manipulate intravenous 
drugs was considered a theoretical population; the true number of such clinical 
settings beings unknown. The population was not considered homogenous but 
made up of clinical settings where there is considerable variation in: the number 
and type of drugs prepared, the environment in terms of it being ‘fit-for-purpose’, 
and the expertise therein. Types of clinical settings were chosen based on their 
high-use of intravenous drugs prepared and from reports in the literature of 
infusate-related outbreaks or high-levels of blood stream infections (Coello et al. 
2003, Vonberg and Gastmeier 2007). The following categories of ward were 
chosen: 
1st Ward - The pilot ward: an Intensive Care Unit (adult) 
2nd Ward – A bone marrow transplant unit (adult) 
3rd Ward – An Intensive Care Unit (adult) 
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4th Ward – A Vascular Surgery ward (adult) 
5th Ward – A Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (paediatric) 
6th Ward – A Medical receiving ward (adult) 
 
A quota sampling of one clinical setting from each of the target clinical settings was 
used. The NHS in Scotland operates as a single NHS Board system. There are 11 
main NHS Boards and 3 island Boards. Data were collected from 1 NHS Board 
that comprises 30% of all healthcare in Scotland – NHS Greater Glasgow and 
Clyde. 
 
7.3.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The inclusion criteria for this study were: 
• A target clinical setting 
• The clinical team were willing to participate and agreed to consent 
• Intravenous drugs were prepared in the clinical setting 
The exclusion criteria were:  
• Clinical areas not in the identified in the target list 
• In a target clinical setting, but preparation of drugs in clinical care settings 
does not take place. 
 
7.4      Ethics and Research Governance 
A submission was made to the local Research Ethics and the Research 
Governance Committees for NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde and the University 
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of Stirling. Ethics and Governance permission was received. The submission 
included the promise to maintain and assure beneficence, non-maleficience, 
fidelity, justice, veracity and confidentiality to all those involved in the study.  
 
The ethical issues that could have arisen were around observations of omissions 
or violations that could have led to patient harm. To address this, the consent form 
included information on what would happen if such events were observed, that is, 
the researcher would inform the HCW being observed. 
 
The researcher assured the ethical committees that the study would benefit wider 
patient safety; there were no interventions in the study that could cause harm to 
either the patients or HCWs, primacy would always be given to the normal 
healthcare activities which would take precedence, and the researcher’s records, 
as discussed in the following sections of the thesis are truthful. No individual 
identifiable nurse or patient data were collected or disclosed. The ward managers 
were invited to see the results of their individual data collection. 
 
The letter from the ethics and R&D management committees approving the study 
is included as Appendix 4. 
 
7.4.1 Recruitment and consent   
Recruitment was performed as specified by the Ethics Committee. A letter was 
sent to the Director of Nursing asking for permission to conduct the study in NHS 
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Greater Glasgow and Clyde and a request was made to nominate ward managers 
in the selected areas. Ward managers from each of the chosen clinical areas 
volunteered to take part. 
 
Several managers of wards made contact requesting that more wards be used in 
the study – however this was not possible given the study design and its purpose. 
 
The information leaflet used for HCWs is shown as Appendix 5 
The consent form for observations is shown as Appendix 6 
 
7.5      Chapter 7 summary 
To answer the research questions, ‘What is the system of aseptic preparation of 
intravenous drugs?’ And ‘How does it work in practice?’, data collection tools were 
required that would minimise bias and describe the system. Six clinical areas were 
chosen (including a pilot ward) where intravenous drugs are prepared and where 
the literature suggests there may be risk of infusate-related outbreaks.  
 
No single data collection source would answer the research questions and no 
existing data collection tools were identified to fit the methodological framework. 
Triangulation was used to strengthen the inferences that were gained from the 
data analysis and reduce the risk of bias during the data gathering or analysing.  
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Four data collection tools were devised. The first tool, the Location Assessment, 
involved the researcher examining the physical environment were the ward 
operates, the patients, the drugs, the procedures, the information available and the 
location were the drugs were prepared. The researcher completed the Location 
Assessment with the nurses in charge of the areas.  
 
The second tool was an observation data collection form that collected data on 
how drugs were prepared in practice. This data was collected by the researcher 
observing, with consent, all drugs prepared on a single shift.  
 
The third data collection tool consisted of two parts. The first part (3a) collected 
data on the HCWs’ opinions of safety (to measure the safety culture related to the 
thesis procedures) and the second part (3b) collected data on when the HCWs 
stated they performed redundancy checks. This data collection was given to all 
identified persons who prepared intravenous drugs on a study ward.  
 
A final data source, for which no data collection tool was devised, was to compare 
written procedures with observed procedures. All the tools required piloting. To 
ensure face validity, the criteria they measure were mapped to the characteristics 
identified from the underlying framework literature, as denoting error-prone 
characteristics, high reliability characteristics, system profile characteristics and the 
methodological framework. 
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Once the data collection tools were completed then ethical and research 
governance at a university and NHS board level were attained. Following this, 
volunteer wards were selected from the inclusion criteria and after discussions and 
agreements to participate from the ward managers, the data collection was then 
ready to commence. 
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8 Results  
This chapter contains the results from all the data collected. Presented first are the 
generic data from the location assessments and the procedure observations that 
were common to all six study wards. This is followed by the individual results from 
the six study wards detailing: the location assessment data, the observations of 
procedures, the contamination risks in the procedures and the strategies for 
reduction of contamination risks. The comparison of observed and written 
procedures is given after this, followed by the results of the opinions of safety.  
After the individual wards’ results, the final sections include collective results on 
redundancy checks followed by an evaluation of the information available from 
sources other than the NHS board.  
 
What these results will demonstrate is that although there is a single training 
programme and overall single procedure manual, there are 6 very different 
procedures performed. The risk of infusate contamination varies between 
individual wards based on the environment facilities available, the equipment in 
use, the drugs and diluents in use, how the procedure is performed and the 
opinions of safety therein. There was only one written procedure which could be 
compared with an observed procedure. A risk assessment had not been performed 
on any study ward. The identified risks included: risks from splash contamination, 
risks of error from distraction and interruption, risks from the types of drugs used 
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(multi-dose vials) and risks from equipment used (Dispensing Pins). Some of the 
wards used equipment to defend the system, for example, reconstitution devices, 
which reduced possible infusate exposure to microbial contamination. Two wards 
used effective in-line filters to prevent infection should contamination have 
occurred. In all six wards there was at least one systematic error that increased the 
infusate contamination risk. Most notably in all of the wards, many staff did not 
know that tops of rubber vials were not sterile and therefore did not decontaminate 
them before use. Despite staff in the ICUs partaking in a national safety 
programme, which provided the ward with data on ventilator-associated 
pneumonia, and central vascular catheter-related infections, there was no IR-BSI 
data and no end product testing being performed in any of the study wards.  
 
The opinions of safety questionnaire which aimed to measure the safety culture 
provided a mixed picture. There were opinions indicating increased safety, such as 
willingness to report errors, and vulnerable safety indicators, for example, 
erroneous assumptions of safety and some nurses finding the procedure stressful. 
The opinions of safety did not always concur with the researcher’s assessment of 
risk; this underlines the importance of triangulated data. Safety culture results are 
available for only five of the six study wards.  Insufficient responses were collected 
on the 6th study ward with which to assess their safety opinions. This ward had the 
least optimal facilities. 
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The redundancy checks data shows that there is again variation in when 
redundancy checks are done and the nature of these. The results clearly indicate 
that asepsis checks are the least likely checks to be performed as a redundancy 
check.  
 
The final results data are an assessment of all other infection-related information 
available to all the HCWs who prepare drugs; these data show that the HCWs who 
prepare and administer intravenous drugs are not well informed about infection 
risks.  
 
From all the data sources detailed above, the system profile was produced. The 
conclusion from the profile is that the system of aseptic drug preparation is at 
present more error-prone than reliable. The chapter begins with a statement on the 
non-existent environmental risk assessments followed by a review of the generic 
training and generic manual pertaining to the preparation of intravenous drugs.   
 
8.1.1 Generic results applicable to all study wards 
In none of the study wards had there been an environmental risk assessment 
performed to identify if the area was suitable for preparing the intravenous drugs 
as required by the CRAG (2002) guidance. In all the study wards it is the qualified 
nurses who prepare and administer the intravenous drugs.   
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What training do those who prepare and administer intravenous drugs receive? 
Once a nurse has had sufficient time post registration, usually 6 months, and the 
ward manager considers the nurse ready, arrangements are made for the nurse to 
attend the NHS board single day (two days for ITU nurses) intravenous training 
programme. On completion of this training, which includes calculation testing, 
supervision is given until the nurse has completed 10 bolus drug preparations, 10 
infusion preparations and 10 infusion pump preparations. Mentoring is provided on 
the wards by qualified nurse and, wherever possible, by a named individual. 
Nurses in-training for intravenous drug competency evidence their progress in a 
record book. Once the nurses’ training had been completed, the written 
examinations passed and the supervised practice completed, the nurse is then 
deemed competent.  
 
Nurses can be moved from a competent status back to one which is not competent 
at the request of the nurse or by one of the team leaders.  This could be, for 
example, if a competent nurse had a run of calculation errors or near-misses 
related to infusion timings or cross-reactions had been identified. The nurse may 
have, for a time, personal problems and feel that the additional burden from drug 
preparation is not helping. This would be grounds for not preparing and 
administering intravenous drugs for a time. 
 
What training is provided after initial training? 
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No further formal training is provided. However, clinical skills are developed on the 
wards and there is ongoing peer approval and informal assessment for all staff 
who prepare and administer intravenous drugs. 
 
Are there any drugs which staff do not prepare? 
None of the staff on any of the study wards are permitted to add drugs to total 
parenteral nutrition bags, prepare chemotherapy drugs or prepare intrathecal 
drugs. These drugs and additions are all prepared in the hospital’s sterile 
pharmacy suite. The study wards all had a formulary which listed the drugs that 
could be given on that ward. 
 
Were any communication failures observed during the preparation of infusates? 
Observing for communication failures was done on the study wards. All 
redundancy checks were done with two nurses, one of whom was competent in 
intravenous drug administration. The following communication statements can be 
made for the observed procedures on all the study wards 
Occasion – all drug checks were done before administration 
Audience – all drug checks were done with one competent nurse and one 
other nurse 
Content – all drug checks were read out against written instructions and 
confirmed 
Purpose – all drug checks were done to ensure right: patient / patient 
prescription, drug, dose, diluent, duration, route, and timing. 
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Are there checklists; if so, what do they cover? 
There were no available checklists for IV drug preparation and administration 
found in any of the study wards.   
 
What generic information is available on the wards? 
Available on all study wards was the NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde “Intravenous 
Medicine Administration Self-Directed Learning Package” (NHS Greater Glasgow 
and Clyde 2009). The document is given to all nurses who undergo training for 
competency in intravenous drug competency in this NHS board. 
 
The following information to prevent infection is given in this document: 
• Hand washing (level II) prior to handling the cannula or preparing medicines 
• Cleaning ports prior to use 
• Changing administration sets every 72 – 96 hours  
• Minimising the number of manipulations to prepare a medicine, that is, 
break a vial membrane once to remove the desired quantity of fluid 
• Minimising the time between preparation and administration 
• Minimising the length of time that the cannula is in situ. It is recommended 
that the cannula is changed every 72-96 hours following insertion, provided 
that an alternative site is available should the patient continue to need IV 
access 
• Use of closed IV systems and reconstitution devices 
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What makes the above generic is the lack of specifics (for example, the 
requirement to change the cannula) when in fact most ICU patients will have CVCs 
which do not get changed every 96 hours. There is a lack of other specifics for 
example: 
‘72 or 96 hours for change of cannula and administration set’ 
There is no information as to why the HCW should choose to change a cannnula 
at 72 hours and why on occasion at 96 hours. There is no mention of the need to 
change it sooner if there are particular risks (for example, post blood or lipid 
transfusion).   
 
‘Minimise the time between preparation and administration’ 
There is no specific information as to what would be an unacceptable preparation- 
to-administration time interval. 
‘Cleaning ports prior to use’ 
There is no information as to which ports in particular are included here, with what 
they should be cleaned (sic) [decontaminated], and for how long should the 
antiseptic be in contact with the port surface. Finally exactly how should the 
antiseptic be applied to ensure that there is effective decontamination of the ports? 
 
‘Use of a closed IV systems and reconstitution devices.’ 
There are no more specifics on what defines equipment as closed and why, if it is 
available, there is not a requirement to use it all the time.   
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The generic document also defines an adverse incident and what should be done 
if one is detected. An adverse incident is defined as:  
‘any happening with or without injury (near miss)  
which is not consistent with the care provided to the patient  by the facility and 
relates to the treatment that the patient has or  should have received.’ 
 
A reporting adverse incident algorithm is provided for staff – the accompanying 
form to be completed does not include infection signs or symptoms, infusate 
contamination, IR-BSI or insertion site infection, as specific listed categories. There 
are 22 options; number 22 is ‘other’.  
 
In summary this generic information is just that; generic. It lacks details of precisely 
what should be done, when it should be done and how it should be done.   
 
This chapter will now continue with the results on the remainder of the data that 
were collected and were specific to the individual study wards. The individual 
wards results are presented in the following order: 
1st Ward - The pilot ward: an Intensive Care Unit (adult) 
2nd Ward – A bone marrow transplant unit (adult) 
3rd Ward – An Intensive Care Unit (adult) 
4th Ward – A Vascular Surgery ward (adult) 
5th Ward – A Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (paediatric) 
6th Ward – A Medical receiving ward (adult) 
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Each individual ward result is presented in the following order: 
o The Location Assessment 
o The observations of drug preparations 
o An assessment of the contamination risks in each ward’s procedures  
o An assessment of how the contamination risks can be reduced  
o Comparison of observed procedures with written procedures 
o The results of the HCWs’ opinions of safety. 
 
The individual ward’s results begin with the pilot ward.
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8.2      Results from the pilot ward: an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) 
 
 
Data Stream 1 – Location Assessment - pilot ward 
Data Stream 2 – Observation of Intravenous Drug Preparations - pilot ward 
Contamination risks in the pilot ward procedure 
How to reduce potential contamination risks in the pilot ward  
Data Stream 4 - Comparison of observed procedures with written procedures 
Data Stream 3a – Opinions of Safety - pilot ward 
 
 
Study took place on Thursday 10th September 2009 
Researcher Evonne Curran  
Observer Dr. Kath Stoddart  
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8.2.1 Data Stream 1 - Location Assessment - pilot ward 
The data for the Location Assessment were obtained by interview with the ward 
manager and from the researcher’s observations during the study period. 
 
The unit and the patients they care for 
The unit is a general intensive care unit (ICU) comprising 10 beds of which 3 are in 
cubicles (Figure 3). The patient population comprises patients requiring respiratory 
support, patients with burns and tertiary referrals patients such as those with upper 
gastrointestinal pathology, in particular patients with severe pancreatitis. 
 
Figure 3     The layout of the pilot ward 
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What vascular devices are used for intravenous drug administration? 
In the main, central vascular catheters (CVCs) are used to administer drugs. This 
is due to the longer term vascular access requirements of intensive care patients, 
the use of drugs irritant to veins and the need for immediate reliable vascular 
access.   Some patients have peripheral vascular catheters (PVCs).  Peripherally 
inserted central catheters (PICCs) and midline catheters would be used if they are 
already in situ when the patient is admitted. Swan Ganz catheters are occasionally 
used; patients can now be monitored without the use of this invasive device. 
 
Approximately how many intravascular drugs are prepared in the unit? 
The patients in the ICU require about 10 drugs each per day. With an average 
daily population of 7 patients, a conservative estimate would be that 25,500 
intravascular drugs per year are prepared in the ICU. 
 
What intravenous drugs are prepared and administered? 
The main intravenous drug groups used and administered to patients are: 
antibiotics, anaesthetic drugs, beta-blockers, ACE inhibitors, bronchodilators and 
gastric ulcer prophylaxis medicines.  In addition, all CVCs are flushed 4 hourly with 
saline and after the administration of drugs to minimise catheter blockage. 
 
Does the unit use drugs associated with infusate sepsis? 
Several drugs that have been associated with causing infusate sepsis are used 
within this ICU. Long-term infusions (>12hr duration) are used for drugs such as 
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heparin and morphine; this initially poses the risk of low level contamination then 
becoming high-level over the course of the infusion.  There is frequent use of lipid 
drugs, such as the anaesthetic propofol, which is known to promote microbial 
growth. 
 
Are any of the intravenous drugs prepared from multi-dose vials? 
The initial response to the above question was that no multi-dose drugs are used; 
however, observation of the drug’s cupboard identified several drugs that, although 
not used as multi-dose drugs, could be used as such in error. For example, 
Lignocaine and Propofol both come as sterile bottles with rubber tops that could 
inadvertently be used, contaminated and replaced on a shelf without showing 
obvious contamination prior to reuse. Invitingly, the Lignocaine is labelled ‘with 
preservative’. 
 
A bag of saline is allocated to each patient for a 24 hour period to be used as a 
multi-dose diluent and flush solution. It is patient-labelled and does not leave the 
bedside. It is accessed via a “Dispensing Pin” which enables repeated doses to be 
removed from the bag without the need to use multiple individual ampoules. 
 
How long are the vascular access devices in situ for? 
There is no set time for CVCs replacement. They are often removed just before 
transfer of a patient. They are always removed if there is redness around the 
insertion site or if there are signs of a catheter-related blood stream infection. 
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Is there a stable team that prepares and administers the intravenous drugs? 
Yes. Generally the population is stable and the entire qualified nurse team is either 
able to prepare and give intravenous drugs or in training to be competent to do so. 
Intravenous drug preparation is seen as part of what they do. The off duty rota is 
prepared to ensure there are sufficient staff on every shift who are trained to 
prepare and administer IV drugs. 
 
Are all the team familiar with all the intravenous preparing procedures? 
Yes. By the time they are deemed competent their records should show that they 
have experience in preparing the wide variety of drugs required by ICU patients, 
and certainly all the usual intravenous drugs prepared by the unit. 
 
Where are the intravenous drug preparation procedures performed? 
There is a designated Drug Preparation Area (Figure 4). However, this is not the 
area where the drugs are prepared. This is unfortunate, because it is well 
designed. (There are no standards for the environment of aseptic preparation 
areas in near patient settings, however, this area was spacious, visibly clean, not 
used for concurrent procedures, and not subject to splash contamination; the sink 
being immediately outside the area). 
 
The reason for not using the Drug Preparation Area is that preparation of drugs in 
the area kept the nurses away from their intubated patients for too long – even 
though this was only for a few minutes at a time. This left insufficient nurses on the 
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floor to prevent the patients from self-extubating. The unit was opened in 2005 and 
before that the ICU was in a much smaller 7 bedded ward in a Victorian building. 
Prior to 2005, everyone and everything was close at hand – which had obvious 
advantages and disadvantages. Ironically, this modern well-equipped and well-
designed spacious Drug Preparation Area posed an unforeseen risk to patients 
because it is too remote from them (Figure 3 and Figure 4). The actual areas 
where drugs are prepared are the table tops at the bedside (Figure 4). 
Figure 4    The drug preparation area in the pilot ward  
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What written procedures are available? 
Each bedside has a computer on the desktop which provides access to 
intravenous drug information for every intravenous drug that can be used in the 
unit. These information sheets include data on the drug, the normal dose, what 
other drugs it can and cannot be given with and the usual modes of administration 
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timing.  A paper based resource of the same information is available in the Drug 
Preparation Area. No written aseptic drug preparation procedures could be found.   
 
Displayed Poster Information 
In a clean and uncluttered Drug Preparation Area there are a total of 20 posters or 
information sheets available – most referring to information that would be required 
rapidly, none refer to maintaining asepsis during the preparation and 
administration of intravenous drugs. 
 
How often are the procedures referred to? 
The nurses themselves had made the drug information accessible on the desktop 
of each bedside computer. These procedures were observed being frequently 
used.  
 
Are the intravenous drug preparation procedures generic and drug specific? 
The procedures are drug specific. However as stated previously, there are no 
specific procedures available to detail how to prevent contamination of the 
infusates.  
 
What other procedures are done in the preparation areas? 
At the bedside, a variety of procedures are done including, bed bathing, suctioning 
(closed), physiotherapy and dressing wounds. However because an individual 
nurse is allocated to an individual patient these procedures are not done 
 154 
concurrently with intravenous drug preparation procedures unless there is an 
emergency. During emergencies, every effort is still undertaken to maintain 
asepsis. 
 
What team operation support is there?  
The manager feels that there is support from within the infusion team between 
colleagues in that they are encouraged to share problems and concerns related to 
intravenous drugs and the administration thereof.  There is 24 hour access to 
pharmaceutical support for information regarding any drug. 
 
The manager in charge of the unit is very supportive of the team and is trying to 
arrange IV drug preparation stations to move the drug preparation areas from the 
bedside to an area close by but less susceptible to splash contamination. 
 
Is the lighting good making it easy to see to read instructions within the unit ? 
Yes – there are no lighting problems. The lighting can be adjusted to suit the 
patient and the nurse. 
 
What if any performance measures are available? 
The ICU is clearly working hard to develop their quality improvement skills and 
lead with the Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP). The unit has data on 
catheter-related blood stream infections (CR-BSI), of which it was stated there 
were none in the past few months.  Error data are discussed at regular meetings 
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between lead nurses and consultants.  All data available is displayed in an area of 
the ward frequented by nurses going to and from their breaks. 
 
What monitoring is done outside the ward? 
The SPSP data is sent to an extranet site and monitored by the SPSP team. 
 
What ITU operator performance monitoring is done? 
The majority of procedures are done in sight of colleagues in the large open plan 
area that is the ICU. All drugs to be administered need to have several redundancy 
checks. Although there is no written procedure, all procedures observed were 
performed to the same process. It would be extremely difficult to be a “rogue 
preparer” within the ICU and not be detected. 
 
What, if any, self-assessment of performance is done? 
There seemed to be a willingness by all those observed to question the process if 
they were in any way unsure. 
 
How frequently are drug errors reported? 
According to the ward manager all drug errors are reported. In the ICU most drugs 
are intravenous and therefore most of these drug errors relate to intravenous 
drugs. Specifics of the drug errors not related to asepsis were not part of this 
study. All drug errors are discussed at consultant / lead nurse meetings and 
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changes made. If required, more support is given to individuals. Analysis of errors 
is seen as a means to achieving and enhancing patient safety. 
 
8.2.2 Data Stream 2 – Observations of drug preparations in the pilot ward 
How many procedures were observed? 
It was a quiet day for the intensive care unit with only 4 of the ten beds occupied. A 
total of 10 intravenous drug preparations were observed for 4 patients. 
 
What procedures were observed and how many drugs were administered? 
The following drugs were observed during preparation to pre administration: 
Antibiotics: Metronidazole infusion; amoxicillin, Co-amoxiclav; Gentamicin, 
Analgesics: Paracetamol infusion, Bronchodilator: Aminophylline 
H2 antagonists: Zantac 
Flush solutions were given after the above intravenous drugs. 
 
How variable are the procedures? 
The procedures do vary in terms of drug compatibility but can be represented 
simply as follows: 
o Draw up drug; Draw up flush; Administer drug; Administer flush   
Or alternatively 
o Draw up diluent; Mix diluent with drug; Draw up mixture (drug and diluent); 
Draw up flush; Administer mixture; Administer flush 
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A good deal of variation underlies this simple representation. For example, the 
administration can be via a continuous infusion, bolus or syringe pump. The 
solution may need to be administered covered (so it does not deteriorate in the 
light) or at a specific temperature. To maintain a specified pH, the diluent may 
vary. Some drugs may need to be stopped prior to administration of a second drug 
to prevent precipitation or a cross-reaction. The IV drug administration sheets 
guide those preparing and administering the infusates to prevent such drug errors.  
 
How is the intravenous drug procedure performed? 
The process of intravenous drug preparation as observed and the reported 
administration procedure is as follows:  
• The nurse applies alcohol hand gel (AHG) to decontaminate hands and dons a 
clean plastic patient-specific, colour-coded apron. 
• The preparation area where the drug is to be prepared is cleaned with a 
detergent wipe. (The first 2 steps are sometimes done in reverse order). 
• All drugs and diluents and sundries are then collected for inspection and cross 
checking. 
• Against the prescription and the patient identification the following are checked 
by 2 nurses (one of whom is deemed competent): the Drug (including expiry 
date) the Diluent (including expiry date), the Dose, the Duration of 
administration, that the Drug is due and has not been administered already, 
and that the intended Route of administration is intravenous. This first set of 
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checks is to ensure that the nurse is able to prepare the prescription correctly 
from the gathered drugs and diluents. 
• One nurse then applies AHG again and dons non-sterile gloves.  
• On several occasions it was observed that something had been forgotten and 
(with the gloves on) the nurse would go back to a draw to collect a syringe or 
additional needle. This would negate the benefit of the gloves. 
• The packs are then opened. 
• The drug is prepared as either a draw up drug then draw up flush, or, if the 
drug is a powder, the process is draw up diluent, mix diluent with drug, draw up 
mixture (drug and diluent). 
• The second set of checks is to ensure that what has been drawn up is the 
correct dosage, the diluent is as required by the prescription and that there are 
not possible cross-reactions that could occur.  
• A visual check for any precipitation or particulates is then done. 
• Labels, if required, are then written and applied. 
• A filter is then sometimes put on to the syringe - this was not always done. 
The following part of the procedure was discussed with the nurse and not 
observed in accordance with the ethics submission. 
• The connection is decontaminated with an alcohol wipe. 
• The red bung is disconnected. 
• The drug is then administered followed by the diluent. Occasionally the flush 
would come direct from a 3-way tap via an existing infusion. 
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• During administration the patient is observed for abnormal reaction to the 
administration of the drug. 
• The syringe or infusion is then disconnected and a new sterile bung is applied. 
• Sundries including gloves are discarded and alcohol gel is again applied to 
hands 
• Documentation is completed. 
This procedure is illustrated as Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5    The drug preparation procedures in the pilot ward  
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Was there distraction during the intravenous drug preparation procedures? 
None of the 10 observed procedures were interrupted as such. One procedure, 
commenced during an ongoing conversation with a doctor regarding the patient’s 
 160 
clinical condition. All safety checks continued as required.  The allocation of one-
nurse to one-patient reduces the possible distractions from assessment of the care 
requirements of other patients. However, because of the very nature of the ICU 
patients and their requirement for continuous monitoring, in essence, all 
intravenous drug preparation procedures were considered as being undertaken 
concurrently with the procedures of, keeping one eye on the patient, one eye on 
the constant read outs of critical measurement monitors and listening for alarms.  
All absences from the bedside were prefixed with an agreement with a colleague 
to take over temporary continuous monitoring of their patient. 
 
Is the equipment needed for intravenous drug preparation procedures close at 
hand? 
Yes – kept on the same bed-side mobile table surface 
 
8.2.3 Contamination risks in the pilot ward procedure 
Figure 6 shows how long it would take in this ward for infusate contamination to 
cause a symptomatic patient response, that is, over days or weeks if 
contamination starts as a biofilm, or almost immediately if there is heavy infusate 
contamination. With Figure 6 as a guide, the procedures and location assessment 
data will be examined for their error-prone and reliability status. To do this, there is 
first an analysis of what is sterile/non-sterile and what are the critical parts of the 
equipment during preparation and immediately prior to administration.  
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Figure 6     Timing from infusate contamination to IR-BSI  
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What is sterile and non-sterile at the start of the procedure? 
Figure 7 illustrates the sterile and non-sterile surfaces and materials used in the 
pilot ward. The sterile surfaces/materials are: 
Syringes, needles, internal contents of drugs ampoules, (internal contents to 
diluents if never used), Dispensing Pin, if never used, diluent if never used. 
 
The non-sterile materials/surfaces are: 
The access point to any rubber topped vial 
Outside containers of any drug vial 
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Re use of the access point to the multi-dose diluent via the Dispensing Pin  
Possibly the multi-dose diluent 
The work surface on which the procedure is to be performed. 
 
Figure 7     The sterility of equipment at the start of the procedure (pilot ward) 
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What are the critical surfaces that if contaminated, or not decontaminated, will 
prevent aseptic preparation?  
As the work surface is not sterile, has not been decontaminated and has been 
open to contamination, it should be cleaned and be dry prior to the procedure 
starting. The critical surfaces during preparation are the connection points of the 
top of the syringe, the metal part of the needle that will come into contact with the 
drug and internal Dispensing Pin surface.  These are the surfaces which, if 
contaminated - or not decontaminated - will prevent aseptic preparation and 
administration (Figure 8). 
 
The other critical surfaces are the ampoule tops and the Dispensing Pin surfaces.  
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The method of using the Dispensing Pin is to remove the blue bung, clean the port 
with alcohol wipe, access the port, then replace the same bung.  
 
Figure 8     The critical surfaces during the procedure (pilot ward)  
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The information literature provided by the manufacturer on the Dispensing Pin 
confirms the status of this medical device as single-use. Therefore, re-use of the 
Dispensing Pin is currently contrary to the manufacturer’s recommendations and 
MHRA (2010) regulations. It would be possible for the diluent to be contaminated 
when removing or replacing the Dispensing Pin bung. Contamination could also 
occur via bacteria bearing droplets, generated by general ICU activity, landing on 
the inner canal when the bung is not in situ. 
 
Immediately before administration what are the critical surfaces that must be 
protected from contamination or decontaminated?  
Immediately before the administration of the drug the critical surfaces are the hub, 
the tip of the syringe and the 3-way tap on the end of the catheter (Figure 9). As 
the 3-way tap is attached to the patient it, must always be considered to be 
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contaminated with at least with a covering of coagulase negative staphylococci, 
the leading cause of catheter related blood-stream infections. 
 
Figure 9     The critical surfaces just before administration (pilot ward) 
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Is the equipment used for intravenous drug preparation procedures free from 
environmental splash contamination? 
Although there is no splash from a tap as such, these portable preparation stations 
are situated within 1 metre of the ventilated patient’s bed.  The suction system 
used is closed and will not create splash but there is always the possibility of 
unplanned disconnection of the endotracheal tube from the ventilator tubing and 
consequent dissemination of aerosols over a couple of metres. Endotracheal 
secretions like all respiratory secretions, contain bacteria.  There are no visual 
cues which signal to the nurses making up the infusion that environmental 
contamination may have occurred and that sterility of equipment may have been 
compromised.  
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Does the equipment aid the process of maintaining sterility of the infusate? 
Four types of equipment appear to increase the risk of asepsis failure, these are 
discussed below. 
 
a) Uncertainty over access point sterility 
Some packaging of drugs clearly demonstrates a sterile access point once the 
access point wrapper or stopper is removed; for example, Metronidazole has a 
sealed peel back top. Others such as Lignocaine has a flip-off top revealing a non-
sterile access point – though no information regarding this is visible and it is not 
obvious in the drug information literature. Other drugs are more likely to be sterile, 
for example, Propofol, the flip off top was sealed – again however, there was no 
visible label to indicate that the access point is sterile. Access points that look 
sterile provide an erroneous visual message that decontamination prior to access 
is not required.  
 
b) The Dispensing Pin 
The Dispensing Pin turns a single-use sterile infusion, such as a 0.9% saline 
500ml infusion bag, into a multi-dose diluent which is used over a 24 hour period. 
There is no preservative in the saline infusion. 
 
 
Dispensing Pin  
 1cm short access canal which 
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The access to the Dispensing Pin is via a short canal. It is not possible to access 
thoroughly this canal in order to decontaminate it. If left unprotected it will become 
exposed to airborne/droplet contamination throughout the 24 hour period it is used. 
Any item in contact with this canal, for example, the top of the syringe, could be 
contaminated with whatever micro-organisms are contaminating it. This contact 
contamination would then contaminate anything that subsequently comes into 
contact with the syringe. Dispensing Pins are provided with a bung to protect the 
canal. It was witnessed that this was sometimes replaced. It would be difficult to 
guarantee the sterility of the contents of the diluent due to the design of the device. 
Thus the Dispensing Pin could potentially contaminate the top of the syringe, 
which subsequently comes into contact with the top of the catheter without an 
intervening decontamination procedure.  
 
Following possible contamination of the saline multi-dose diluent, then its use for a 
24 hour period gives time for a single organism possibly to become millions; or at 
the very least to may survive and potentially contaminate the catheter lumen, 
facilitating biofilm formation (if not frank infusate) contamination.  Figure 6 shows 
possible contamination outcomes depending on the degree of contamination of the 
infusate. 
 
c) The filter 
The access point to the catheter is defended on most observed occasions by a 
filter. The filter is a Millipore Millex® -OR 0.22µ filter. It has a maximum pressure 
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specification of 75 psi. The question that no one in the ward who was asked could 
answer is: what pressure is exerted during administration? There was limited 
knowledge regarding this product available on the ward. 
 
The part of the syringe that was in contact with the Dispensing Pin is the part that 
is in contact with the filter. Therefore, if a filter is used, it does prevent contact 
contamination of the catheter hub from a potentially contaminated syringe tip – but 
not in the way it is designed to do. The manufacturer’s specification of the Millipore 
Millex® -OR 0.22µ filter [SLGS 025 OS] advises:   
“Do not use this product as an in-line filter for intravenous administration” 
It must be concluded therefore, that this filter does not achieve the effective 
microbial filtration as it was believed understood by those using it in the pilot ward. 
 
d) Single-use drugs able to be used as a multi-dose drugs 
Any multi-dose drug use carries a risk of infusate contamination. The risk arises 
from an original non-sterile access followed by replacement of the residual drug 
back on the shelf for reuse. Repeat access for a subsequent patient can then 
produce a contaminated infusate. There is no evidence that this practice is 
ongoing within the unit. This risk is shown in Table 2.  The four equipment risks are 
all dependent on other factors; for example, the access point may not be sterile, 
but without viable micro-organisms and a procedural step that transfers the micro-
organisms, the infusate will not be contaminated. Similarly, reused single-use vials, 
will only contaminate an infusate if, during use, the vial has become contaminated. 
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What are the intravenous drugs at highest risk contamination for the Pilot ICU? 
The types of drugs prepared in the ICU with the highest risk of causing infusate 
contamination are illustrated in Figure 10. 
Figure 10   Infusates posing the highest contamination risk (pilot ward) 
Long Term Infusions (>12 hours): heparin; morphine; 
insulin
Low level contamination becoming high level over duration 
of infusion.
This could occur with splash contamination during a 
procedure or, use of a contaminated diluent.
Contamination of Lipid Drugs during preparation
Lipid drugs and infusions promote microbial growth and 
any open manipulation could result in contamination.
The longer the infusion, the greater the opportunity for 
single organisms to become millions within 24 hours. 
Use of a contaminated drug 
Unrecognised reuse of a vial that has been contaminated.  
It is possible to have1,000,000 micro-organisms per ml of 
and the drug have a non–cloudy appearance.
Bolus or short Infusions with low level contamination
Contamination from the environment or contaminated 
diluent/drug causing seeding of the catheter surface.
 
The infusates at highest risk are: long-term infusates, lipid based infusates, any 
infusate with low level contamination from the environment, infusates made from a 
contaminated drug or diluent, for example, from a multi-dose vial. Long-term 
infusions and lipid drugs are used frequently within the ICU; therefore the risk of 
asepsis failure and infusate contamination must (also) be considered high. 
 
At which stage is the procedure likely to produce errors in aseptic preparation? 
Figure 11 illustrates the steps of the procedure where, in certain circumstances, 
contamination could occur, these are: 
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• Accessing the sterile drug through a non-sterile access point contaminating 
the drug. 
• Critical surface contamination / non decontamination: 
o Touching with unclean or gloved hands the tip of the syringe with 
subsequent contamination of the catheter lumen.  
o Critical surface contamination from direct contact with a 
contaminated environment work surface. 
o Failure to decontaminate effectively the hub prior to connection with 
the syringe. 
• Accessing the diluent via a contaminated Dispensing Pin canal, thus 
contaminating the tip of the syringe  
• Drawing up the diluent if it is contaminated by multi access. 
Figure 11   The steps where contamination is most likely to occur (pilot ward) 
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All drugs prepared in the unit are prepared immediately prior to use, therefore 
storage post preparation with delayed administration is not an issue. 
 
8.2.4 How to reduce potential contamination risks in the pilot ward 
The procedure as performed currently can be classified as:  
 An interrupted aseptic procedure - performed by a single nurse with checker 
 
The written procedure (Figure 5) has been colour-coded with blue indicating 
mandatory redundancy checks, orange indicating steps critical to asepsis and 
green for steps essential to the procedure, but not to asepsis. From this colour-
coding it can be seen that the procedure is an interrupted aseptic procedure; that 
is, it involves aseptic steps followed by non-aseptic steps during which there is 
potential contamination of gloved hands. For example, the need to apply labels as 
soon as a drug has been added is a non-aseptic interruption of the aseptic 
procedure, albeit essential for patient safety. This non-aseptic step is then followed 
by aseptic steps pre-administration. This interruption without subsequent hand 
hygiene prevents completion of the procedure as an aseptic one. (Shown in Figure 
5 as orange boxes followed by blue, green and then orange boxes). 
 
To promote reliability and reduce errors, the following steps in the procedure 
should be removed (Figure 12). 
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Change: Always start the procedure with the decontamination of the work surface 
The most logical routine to start the procedure is to clean the work surface, then 
decontaminate hands and then don a plastic apron. The rationale for this 
methodology will be discussed later. 
Figure 12   Steps in the current procedure that could be eliminated  
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Change – From use of gloves to hand hygiene at critical steps 
Using gloves at the start of the procedure and then touching potentially 
contaminated surfaces or objects negate asepsis. It is not possible to use a single 
pair of gloves at the start of the procedure and maintain asepsis of the procedure. 
Not using gloves but instead using alcohol hand gel (AHG) to link between the 
interruptions in asepsis steps can restart and maintain asepsis throughout the 
procedure.  It would seem logical, therefore, to stop using gloves and introduce 
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hand hygiene at any time when potential contamination of the hands may have 
occurred (Figure 12).  
 
If gloves are considered critical to prevent contamination of nurses’ hands by the 
drug, the then further deliberation must be given to the equipment being used. It 
should be easy to prepare a drug by using equipment that does not cause splash, 
for example, with the use of reconstitution devices. Exposure of HCWs’ skin to 
drug contamination should be considered under Control of Substances Hazardous 
to Health (COSHH) Regulations (2002) and a risk assessment carried out detailing 
what is required to negate or mitigate against this risk (Health and Safety 
Executive 2009). 
 
Change - Stopping the Current Filter Usage 
There is no benefit from the current filter as it is not designed for in-line use and 
therefore its use should stop (Figure 12). The overall use of filters will be discussed 
in the combined results.  
 
New Step – Confirm drug and diluent are single-use sterile 
During the first set of mandatory safety checks, a new check has been introduced. 
This is to confirm that both the drug and diluent are single-use and sterile (SUS) 
(Figure 13).  This would mean stopping the use of the Dispensing Pin and multi-
dose diluent. This is the most important change to enhance asepsis in this ward. 
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New Step – Identification of critical surfaces and information before preparation  
As the procedure is ready to start, a new cognitive step has been introduced at 
which the HCW identifies the critical surfaces and essential drug information. This 
is to remind the nurse that the tops of drug vials are not sterile unless there is 
visual evidence presented to the contrary and to identify clearly what can and 
cannot be touched to maintain asepsis of the procedure.  Also, at this point 
checking for critical drug information will enable appropriate steps to be taken in 
order to optimise safe administration. 
 
New Step – Review possible critical surface contamination and cross-reaction risk 
Prior to administration of the drug, a further cognitive step is introduced whereby 
the HCW reviews the performed procedure and is confident that neither critical 
surface contamination has occurred, nor cross-reactions are likely to occur. 
 
Figure 13 shows the procedure with new steps included as yellow, Figure 14 is the 
same procedure with the colour-coding of all steps as blue for mandatory checks, 
orange for steps critical to asepsis and green for other steps. 
 
These changes do not make or guarantee a validated aseptic procedure, but they 
do make a procedure which will not obviously cause infusate contamination from 
environmental, drug or diluent sources. To validate the procedure would require 
end product testing and greater process monitoring. 
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Figure 13   Integrated new steps and new system order (pilot ward) 
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Figure 14   Revised procedure (Figure 13 colour-coded) 
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8.2.5 Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparisons (pilot ward) 
This data could not be collected as there was an absence of written procedures 
with which to compare the observed procedures.  
 
8.2.6 Data Stream 3a - Opinions on safety (pilot ward) 
A total of 48 questionnaires were issued to all staff in the ICU who were competent 
or in training for competency in intravenous (IV) drug preparation, 17 (35%) were 
returned. During a repeat visit, the ward manager was asked to remind staff to 
complete the questionnaire and a further reminder request was issued via email.  
The resulting statements on safety are given below and summarised in Appendix 
7. 
 
Statement 1 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure  
The majority of the respondents, 11/17 (65%) agreed with this statement. However 
due to the equipment used, and the method of its use on this ward this was not 
observed to be the case. 
 
Statement 2 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 
To the statement on ability to detect asepsis failure, 6/17 (35%) thought it easy to 
detect failure, 3/17 (18%) thought it difficult and the remaining 7 (41%) could 
neither agree nor disagree with the statement. Although it would be easy to detect 
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an obvious touch contamination, contamination of the equipment or drugs is not 
easy to detect, as microbes are invisible to the naked eye. 
 
Statement 3 – The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 
The responses to this statement were variable, 3/17 (18%) strongly agreed with 
the statement and 2/17 (12%) strongly disagreed with it. These responses may 
have reflected experience. For example, more experienced nurses perhaps 
considering the procedures simple, and those in-training considering them 
complex. However, there is no data available to support this. Clearly there is 
variability of opinion on the simplicity statement and efforts to reduce perceived 
complexity are needed; this possibly reflects the degree of experience of the 
respondents. 
 
Statement 4 – The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely  
The majority of respondents 15/17 (88%) agreed with this statement. It is possible 
that the respondents were referring to availability of resources and their opinions of 
the ease of which the equipment available facilitated drug preparation. The 
Dispensing Pin, for example, made it much easier to withdraw volumes of diluent; 
but crucially however, it also made asepsis failure more likely. 
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Statement 5 – The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
There was less agreement with this statement. 2/17 (12%) disagreed with the 
statement and only 9/17 (53%) agreed. There was no opportunity for respondents 
to state what in particular about the environment was making it unsafe. Statements 
4 and 5 are the reverse of what was found by the researcher. It was the equipment 
(resources) and how they were used that was making the procedure unsafe, not 
the environment as such. 
 
Statement 6 - On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare 
IV drugs safely 
The majority of respondents 10/17 (59%) agreed with this statement. Although the 
visit took place on a quiet ICU day, on the feedback visit with all beds occupied, 
the distraction from many concurrent activities and patient alarms was all too 
apparent. 
 
Statement 7 – I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 
Only 3/17 (18%) respondents agreed with this statement. These nurses were 
possibly still in training and being mentored to achieve competency.  The majority 
disagreed with this statement; they did not get feedback on their performance. 
There was no standing policy to do this. 
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Statement 8 – I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding 
preparing of IV drugs on this ward 
There was variation in the responses here 11/17, (64%) disagreed with the 
statement and only 4/17 (24%) agreed, indicating most would be comfortable 
raising concerns if they were identified. 
 
Statement 9 – I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 
Twelve of the 17 respondents (70%) disagreed with this statement, which confirms 
the findings of Statement 6, that distraction and interruption are frequently part of 
the ICU drug preparation procedure.  
 
Statement 10 – Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this 
ward 
The majority of respondents agreed with this statement 11/15 (73%). There were 2 
non-responses to this statement. It is difficult to assess whether this was an 
oversight or whether the 2 non-responders to this question genuinely could not 
answer it. 
 
Statement 11 – If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 
Thirteen of the 17 (76%) respondents agreed with statement.  Only one 
respondent strongly disagreed. This indicates that that the majority of the nurses 
on the pilot ward recognised the need to report any drug errors for the safety of the 
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individual patient, the safety of the system, and they felt as a nurse it was safe for 
them to do so. 
 
Statement 12 – There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs 
Only 2 (12%) of respondents disagreed with this statement. 12 (71%) agreed there 
was good support on the ward for those who prepared drugs. 
 
Statement 13 – To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 
Nearly all of the respondents 16/17 (94%) agreed with this statement, which 
reflected the ward manager’s statements on efforts to reduce drug errors. This also 
confirms the findings in statement 11. 
 
Statement 14 – I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 
Six of the 17 (35%) respondents could neither agree nor disagree with this 
statement.  Two of the 17 (12%) respondents stated IV drug preparation was 
stressful. This is possibly due to perceived risks from errors to their patients and to 
themselves as nurses or, if students, perhaps the risk of not being seen as 
competent in performing the task. 
 
Statement 15 – Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 
The results to this statement were varied with both strong agreement and 
disagreement being reported. More respondents [7/17 (41%)] disagreed with the 
statement than actually agreed with it [4/17 (24%)].  This indicates that nurses 
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chose to work in the ICU not because they prepare intravenous drugs - but in spite 
of it. 
 
8.2.7 Summary of safety opinion questionnaire results on the pilot ward 
The responses to the statements indicate that the factors that make the procedure 
error-prone on this ward are therefore: 
o Erroneous assumptions of safety (Statements 1, 2) 
o Complexity of the procedure (Statement 3) 
o Perceived environmental difficulties (Statement 5) 
o Unrecognised risk from the available resources (Statement 4) 
o Lack of performance feedback (Statement 7) 
o Distractions and interruptions (Statements 6 and 9) 
o Stress from the procedure (Statement 14) 
o Lack of job satisfaction (Statement 15) 
What enhances the safety of the procedure on this ward are  
o The resources available to prepare IV drugs (Statement 4) 
o The willingness to report errors (Statements 8, 11) 
o That asepsis failure is a priority on this ward (Statement 10) 
o The support provided to the team (Statement 12) 
o That staff are encouraged to report errors (Statement 13). 
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8.2.7.1 Additional comments from the respondents 
The respondents were given space for additional comments – the following three 
comments were written: 
“Very busy unit, sometimes to the detriment of aseptic technique – always rushing” 
“My practice is very dependent on colleagues experience and workload at the time 
of assistance.” 
“Some aspects of IV drug administration (checking overall procedure was 
performed aseptically), checking catheter hubs were aseptically accessed not 
always double checked due to time, that is, if the unit is extremely busy. Would 
trust colleagues to perform the points mentioned above aseptically.” 
 
8.2.8 Summary of the pilot ward results 
The Location Assessment in this ward identified potential environmental 
contamination risks, for example, the risk of exposing equipment to droplets from 
ventilator disconnections. There are also risks identified from the equipment: the 
filter was not designed (or labelled) to be used as in in-line filter, the Dispensing 
Pin was labelled single-use and therefore should not have been used to turn a 
single-use bag of saline into a multi-use item.  The procedure itself poses risks in 
that drug vial tops are not recognised (or well-labelled) as non-sterile items and 
therefore not decontaminated. Additionally, the procedure is an interrupted aseptic 
procedure and hand hygiene needs to be performed before commencing aseptic 
steps after non-aseptic steps. The use of gloves does not facilitate asepsis. The 
procedure observations identified the complexities and also some of what the 
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nurses did and did not know about what is sterile and non-sterile before and during 
the procedure. The statements from the opinions of safety and redundancy checks 
questionnaire identified that the some of HCWs’ perceptions of risk are at odds 
with the evidence, for example, 6/17 (35%) thought it easy to detect asepsis failure 
when it is not. The majority 10/17 (59%), state that distractions and interruptions 
make it difficult to prepare intravenous drugs safely. This concurs with the 
researcher’s observations that all procedures in the unit are done with concurrent 
observations of the patient’s well-being, and whilst being continuously alert to the 
readouts from monitors and listening to all noises for patients’ alarms.  Indicators 
of safety were also identified; for example, the majority of staff stated they were 
encouraged to report errors, that they would report errors and that there was good 
support within the unit to enable them to perform the procedure. The comment by 
one nurse that the number of redundancy checks would vary with the business of 
the unit at the time, concurs with the description of systems by Dekker (2006: 16) 
‘People in them [systems] have to create safety by tying together the patchwork of 
technologies, adapting under pressure and acting under uncertainty.’  
 
The data from all sources fitted in with the methodological framework: the 
procedure is dangerous and complex. The procedure relies more on humans than 
machines for safety. The system needs understood from the perspective of what is 
required to make it easier to do the right thing, and notably, by measuring and 
understanding performance and by changing systems healthcare can be made 
more reliable.  
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As a consequence of the pilot study results - which was performed in the presence 
of an observer – and the foregoing data analysis and data presentations, the data 
collection tools were not amended for use in the remaining 5 study wards. 
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8.3      Results from the 2nd ward: a bone marrow transplant unit 
(BMTU) 
 
Data Stream 1 – Location Assessment 2nd study ward (BMTU) 
Data Stream 2 – Observation of Intravenous Drug Preparations 2nd ward 
Contamination risks in the 2nd ward procedure 
How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 2nd ward 
Data Stream 4 - Comparison of observed procedures with document review  
Data Stream 3a – Opinions of Safety 2nd ward 
 
 
 
Study took place on Friday 18th September 2009 
Researcher Evonne Curran  
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8.3.1 Data Stream 1 - Location Assessment 2nd study ward 
The data for the location assessment were obtained by interview with the ward 
manager and from the researcher’s observations during the study period. 
 
The unit and the patients they care for 
The BMTU is purpose-built and opened in 2007. It comprises 10 single cubicles, 
which are all positively pressured to reduce the risk of the patients developing 
pneumonic illnesses from airborne-pathogens. Two of the cubicles have a negative 
pressure ante-room, which can prevent airborne cross-transmission, should a 
patient have a communicable infection during a period of immuno-compromise 
(Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15    The layout of the second study ward  
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This BMTU cares for patients before and after bone marrow transplant. In addition, 
the ward cares for patients with haemo-oncology diseases who cannot be 
accommodated in their original ward. To optimise the likelihood that bone marrow 
transplants will not be rejected, significant healthcare interventions are required 
pre transplantation. After their bone marrow transplant the patients again require 
intensive support to minimise the risk of bone marrow transplant rejection and to 
reduce the risk of infections until their transplant begins to produce sufficient 
effective blood cells.  
 
What vascular devices are used for intravenous drug administration? 
In the main, central vascular catheters (CVCs) of a Hickman style are used. This is 
due to the extremely long-term vascular access requirements of BMTU patients, 
the use of drugs very irritant to veins and the need for reliable vascular access. 
Emergency femoral lines may be used for short-term periods. Peripherally inserted 
central catheters (PICCs) are seldom used.  
 
Approximately how many intravascular drugs are prepared in the BMTU? 
The patients in the BMTU require about 10 – 12 drugs per patient per day. This 
means that about 100 intravenous drugs are prepared each day in the BMTU unit 
and 36,500 intravascular drugs per year.  
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What intravenous drugs are prepared and administered in the BMTU? 
The main intravenous drug groups administered to patients are: antibiotics, 
immuno-suppressants, immuno-conditioning, anti-emetics, anti-fungal agents and 
chemotherapy drugs.  To ensure that the entire drug prepared is administered, Y 
administration sets are frequently used. This enables a flush to be put in the 
second arm of the Y and the catheter flushed after the drug infusion is complete. 
 
Does the unit use drugs associated with infusate sepsis? 
Lipid drugs, such as propofol which promote microbial growth, are infrequently 
used in the BMTU. Long-term infusions (>12 hours duration) are used for some 
analgesics and other drugs. Patients in the BMTU can have poor blood clotting 
capabilities and therefore drugs such as heparin, which reduces clotting, are 
seldom required. 
 
Are any of the intravenous drugs prepared from multi-dose vials? 
No. However, if a drug is prepared for two patients at the same time one nurse 
would prepare both drugs to save wasting an ampoule, that is provided of course, 
a single ampoule contained sufficient drug for both patients. No multi dose-diluents 
are used. 
 
How long are the vascular access devices in situ for? 
The CVCs can be in use for a period of between 1 month to 6 weeks or for up to a 
period of several months for one particular group of transplant patients.  The 
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catheters used are tunnelled; this reduces the risk of insertion site infections.  It is 
dangerous procedure to re-site a CVC in an immuno-suppressed patient with a low 
platelet count. The risk of haemorrhaging during the procedure is high and 
therefore, if the catheter becomes infected, efforts will be made to salvage the line 
with the use of antibiotic locks. Line-salvage using antibiotics are not possible in 
lines that are in continuous use, for example, in ITU patients’ lines. This is because 
elements of biofilm will be continuously infused along with the infusion causing the 
patient to be severely ill for the duration of line use.  The BMTU staff are very 
conscious of the need to prevent CR-BSI in their patients, and are aware that if 
CR-BSI occurs, this could have additional life-threatening implications for the 
patient. 
 
Is there a stable team that prepares and administers the intravenous drugs? 
Yes. The population is stable and the entire qualified nurse team is either able to 
prepare and give intravenous drugs or in training to be competent to do so. 
Intravenous drug preparation is seen as part of what they do.  
 
Where are the intravenous drug preparation procedures performed? 
There is a designated Drug Preparation Room (Figure 16). This Drug Preparation 
Room is uncluttered and visibly clean. 
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Figure 16     The drug preparation room (2nd ward) 
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Preparation is done on the trolleys. 
 
Are there any drugs which BMTU unit staff do not prepare? 
The BMTU unit staff do not add drugs to total parenteral nutrition bags or prepare 
intrathecal drugs. Chemotherapy drugs are administered but, in the main, these 
drugs will have been pre-prepared in the sterile pharmacy suite. 
 
Are all the team familiar with all the intravenous preparing procedures? 
Yes. The frequency with which drugs are given in the BMTU unit means by the 
time nurses are deemed competent, they have attained experience in a wide range 
of drug preparation and administration and have had a wealth of opportunities to 
prepare them.   
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What written procedures are available? 
Two written procedures for the safe administration of intravenous drugs were 
provided for review: 
o The first – The Scrubbing Procedure 
o The scrub procedure lacks some specifics in that it states at 5.01 
‘scrub for 3-4 minutes according to the hospital infection control hand 
washing policy.’ 
o The scrub procedure offers an alternative to the traditional antiseptic 
soap and water wash, with the option of an alcohol based hygiene 
alternative. 
o The second procedure – Procedure for the safe administration of 
intravenous MabCampath® (a humanized rat monoclonal antibody). This 
drug frequently causes severe patient reactions and different infusion times 
are specified as a consequence between the first and subsequent infusions. 
o Although this procedure is detailed it again lacks specifics, for 
example, ‘set up trolley with the aforementioned equipment using 
aseptic technique’, exactly how to perform this aseptic technique is 
not specified in the procedure. 
 
Displayed Poster Information 
In a clean and uncluttered Drug Preparation Area there are a total of 20 posters or 
information sheets available – most referring to information on intravenous 
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infusions and hand hygiene. None refer to any aspect of how to maintain asepsis 
during preparation and administration of intravenous drugs. 
 
How often are the written procedures referred to? 
In an effort to maintain control of the procedures, they are kept in the ward 
manager’s office. Consequently, the procedures are not referred to on a 
procedure-by-procedure or day-to-day basis.  All the procedures contain a colour 
printed watermark. There is a warning on each document that unless the coloured 
watermark is visible then the copy is unauthorised. 
 
Are the intravenous drug preparation procedures generic or drug specific? 
The procedures are drug specific; however, as stated previously, there are no 
specific procedures available to detail how to prevent contamination of the 
infusates other than to follow ‘aseptic technique.’  
 
Do the intravenous drug preparation procedures include problem identification and 
if <this situation> then <that> actions? 
Yes. The document on MabCampath® infusion details what to do should the 
patient react to the drug; that is, if the patient becomes become pyrexial and or 
develops a rigor. If line occlusion occurs, then there is an algorithm poster 
documenting what to do to optimise the likelihood of removing the occlusion 
without harm to the patient as a consequence. 
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What other procedures are done in the drug preparation room? 
The only other procedure done in the drug preparation area is hand hygiene.  This 
seems innocuous; however, observations of this procedure using the 2 person full-
scrub sink will be described.  There are obvious spray marks for a semi-circled 
area extending about 0.5 metre from the scrub sink (Figure 32). Some of the 
nurses who wash their hands at this sink stand to one side of the automatic taps 
so that their uniforms do not become drenched whilst they perform hand hygiene. 
Consequently, when concurrent drug preparation procedures are performed, the 
sterile equipment on the trolley is exposed to spray (potentially containing 
environmental micro-organisms from the hand hygiene procedures).  
 
This is a particularly large spray, in part due to the design of the taps which instead 
of a single flow faucet have a shower style multi-stream flow. Additionally, angle at 
which the spray hits the upper side of the scrub sink seems responsible for the 
some of the large spray area. Of the 17 aseptic procedures performed, 4 were 
performed during concurrent hand hygiene procedures and are subject to potential 
spray contamination. As patients on this ward are vulnerable to infections from 
opportunistic environmental micro-organisms, the water supplied to the BMTU unit 
is filtered and of a higher quality that that supplied to general wards. Nevertheless, 
given the capabilities of environmental Gram negative organisms, it is to be 
expected that the sink will become periodically contaminated with micro-organisms 
that could cause infusate contamination arising from drop droplet sprays. 
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What team operation support is there?  
There is support from within the infusion team between colleagues. The ward team 
are very supportive of their pharmacist and the work done by the pharmacist to 
assist them in preparing drugs.  
 
Is the lighting good, making it easy to see to read instructions within the unit? 
Yes – there are no lighting problems in the area. 
 
What, if any, performance measures are available? 
There was no data with regard to CR-BSI incidence. There was data on the 
acquisitions of MRSA and C. difficile acquisitions within the BMTU unit. The ward 
is not yet participating in the Scottish Patient Safety Programme. 
 
What monitoring is done outside the ward? 
There is no specific CR-BSI surveillance done. This does not mean that infections 
would not be picked up and discussed at critical incident meetings – just that there 
is no ongoing surveillance and performance monitoring of CR-BSI. 
 
What in-unit operator performance monitoring is done? 
The majority of procedures are done in sight of colleagues in the Drug Preparation 
Room which is open. Procedure preparations can be done concurrently. At one 
point 3 nurses were observed preparing intravenous drugs simultaneously. The 
preparation area could accommodate 4 concurrent preparation procedures. 
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Significant variations or deviations in procedures would be noted.  All drugs to be 
administered need to have several redundancy checks. Although there is no 
written procedure, all procedures observed were done to the same standard. It 
would be extremely difficult to be a “rogue preparer” within the BMTU unit and not 
be detected. There seemed to be a genuine pride in the work done to prepare IV 
drugs. 
 
What, if any, information is available during the preparation of intravenous drugs, 
and how situation-aware is the nurse? 
The nurse preparing the drug has visible information on the amount of drug and 
diluent being prepared and whether the infusate contains particulates. The key 
information unavailable to the nurse is the sterile or non-sterile nature of the 
aseptic preparation and of the end result. 
 
What if any self-assessment of performance is done? 
All those observed showed a willingness to question aspects in the process if they 
were unsure. 
 
How frequently are drug errors reported? 
According to the ward manager all errors are reported. The ward manager 
considers that because of the extensive redundancy checks, few errors arise on 
the ward.  
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8.3.2 Data Stream 2 - Observations of drug preparations (2nd ward) 
How many procedures were observed? 
A total of 17 intravenous drug procedures were observed from the gathering of the 
equipment until the nurse entered the patients’ rooms. During these 17 procedures 
a total of 20 drugs were prepared.  During the preparation of the 17 procedures, at 
7 times there were concurrent preparations by more than one nurse was ongoing 
in the Drug Preparation area. 
 
What drugs were prepared and administered? 
The drugs prepared and administered were:  
Antibiotics: Co-trimoxazole, gentamicin, ampicillin co-amoxiclav, piperacillin 
with tazobactam, teicoplanin 
Anti-fungals: itraconazole  
Anti-virals: aciclovir,  
Immune-suppressants: Hydrocortisone, ciclosporin, 
Antiemetics: ondansetron,  
Analgesics: diamorphine.  
Antihistamine: chlorphenamine 
Diuretics: furosemide 
Monoclonal antibody: MabCampath®  
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The above drug names are generic apart from MabCampath®, this name is given 
as the proprietary name because all the documents on the ward refer only to the 
proprietary name (generic name Alemtuzumab). 
 
How variable are the procedures? 
Some drugs are administered as bolus, some like diamorphine, as a long-term 
infusion (>12 hours). The majority are prepared and put into 100ml or larger 
infusion bags. The use of a diluent in this way reduced variation in the procedures. 
There are however, still significant variations to the procedure; for example, some 
drugs require the use of opaque bags so that the infusate is not exposed to the 
light.  Chemotherapeutic agents are stored separately in a locked cupboard and 
sent to the unit wrapped within units. 
 
The Hickman-style catheters have 2 lumens; a drug and a blood line. This does 
not mean that all the drugs go down the drug line. Sometimes half of a prescribed 
drug would go down one arm of the catheter and the remainder via the other 
lumen. For example, antibiotics to salvage an infected line are administered 
through both lumens.   
 
How is the intravenous drug procedure performed? 
Figure 17 shows the process of intravenous drug preparation as observed and 
administration procedure as reported. 
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Figure 17     The drug preparation procedures (2nd ward) 
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• The nurse applies alcohol hand gel (AHG) to decontaminate hands and then 
gathers together all the drugs and diluents required for the preparation. 
• Against the prescription, the gathered medications are checked by the nurse 
who will prepare the drugs and a second nurse (one of the nurses will be 
deemed competent at intravenous drug preparation) that it is the correct: Drug 
(including expiry date), Diluent (including expiry date), Dose, Duration of 
administration, Due – that the drug is due and has not been given and the 
Route of administration.  This first set of checks is to ensure that the nurse is 
able to prepare the prescription correctly from the gathered drugs and diluents. 
• Drug addition labels are then written. 
• A trolley is then cleaned with a larger 10cm by 10cm alcohol wipe to create a 
decontaminated surface. 
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• Onto this trolley surface a pack of 2 sterile water-repellent squares are placed. 
• One corner of one of the sterile squares is opened to cover the entire trolley 
surface. 
• On to this (now sterile) field, all sterile items required for preparation are placed 
using a non-touch technique, including, 500 ml 0.9% saline infusion bag, sterile 
Y type administration set, syringes, needles. 
• Once all the sterile sundries have been placed on the field, the outer surfaces 
of all non-sterile sundries such as drug vials, labels, water for injection are 
wiped using an antiseptic wipe and then placed on the trolley surface. 
• The nurse performs a surgical scrub (using either antiseptic soap and water or 
the alcohol hand rub) as per the displayed procedure. 
• Sterile gloves are put on. 
• The administration set is connected to the 500 ml 0.9% saline infusion bag and 
air purged from the tubing. 
• Glass ampoules are then broken, or the flip tops of vials are removed. The drug 
access points of flip top vials are not decontaminated. 
• The drug is drawn up (mixed with a diluent if required). 
• The drug is injected into a 100ml infusion bag which is then connected to the 
second arm of the Y administration set 
• The drug is inspected for particulates and precipitation. 
• A label is applied if the drug is to be infused via infusion pump. 
• If any drug prepared was in excess of that prescribed, the finished drug is then 
checked to be of the correct dosage. 
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• If additional drugs are required they are prepared in the same way. 
• Once all drugs are prepared the nurse pushes the trolley touching only (with 
sterile gloves on) the sterile cover of the trolley.  (This has been coloured within 
Figure 17 as orange - critical to asepsis - touching any non sterile item during 
this step would constitute an asepsis failure). 
• The door to the patient’s room is then opened without using hands. 
The remainder of the procedure was unobserved in line with the ethics submission. 
The BMTU staff described the following: 
• The patient identification and prescription name are checked (verbal check). 
• The nurse picks up the second sterile field and the patient lifts the catheter, the 
second sterile field is placed under the catheter. 
• The nurse then decontaminates the catheter and Bionector® which presents an 
external rubber bung surface and can be connected directly to the 
administration set once decontaminated. 
• A short arm extension with external clamp may be used to provide greater 
control of drug administration. 
• As all patients are in cubicles with closed doors, some drugs require the nurse 
to remain with the patient during the infusion, others do not. All patients are 
conscious and able to call for help. There is no telemetry monitoring.  
• Once the drug is administered, the Y connection is switched and the flush 
administered.  
• The nurse leaves the patient’s room, sundries including gloves are discarded 
and alcohol gel is again applied to hands 
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• Documentation is completed. 
 
Was there distraction during the intravenous drug preparation procedures? 
The nurses are conscious of distractions during drug procedures. A purple apron is 
used as a visual “Do Not Disturb Notice” for non-intravenous drug rounds. Once 
intravenous drug preparations commenced no other procedures or interruptions 
took precedence. The only distraction seen was sometimes from colleagues who 
were trying to do the same thing, that is, prepare drugs aseptically. From time-to-
time due to the lack of space there was the need to move the trolleys mid-
procedure. This was deemed normal and completed without apparent loss of 
situation awareness. 
 
Is the equipment needed for IV drug preparation procedures close at hand? 
Yes – all the required equipment is kept in the Drug Preparation Room. Of note, 
there were 4 different antiseptic wipes available. 
General purpose environmental wipe 
*Alcohol 10cm X 10cm wipe 
*Clinell®  wipe containing Chlorhexidine gluconate and alcohol 
*Steret smaller 2.5cm X 2.5cm wipe containing alcohol 
* all these three wipes were housed in the same small storage container 
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8.3.3 Contamination risks in the 2nd ward procedure 
Figure 6, showing how long it would take for infusate contamination to cause 
infection, is also applicable to the second study ward. With this figure as a guide 
the procedures and location assessment data will be examined for their error-
prone and reliability status. As procedures, drugs and equipment vary from place 
to place, for this ward there is a need to analyse for the procedure; firstly, what is 
sterile/non-sterile? Secondly, what are the critical parts of the equipment during 
preparation? And thirdly, what are the critical parts immediately prior to 
administration? 
 
What is sterile and non-sterile at the start of the procedure? 
Figure 18 shows the sterility of equipment and surfaces at the start of the 
procedure on the second ward.  
Figure 18   The sterility of equipment at the start of the procedure (2nd ward) 
Internal contents 
only
Internal contents / surfaces and external surfaces
NB Work surface contaminated
 
 
The sterile surfaces/materials are the: trolley surface cover, syringes, needles, 
infusion bag and its contents, internal contents of drugs ampoules. 
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The non-sterile materials/surfaces are: 
The access point to any rubber topped vial 
Outside containers of any drug vial - including under flip off tops 
Drug addition label 
The work surface (trolley top). 
 
What are the critical surfaces during the procedure that, if contaminated or not 
decontaminated, will prevent aseptic preparation?  
The critical surfaces during preparation are the connection points of the 
administration set, the tops of the syringes and the metal part of the needle that 
will come into contact with the drug.  These surfaces should not be touched. The 
top of the drug ampoule vial should be considered contaminated and requiring 
decontamination (Figure 19). On this ward the trolley surface is cleaned and 
covered with a sterile drape creating a sterile field and negating contamination of 
critical sterile surfaces. 
Figure 19     The critical surfaces during the procedure (2nd ward) 
External surface: 
(non-sterile, 
therefore 
decontaminate)
Connection points : (sterile, therefore don’t touch)
Work surface contamination –
decontaminate before procedure commences
(on this ward cleaned and sterile field created)
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Immediately before administration what are the critical surfaces that must be 
protected or decontaminated?  
Immediately before the administration of the drug the critical surfaces are the 
Bionector®, (a needle-free connector put at the end of the catheter to allow for 
easy administration), the top of any syringe should a bolus drug be administered 
and the end of the administration set to be connected to the Bionector® (Figure 
20). The Bionector® access point is the only piece of equipment that requires 
decontamination as the other critical surfaces should be sterile; however, these 
sterile surfaces must not become contaminated. 
 
Figure 20   The critical surfaces just before administration (2nd ward) 
 
 
 
Is the equipment used for intravenous drug preparation procedures free from 
environmental splash contamination? 
There is obvious splash contamination of the area surrounding the scrub sink as 
discussed earlier. Although not obvious unless looked for, there are visual cues 
that could signal to the nurses making up the infusion that environmental 
contamination may have occurred and sterility of equipment may have been 
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compromised. This, as explained previously, is from the spray during hand 
washing from the scrub sink. The most oblivious safety measure here to prevent 
contaminated spray contaminating sterile fields is, in the short-term, not to perform 
hand hygiene during drug preparation. In the longer a better and better sited scrub 
sink area would be beneficial.  
 
Does the equipment aid the process of maintaining sterility of the infusate? 
Only one item of equipment posed a hazard during aseptic preparation – the 
rubber topped drug vials which, as stated previously, require decontamination prior 
to access to prevent potential asepsis failure. 
 
Where is the procedure in this ward likely to produce errors in aseptic preparation? 
Figures 21 and 22 illustrate the potential sources of IV contamination on the ward 
and what makes it difficult to assure asepsis, that is, the parts of the procedure 
where contamination is most likely to occur, these are: 
• During preparation from spray contamination generated at the scrub sink. 
• Needle piercing a non-sterile rubber topped vial contaminating the drug. 
• Failing to decontaminate effectively the Bionector® pre administration. 
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Figure 21      Where contamination is most likely (2nd ward) 
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Figure 22     What makes it difficult to ensure aseptic preparation (2nd ward) 
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8.3.4 How to reduce potential contamination risks (2nd ward) 
 
This procedure can be classified as: 
An uninterrupted aseptic procedure performed by a single nurse assisted, at 
intervals, by a second nurse to perform required redundancy checks. 
The nurses on this ward have negated the natural interruption of an aseptic drug 
preparation procedure by a ‘disinfect everything’ and ‘touch nothing that has not 
been disinfected or is sterile’, methodology.  The lack of quality control data on the 
end product or CR-BSI data means they cannot objectively assess the 
effectiveness of their efforts, for example, it cannot be confirmed that wiping labels 
with a disinfectant wipe is an effective means of decontamination. The nurse 
enters the patient’s room alone; therefore identity checks are done by a single 
nurse and done verbally. Maintaining an uninterrupted aseptic procedure could 
therefore be said to take precedence over redundancy checks or right patient 
checks.  Checks are performed after the drug is prepared and labels applied at the 
correct time, immediately post preparation; however they are done without what is 
considered to be interruption of the aseptic procedure – denoted on Figure 17 by 
double-colouring of these steps. Changes to the procedure which would reduce 
the risk of contamination are as follows. 
 
 
 
 207 
Change – Remove the risk of contaminated aerosols by removing the scrub sink 
Regardless of the asepsis in the steps performed by the nurse, the procedure is 
vulnerable due to the dissemination of potentially contaminated aerosols during 
concurrent hand hygiene procedures. Concurrent hand hygiene procedures should 
stop as a short-term step and the sink should be removed as a medium / long-term 
step. To reduce the risk from splash contamination, the use of the sink should be 
stopped during and immediately before aseptic procedures. 
 
New step – hand hygiene after trolley cleaning 
An additional hand decontamination step is introduced prior to the opening of the 
sterile trolley towel. This is because hands may have been contaminated during 
the cleaning of the trolley by transient environmental pathogenic micro-organisms 
and the next item they touch will be the sterile drape towel. 
 
New step – confirm drug and diluent are single-use sterile 
Although there are no multi-dose diluents or vials currently used, an additional step 
of confirming that drugs and diluents are single-use and sterile would still add to 
patient safety. 
 
New step – decontamination of the vial tops 
The critical point that is being missed in this procedure is the disinfection of the vial 
tops. To reduce the risk of error from micro-organisms entering the drug vial, the 
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top of the vial should be decontaminated – this amended step to the procedure is 
shown in Figure 23.  
 
New step – consider cross-reactions at a set point 
The drugs used on this ward tend follow a pattern depending on the patient’s 
progress pre and post transplant.  There is a more limited drug selection used in 
the BMTU and therefore the opportunities for cross-reactions between the 
commonly used drugs are well recognised in this ward. Nevertheless a ‘stop and 
consider possible cross-reaction’ step before administration commences step has 
been introduced in the modified procedure.  
 
Figure 23  Suggested amendments to the procedure (2nd ward) 
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The key questions in assessing possible changes to this procedure are:  
o Is a full surgical scrub antiseptic hand decontamination required? 
o Would an-interrupted aseptic procedure using alcohol hand decontamination at 
key points better reduce the risk of contamination? 
o Would the advocated changes produce benefits or disadvantages for the 
nurses? 
 
An alternative amended procedure which could be tested for advantages is shown 
as Figure 24. It is an interrupted-aseptic procedure involving the removal of gloves 
when labels are stuck on bags. The aseptic procedure recommences when the 
nurse arrives in the patient’s room.  The change provides the nurse with the 
freedom of confirming the patient’s arm band and identification by being able to 
touch the patient before hand hygiene to restart the aseptic procedure. The 
advantages of this procedure (Figure 24) need to be assessed for increased or 
decreased simplicity and increased or decreased use of resources as well as 
increased or decreased microbiological risk. 
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Figure 24   Alternative procedure (2nd ward)  
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The alternative procedure needs evaluation as it may have advantages for HCWs, 
including reduced exposure to antiseptics without increased risk to patients. Added 
to the uncertainty of the efficacy of the new procedure, there are other issues 
related to which antiseptic should be used and the method of antiseptic use. These 
matters will be discussed separately.   
 
8.3.5 Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparisons (2nd ward) 
There was no written procedure for aseptic preparation of infusates available on 
this ward. Consequently, no comparisons could be made. 
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8.3.6 Data Stream 3a - Opinions on Safety (2nd ward) 
A total of 15 questionnaires issued were issued to all the staff who were either 
competent or who were in training to be competent within the unit; 7 responses 
were received (47%).  This includes 2 responses received after an e-mail reminder 
was issued to the ward manager. The results to the statements on safety are given 
below (a summary of these data are given in Appendix 8). 
 
Statement 1 – When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 
The majority of the respondents 5/7 (85%) agreed with this statement. Two neither 
agreed nor disagreed. However, due to the risk of splash contamination within the 
drug preparation area, it is, in fact difficult to prevent asepsis failure in this unit. 
 
Statement 2 – When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 
There was a variable response to this question, with strong agreement and strong 
disagreement noted. Three of the 7 respondents (43%) agreed that it was easy to 
detect asepsis failure.  Two neither agreed nor disagreed indicating they were not 
sure whether it was easy to detect.  Although it is easy to detect contact 
contamination failure, it is not easy to detect asepsis failure from environmental 
sources such as the sink. 
 
Statement 3 – The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 
There was no strong agreement or disagreement with this statement. Four 
respondents (57%) neither agreed nor disagreed with it. This possibly reflects the 
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variability in the procedures. Some are simple and some are extremely 
complicated  
 
Statement 4 – The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 
No one disagreed with this statement.  The resources available and used on the 
ward including, antiseptics and sterile disposable trolley cloths, correlated with the 
view that ward staff had everything they thought necessary to prepare IV drugs 
safely. 
 
Statement 5 – The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
Only one respondent disagreed with this statement. This further emphasises that 
those preparing intravenous drugs did not recognise the potential environmental 
hazard from the scrub sink in the drug preparation area. 
 
Statement 6 – On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to 
prepare IV drugs safely  
Once again the majority neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. By using 
a dedicated Drug Preparation Area the nurses were not constantly listening for 
alarms and watching for patient’s self-extubating as in the pilot ICU. However, the 
closeness to the nurses’ station means that the Drug Preparation Area is the first 
port of call for enquiries when the station was unmanned, meaning that 
opportunities exist for distraction during preparation. 
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Statement 7 – I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation  
As in the pilot study, the majority 5/7 (71%) respondents disagreed with this 
statement.  The one respondent who agreed with this statement could have been 
in training for competency. There was no policy statement encouraging this to be 
done. 
 
Statement 8 – I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding the 
preparing IV drugs on this ward  
There was 7/7 (100%) disagreement with this statement, meaning that all 
respondents would raise any safety concern they recognised. 
 
Statement 9 – I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption   
There were variably responses to this statement, 3/7 (43%) of respondents 
strongly disagreed with this statement. The remainder either agreed or neither 
agreed or disagreed. It is possible that some members of the staff are more likely 
to get interrupted than others; the ward manager or daily nurse in charge, for 
example are more likely to be requested to accompany doctors on ward rounds. 
 
Statement 10 – Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this 
ward 
The majority of respondents 5/7 (71%) strongly agreed with this statement.  The 
procedure which involved a full surgical scrub lent weight to this statement. 
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Statement 11 – If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it  
The responses to this question agree with statement 8 on being comfortable with 
raising safety concerns. The majority here, 6/7 (86%), would self-report an error if 
they recognised it in their own practice. 
 
Statement 12– There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs 
Once again no respondents disagreed with this statement. The majority of 
respondents 4/7 (57%), either agreed, or strongly agreed, with the statement on 
available support. 
 
Statement 13 – To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors  
Six of the 7 respondents agreed, or strongly agreed, that they were encouraged to 
report errors (Figure 46). The one strong disagreement was possibly a misread. 
The responses to this statement otherwise concur with other statements on 
support and error reporting. (Statements 8, 10, 11 and 12)  
 
Statement 14 – I find preparing IV drugs is stressful   
This statement produced variable responses. An equal number agreed and 
disagreed with the statement. Therefore, some nurses clearly find the preparing of 
IV drugs stressful. This is understandable; despite the supportive environment, 
errors in IV drug preparation, particularly of the toxic drugs used, can be life-
threatening for the patients and potentially career threatening for the nurse. 
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Statement 15– Preparing IV drugs give me job satisfaction    
Once again there was a wide range of responses to the statement. The majority 
4/7 (57%) disagreed – they did not get job satisfaction from preparing IV drugs. 
Therefore, despite the high volume of drugs prepared, approximately 10 per 
patient per day, it can be concluded again that the majority of respondents work in 
the BMTU not because they have to prepare IV drugs but in spite of the fact that 
this is the case. 
  
8.3.6.1 Additional comments from the respondents  
“Double checking depends on the business of the ward and type of drug is always 
with chemo or unfamiliar drug.” 
“If a new junior member was under supervision I would always check every step. 
After a period of supervision a nurse is deemed competent only the drug, dose 
patient and infusion rates are checked routinely.” 
“Comments are my responsibility as the one accessing the Hickman line I feel.” 
(Referring to never checking the catheter hubs were accessed aseptically and the 
checking that hand hygiene and PPE use was appropriate). 
 
8.3.7 Summary of the opinions of safety from the 2nd ward 
Some of the responses to the statements indicate aspects of a safety culture that 
could make the procedure more error-prone. These are as follows: 
o Erroneous assumptions of safety (Statements 1, 2 )  
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o Complexity of the procedure (Statement  3) 
o Unrecognised environmental difficulties (Statement 5 ) 
o Lack of performance feedback (Statement 7) 
o Distractions and interruptions (Statement 6, 9) 
o Stress from the procedure  (Statement 14) 
o Lack of job satisfaction (Statement  15) 
 
The responses which indicate positive aspects of a safety culture and therefore 
reduce the risk of error in the procedure are: 
o The resources available to prepare IV drugs (Statement 4) 
o The willingness to report errors (Statements 8,11) 
o That asepsis failure is a priority on this ward (Statement 10) 
o The support provided to the team (Statement 12) 
o That staff are encouraged to report errors (Statement 13)) 
 
8.3.8 Summary of the results from the 2nd ward 
Whilst completing the Location Assessment tool on this ward, the ward manager 
stated that their very vulnerable patients necessitated a procedure that includes a 
full (surgical) scrub technique. However, the environment posed the patients risks 
from the very scrub sink used to achieve safety; vast sprays of droplets frequently 
contaminate the nurses’ sterile preparation areas. Although no specific equipment 
was identified that would increase risk on this ward, vial tops were not 
decontaminated, potentially causing another source of infusate contamination. In 
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this ward the attempts to prevent infusate contamination focused on preventing 
organisms getting into the drugs; there was no attempt to use filters to prevent 
contaminated drugs getting into the patients.   
 
The opinions of safety demonstrated that the procedure was not much-loved, 4/7 
(57%) did not agree that it gave them satisfaction, even thought it made up a good 
part of the nurses’ daily work load.  There were indicators of a good safety culture, 
in that the nurses were encouraged to report errors and HCWs stated that if they 
noticed an error they would report it.  
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8.4     Results from the 3rd ward - an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) 
 
 
Data Stream 1 – Location Assessment (3rd ward) 
Data Stream 2 – Observation Drug Preparations (3rd study)  
Contamination risks in the 3rd ward procedure 
How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 3rd ward  
Data Stream 4 – Comparison of observed procedures with document review 
Data Stream 3a – Opinions of Safety (3rd ward an ICU) 
 
 
 
Study took place on Monday 28th September 2009 
Researcher Evonne Curran  
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8.4.1 Data Stream - 1 Location Assessment 3rd ward 
The data for the Location Assessment tool were obtained by interview with the 
ward manager and from the researcher’s observations during the study period. 
 
The unit and the patients they care for 
The unit is a general intensive care unit (ICU) caring for patients with a wide range 
of severe illnesses including: renal disease, multiple trauma following road traffic 
accidents and respiratory failure due to many causes. The unit is a regional centre 
and cares for a wide range of tertiary referral patients.  The ICU comprises 7 ICU 
beds and 2 HDU beds, or it can be used as an 8 bedded ICU with one vacant bed 
(Figure 25). 
Figure 25    The plan of the 3rd ward (an ICU) 
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What vascular devices are used for intravenous drug administration? 
In the main, central vascular catheters (CVCs) are used to administer intravenous 
drugs. This is due to the longer term vascular access requirements of intensive 
care patients, the use of drugs irritant to veins and the need for immediate reliable 
vascular access.  The CVCs are sited in the internal jugular veins. Femoral veins 
are used when there is no alternative venous access.  Occasionally patients have 
peripheral vascular catheters (PVCs); this is mainly the high dependency patients. 
Peripherally inserted central catheters (PICCs) and midline catheters are not 
routinely used, but would be used if they are already in situ when the patient is 
admitted. 
 
Approximately how many intravascular drugs are prepared in the unit? 
On average, a patient in the ICU would require between 10-12 drugs per day. 
Therefore, the unit can prepare and administer about 90 intravenous drugs per day 
and about 33,000 per year. 
 
What intravenous drugs are prepared and administered? 
The main intravenous drug groups used administered to patients are: antibiotics, 
inotropes, ACE inhibitors, bronchodilators, sedatives, anticoagulants and gastric 
ulcer prophylaxis medicines. 
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Does the unit use drugs associated with infusate sepsis? 
There is frequent use of lipid drugs, such as propofol, which are known to promote 
microbial growth and are associated with infusate sepsis.  Intravenous drugs are 
administered via bolus, syringe pump and via infusion. Long-term infusions (>12 
hours) are used for insulin and diamorphine and very occasionally for heparin. 
These long-term infusions pose a unique risk in that they enable low numbers of 
micro-organisms to multiply over the duration of the infusion, eventually causing 
infusate sepsis. 
 
Are any of the intravenous drugs prepared from multi-dose vials? 
Propofol (anaesthetic sedative) and heparin (anticoagulant) are delivered as sterile 
bottles with rubber tops that could inadvertently be used, contaminated and 
replaced on a shelf; that is, contaminated without showing obvious contamination, 
and then, dangerously for patients, reused. There are some drugs, including one 
heparin preparation, which is prepared from multi-dose vials. The product 
information for this heparin states that it can be used for up to 14 days once 
opened. Dispensing Pins are available; these devices enable repeated doses to be 
removed from the bag without the need to use multiple individual ampoules.  
 
How long are the vascular access devices in situ for? 
CVCs are routinely replaced after 7 days (longer if appropriate, for example if they 
are required for only a few more days).  The CVCs would always be removed if 
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there was redness around the insertion site, or if there are signs of a catheter-
related blood stream infection. PVCs would be removed after 3 days. 
 
Is there a stable team that prepares and administers the intravenous drugs? 
Yes.  There is a core of long-term staff on the ward who have been deemed 
competent for some time in relation to intravenous drug preparation.  
 
What post initial training is provided? 
A post-training consolidation pack is being prepared to provide further support for 
nurses and further assurance of patient safety related to drug administration.  It Is 
intended that this will reaffirm the policy. At present, no further formal training is 
provided. There is ongoing peer approval and assessment for all staff who prepare 
and administer intravenous drugs. 
 
Are all the team familiar with all the intravenous preparing procedures? 
By the time team members are deemed competent, their records should show that 
they have experience in preparing the wide variety of drugs required by ICU 
patients, and certainly all the usual intravenous drugs prepared by the unit. 
 
Where are the intravenous drug preparation procedures performed? 
There is a designated Drug Preparation Area, (Figure 26). Depending on the 
complexity of the drug preparation and the preference of the nurse, some IV drugs 
are prepared here; some are prepared at the bedside. 
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This Drug Preparation Area is uncluttered and visibly clean. The one sink does not 
create splash that could contaminate drug preparation procedures (Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26  The drug preparation area in the 3rd ward 
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What team operation support is there?  
The ward manager has put together a resource pack for all the staff. This pack 
contains the policies and a variety of supplementary information to support all 
those who prepare intravenous drugs. This information is readily available and is 
kept in the drug preparation area. The manager feels that there is support from 
within the infusion team between colleagues, in that they are encouraged to share 
problems and concerns related to intravenous drugs and the administration 
thereof. There is unit pharmaceutical support available. 
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What written procedures are available? 
Drug information sheets are available in a folder in the Drug Preparation area. 
These sheets contain information about the drug; how it can be reconstituted, 
compatibilities and incompatibilities, final pH. No information regarding infection 
risk is provided. 
 
A manual entitled “Safe and Secure Handling of Medicines in Hospital Wards, 
Theatres and Departments.” is available on the unit (NHS Greater Glasgow and 
Clyde 2008). Section 14.5 of the above document is the ‘Administration of 
medicines by injection and infusion. (This is the only one of the six study wards in 
which this April 2008 document was identified). Within the document there is no 
instruction on precisely how to perform aseptic technique. The instruction available 
is discussed in Data Stream 4. 
 
How often are the drug procedures and drug information referred to? 
The nurses often refer to the drug information sheets.  The resource pack is 
available and used as a resource pack rather than a procedure reference guide. 
The procedure (14.5) as detailed in the NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde, Safe 
and Secure Handling of Medicines in Hospital Wards and Departments was not 
referred to on a procedure-by-procedure basis (NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde 
2008). 
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Are the intravenous drug preparation procedures generic or drug specific? 
The drug information sheets are drug specific. However, as stated previously, 
there were no specific procedures available to detail how to prevent contamination 
of the infusates.  
 
Do the intravenous drug preparation procedures include problem identification and 
if <this situation> then <that> action is required? 
There is no information relating to the preventing of infusate contamination in this 
format.  
 
Displayed Poster Information 
In a clean and uncluttered Drug Preparation Area there are a total of 10 posters or 
information sheets available – most referring to information that would be required 
rapidly. None of these posters refers to asepsis maintenance during the 
preparation and administration of intravenous drugs. 
 
What other procedures are done in the preparation areas? 
 In the Drug Preparation Area other preparation procedures are readied, for 
example, dressing procedures, control drug procedures. This area is spacious and 
few concurrent procedures were observed.  At the bedside a variety of procedures 
are done including, bed bathing, suctioning (closed), physiotherapy and dressing 
wounds. However, because an individual nurse is allocated to an individual patient, 
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these procedures are not performed concurrently with intravenous drug 
preparation procedures unless there is an emergency. During emergencies, every 
effort is still undertaken to maintain asepsis. 
 
Is the lighting good, making it easy to see to read instructions within the unit ? 
Yes – there are no lighting problems. The lighting can be adjusted to suit the 
patient and the nurse. 
 
What if any performance measures are available? 
The ICU is clearly working hard to develop their quality improvement skills and 
lead with the Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP); the unit has data on 
catheter-related blood stream infections (CR-BSI), of which it was stated there had 
been 82 days since their last infection. 
 
All data available is displayed in an area where the nurses and members of the 
public come through the unit.  Error data is discussed at regular meetings with the 
clinical team.  
 
What in-ward operator performance monitoring is done? 
The majority of procedures are done in sight of colleagues in the large relatively 
open plan area that is the ICU. All drugs to be administered need to have several 
redundancy checks. Although there is no written procedure, the majority of 
procedures are done to a similar process. There were some observed and 
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reported variations, for example, one nurse was observed using alcohol gel on 
gloved hands, the ends of the catheters could be connected with either a 3-way 
tap or Bionector®. There was an option to use Dispensing Pins although all 
observed procedures were performed by the ward nurses using single-use 
diluents. However, the elements of the procedures were similar – the order in 
which they were performed seemed to be operator dependent.  It would be 
extremely difficult to be a ‘rogue preparer’ within the ICU and not be detected. 
 
What if any information is available during the preparation of intravenous infusion 
and how situation aware is the nurse? 
The nurse preparing the drug can tell the amount of drug and diluent being 
prepared and what is required; the nurse is also aware of whether there is 
undissolved drug, or particulates such as visible glass particles present in the 
infusate.  The only information unavailable to the nurse is the sterile or non-sterile 
nature of the drug (also, if the Dispensing Pin is used, it is not known whether 
there is contamination of the diluent, the Dispensing Pin canal, the syringe tip and 
the catheter connection point).  
 
What monitoring is done outside the ward? 
Data on CR-BSIs and compliance with vascular care procedures are sent to the 
SPSP extranet site and monitored by the SPSP team as well as being reviewed 
and acted up on internally. 
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How frequently are drug errors reported? 
The ward manager reported that clinical incidents involving medications are 
reported on average 250 times per month throughout NHS Greater Glasgow and 
Clyde. 
 
According to the ward manager all drug errors are reported. Error reporting is seen 
as a means to achieve safety. 
 
8.4.2 Data Stream 2 Observations drug preparations (3rd ward) 
How many procedures were observed? 
In a busy ICU a total of 17 procedures were observed. These 17 procedures 
involved 22 drug preparations. 
 
What procedures were observed and how many drugs were administered? 
A variety of procedures were observed; drugs prepared for bolus, for syringe driver 
and for administration via infusion.  
The infusates prepared included:  
Analgesics: Paracetamol 
Anaesthetics/sedatives: Propofol, Fentenyl, Diazemuls 
Antibiotics: Clarithromycin, Ampicillin, Cefotaxime, Amoxicillin 
Steroids: Hydrocortisone, dexamethasone 
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Others: Potassium chloride, insulin, proton-pump inhibitors, acyclovir, 
phenytoin. 
 
How variable are the procedures? 
The procedures do vary in terms of drug compatibility but can be represented 
simply as follows: 
o Draw up drug; Draw up flush; Administer drug;  Administer flush;   
Or alternatively 
o Draw up diluent; Mix diluent with drug; Draw up mixture (drug and diluent); 
Draw up flush; Administer mixture; Administer flush. 
 
Underlying this simplification there is a good deal of variation. The solution may 
need to be administered covered, so it does not deteriorate in the light, or may 
require to be administered at a specific temperature. To maintain a specified pH, 
the diluent may vary. Additionally, some drugs may need to be stopped prior to 
administration of a second drug to prevent precipitation or cross-reaction. The IV 
drug administration sheets help ensure the procedure minimises such risks.  
 
The procedure is illustrated in Figure 27. Observed variations in the procedure are 
denoted by a ‘+/-‘ sign. 
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Figure 27   How the drug preparation were performed in the 3rd ward 
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How is the intravenous drug procedure performed? 
Figure 27 shows the process of intravenous drug preparation as observed and 
administration procedure as reported as follows: 
• That the nurse gathers all drugs and diluents. 
• Against the prescription (which is on a computer screen) the following are 
checked by 2 nurses (one of whom is deemed competent): 
o The patient and prescription match. 
o The Drug (including expiry date), the Diluent (including expiry date), the 
Dose, the Duration of administration; that the drug is Due and has not 
been given and the Route of administration.  This first set of checks is to 
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ensure that the nurse is able to prepare the prescription correctly from 
the gathered drugs and diluents. 
• Sundries (needles, syringes and administration sets) are then gathered. 
• Alcohol hand gel may then be applied; a plastic apron and non-sterile gloves 
are put on. 
• As in the pilot ICU, it is often recognised at this stage that something has been 
forgotten and, with the gloves on, going back to a drawer to collect a syringe or 
additional needle. This would negate any infection control benefit from the 
gloves. 
• The packs are then opened. 
• The drug access points of rubber-topped vials are sometimes decontaminated. 
(‘Snap and enter’ vials are frequently used into which the needle can be 
inserted to collect the drug without the need to pierce a bung. These vials do 
not require decontamination). 
• The drug is prepared as either a draw up drug, draw up flush, or a draw up 
diluent. The procedure is then to mix the diluent with drug, and then to draw up 
the mixture (drug and diluent). 
• The second set of checks is to ensure that what has been drawn up is the 
correct dosage, the diluent is as required by the prescription and that there are 
not possible cross-reactions that could occur. A visual check for any 
precipitation is done. 
• Pre-written labels are then applied to syringes or infusions (Labels are 
sometimes written at this point).   
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The following part of the procedure was discussed with the nurse and not 
observed as per the ethics submission. 
• The connection is decontaminated with an alcohol wipe. 
• The red bung is disconnected. 
• The drug is then administered (by bolus / syringe or infusion) followed by the 
diluent. Occasionally the flush would come direct from a 3-way tap via an 
existing infusion. 
• During administration the patient is observed for abnormal reaction to the 
administration. 
• The syringe or infusion is then disconnected and a new sterile bung is applied. 
• Sundries including gloves are discarded and alcohol gel is again applied to 
hands. 
• Documentation is completed. 
One nurse applied alcohol hand gel to gloved hands, a clear recognition that the 
gloved hands had become contaminated and something needed to be done. 
However, gloves are not designed to be decontaminated in the same way as 
hands. 
 
Was there distraction during the intravenous drug preparation procedures? 
It was not unusual for a nurse to be disturbed during the preparation of a drug but 
this was not seen to result in the omission of a step.  As noted previously in an 
ICU, when the nurse is at the bedside there are concurrent procedures of watching 
the patient, listening for alarms and intermittent monitoring of the telemetry. 
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Is the equipment needed for intravenous drug preparation procedures close at 
hand? 
Equipment is kept in the patient’s own equipment trolley or in the drug preparation 
area.  
 
8.4.3 Contamination risks in the 3rd ward procedure 
Figure 6 illustrates again for this ward how long infusate contamination would take 
to cause a symptomatic response in a patient; that is, almost immediately if there 
is heavy infusate contamination, or over days or weeks if contamination causes 
biofilm formation to start. With this figure as a guide, the procedures and location 
assessment data will be examined for their error-prone and reliability status. To do 
this there is first an analysis of what is sterile/non-sterile and what are the critical 
parts of the equipment during preparation and immediately prior to administration.  
 
What is sterile and non-sterile at the start of the procedure? 
No Dispensing Pins were seen in use, although I was informed they could be used 
and they were seen to be available on the shelves. Figure 28 illustrates the sterile 
and non-sterile surfaces and materials used in the pilot ward. The sterile 
surfaces/materials are: 
Syringes, needles, internal contents of drug ampoules, (internal contents to 
diluents if never used), Dispensing Pin (if never used), diluent (if never 
used). 
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The non-sterile materials/surfaces are: 
The access point to any rubber topped vial 
Outside containers of any drug vial 
Reuse of the access point to the multi-dose diluent via the Dispensing Pin  
Possibly the multi-dose diluent if a Dispensing Pin is used 
The surface on which the drugs are to be prepared. 
 
Figure 28  Equipment sterility at the start of the procedure (3rd ward) 
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What are the critical surfaces that if, contaminated or not decontaminated, will 
prevent aseptic preparation?  
As the work surface is not sterile, has not been decontaminated and has been 
open to contamination, it should be cleaned and be dry prior to the procedure 
starting.  
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The critical surfaces during preparation are the connection points of the top of the 
syringe, the metal part of the needle that will come into contact with the drug and 
internal Dispensing Pin surface. These surfaces should not be touched (Figure 
29). The other critical surface is the top of the ampoule. 
 
Figure 29  The critical surfaces during the procedure (3rd Ward) 
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As identified on the pilot ward, Dispensing Pins are designated single-use 
equipment. It would be possible for the diluent to be contaminated by the bung 
being contaminated when removed and then replaced or after non-immediate 
replacement of the bung or by droplet contamination from general ICU activity.  
There is no mechanism to identify whether multi-dose vials are contaminated. 
 
Immediately before administration, what are the critical surfaces that must be 
protected from contamination or decontaminated?  
Immediately before the administration of the drug the critical surfaces are the hub, 
the tip of the syringe and the 3-way tap on the end of the catheter (Figure 30). As 
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the 3-way tap is attached to the patient, it must always be considered to be 
contaminated and to be covered with at least coagulase negative staphylococci, 
the leading cause of catheter related blood-stream infections. 
 
Figure 30   The critical surfaces just before administration (3rd Ward) 
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Is the equipment used for intravenous drug preparation procedures free from 
environmental splash contamination? 
There is no possible splash from a sink during drug preparations. At the bedside, 
although a closed suction system is used there is always the possibility of 
unplanned ventilator disconnection resulting in aerosols being disseminated over a 
couple of metres; this would (since endotracheal secretions are always 
contaminated) contain bacteria.  There are no visual cues which signal to the 
nurses making up the infusion that environmental contamination may have 
occurred and sterility of equipment may have been compromised. 
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Is the equipment adequate; that is, does it aid the process of maintaining sterility of 
the infusate? 
Three types of equipment appeared to pose possible asepsis challenges for the 
nurses: Sterile or non-sterile access points, Dispensing Pins and the use of 
potentially contaminated multi dose vials. The mechanisms by which this 
equipment poses a risk have been discussed previously.  
 
What are the infusates at highest risk of contamination for the 3rd ward? 
Figure 10 highlights the infusates at highest risk of contamination in this ward. In 
this ITU there is high use of lipid drugs, which promote microbial growth.  Also, 
there is a high use of infusions of >12 hours duration which can enable microbial 
growth over the lifetime of the infusion. Such infusions in this ICU could include 
heparin, diamorphine or insulin.  Finally, there could be unintentional use of 
contaminated diluents, or contaminated multi-dose vials on this ward. 
 
Where is the procedure likely to produce errors in aseptic preparation? 
Figure 31 illustrates the stages of the procedure at which contamination is most 
likely to occur; these are the same as in the pilot ward: 
• Accessing the sterile drug through a non-sterile access point with resulting 
contamination of the drug. 
• Critical surface contamination / non-decontamination: 
o Touching (with unclean or gloved hands) the tip of the syringe with 
subsequent contamination of the catheter lumen.  
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o Critical surface contamination from direct contact with a 
contaminated environment work surface. 
o Failure to decontaminate effectively the hub pre connection with the 
syringe. 
• Accessing the diluent via a contaminated Dispensing Pin canal thus 
contaminating the tip of the syringe  
• Drawing up the diluent if it is contaminated through multi access. 
• Using a contaminated multi-dose vial. 
 
Figure 31   When contamination is most likely to occur (3rd ward)  
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8.4.4 How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 3rd study ward 
The procedure at present can be classified as: 
An interrupted aseptic procedure performed by a single nurse with checker 
That is, there are aseptic steps followed by non-aseptic steps followed by aseptic 
steps (Figure 27). The interrupted aseptic nature of the procedure is illustrated by 
colour-coding the steps: blue for mandatory checks, green for essential steps but 
not critical to asepsis, orange for steps critical to asepsis (Figure 27). Changes that 
would promote reliability and reduce errors in this procedure are highlighted below. 
 
New step - Cleaning the work surface preparation area  
The procedure should commence with cleaning of the work surface preparation 
area with either a detergent or disinfectant wipe.  The surface should be allowed to 
dry before any items are placed on it. This should be followed by hand hygiene 
and then donning of the plastic apron. A visibly clean work surface does not 
denote microbiological ‘cleanliness’. Pathogenic environmental and skin 
organisms, that could cause infusate contamination, can survive for long periods of 
time on surfaces. Through direct contact, equipment and then the infusate itself 
could become contaminated. Therefore, the preparation surface should be cleaned 
before starting the procedure to reduce the risk of equipment contamination or 
contamination of the HCWs’ hands.  The area should be dry before any items are 
placed on it. This step should be considered critical to asepsis. 
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New step - Introducing hand hygiene after cleaning of the preparation area 
As the cleaning of the surface could itself result in contamination of the nurses’ 
hands by the same transient environmental micro-organisms, the second step is to 
decontaminate hands by using an alcohol based hand gel. The last preliminary 
step is donning the plastic apron to prevent contamination from the uniform 
causing contamination of the preparation area. This preliminary procedure 
assumes that hands are visibly clean before commencing the task and that 
cleaning the surface does not result in visibly dirty hands, if it does, hand washing 
would be required. 
 
New step - Confirm drugs and diluents are single-use sterile 
All drugs and diluents should be confirmed as single-use sterile (SUS) at the start 
of the procedure. This means that the use of Dispensing Pins should be stopped. 
In addition, all multi-dose vials, even of heparin with preservative, should be 
stopped. Once all the equipment has been gathered, an additional cognitive step 
of considering for each procedure what is sterile and what is critical throughout the 
procedure will help guide practice. At this point checking for critical drug 
information will reduce other patient safety hazards associated with intravenous 
drug administration. 
 
Changed step - from glove use to hand hygiene at critical points 
There was a lack of clarity as to why gloves are used for this procedure. Gloves 
could be being used to prevent microbial contamination from nurses’ hands to the 
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sterile equipment during the procedure, to prevent contamination of the nurses’ 
skin by the drug or just because it is custom and practice. If gloves are to be used 
effectively, that is changed if ever contaminated during any stage of the procedure, 
then as the procedure is an interrupted aseptic procedure they should be replaced 
every time the gloved-hands come in contact with a potentially contaminated 
surface (therefore pairs would be required for this procedure [the first before 
gathering sundries, the second after touching contaminated drug ampoule 
surfaces and the third pair before administration]). Gloves are not designed to be 
decontaminated in the same ways as hands, that is, by hand-washing or using 
alcohol hand gel.  
 
If glove use is to prevent hand contamination from the drug, then they should be 
used before drug manipulation and removed after drug is drawn into the syringe; 
this is the last opportunity for skin contamination. This type of glove use, that is, to 
protect the nurses’ skin, requires a Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 
Regulations 2002 (COSHH) risk assessment be completed, to determine what risk 
is present and how it can be negated or mitigated against (Health and Safety 
Executive 2009). Assuming that gloves are not used prevent a hazardous 
exposure to the nurses’ skin, the amended procedure replaces glove use by more 
frequent hand decontamination to increase the likelihood of an aseptic procedure 
being achieved.  
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The tops of all drug vials not marked sterile should be decontaminated with a 
disinfectant wipe. Alcohol hand gel should then be applied after sundries have 
been opened – this is because during the opening of the vials, or flipping off of lids, 
hands may have become contaminated. 
 
Sticking labels on to infusion bags as soon as the drug is added is a critical patient 
safety step which interrupts the aseptic procedure. Therefore, in order to 
recommence the aseptic procedure, hand hygiene should be performed after the 
label has been applied to the infusate bag/syringe.  Alcohol hand gel should also 
be reapplied once more if there is a requirement to disconnect the line before 
flushes. 
 
New step – Review possible critical surface contamination and cross-reaction risk 
As in the pilot ward, prior to administration of the drug, a further cognitive step is 
introduced. At this point the nurse reviews the performed procedure and is 
confident that neither critical surface contamination has occurred nor cross-
reactions are likely to occur. There is also the opportunity to undertake the critical 
non-aseptic check of considering what steps, if any, are required to prevent cross-
reactions or precipitation. 
 
The procedure as done currently is shown as Figure 27, the new steps in the 
procedure are shown as Figure 32, and are colour-coded in Figure 33. The colour-
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coding of the procedure enables staff to identify what steps are critical to asepsis 
and what are critical to patient safety, for example, sticking on of labels. 
 
Figure 32  Amended procedure for increased reliability (3rd ward) 
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Figure 33   Revised procedure colour-coded (3rd ward) 
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The recommended changes attempt to achieve an aseptic procedure, without end 
product validation, it is not possible to confirm that this modified aseptic procedure 
will reliably achieve a sterile product. 
 
8.4.5 Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparisons (3rd ward) 
This ward has a written procedure and the following table (Table 8) iterates the 
step in the procedure, the purpose of the step and whether it was observed.  
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Table 8     Comparison of written and observed procedures 3rd ward  
Procedure Purpose Observed 
Has a clear, uncluttered surface for 
preparation 
To prevent 
contamination 
Yes 
Has adequate space To enable the 
procedure to be 
performed correctly 
Yes 
Is quiet, away from distractions To prevent errors Not always 
possible 
Has a surface that can be cleaned To prevent contact 
contamination 
It has a surface 
that can be 
cleaned, but it 
was not 
physically 
cleaned before 
each procedure 
Has access to hand washing 
facilities (medicine preparation, 
however, should not be carried out 
adjacent to sinks) 
To prevent splash 
contamination 
Yes 
Is well lit To reduce errors  Yes 
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Table 8     Comparison of written and observed procedures 3rd ward  
Procedure Purpose Observed 
If available, a ready-to-use form of 
injection should be used in 
preference to one prepared at 
ward/pharmacy level 
To reduce errors Unable to tell 
what was 
available in 
pharmacy 
Injections for one patient only 
should be prepared at a time and 
administered before preparing any 
injections or infusions for another 
patient 
To reduce errors Done, but one 
patient had 5 
drugs being 
prepared during 
the same 
procedure 
Injections must be clearly 
identifiable at all stages during 
preparation and administration 
To reduce errors 
 
 
Yes, as far as is 
practical. 
The additive label for syringes and 
infusions (excluding syringes 
prepared for immediate use as a 
bolus) must be prepared before 
starting preparation of the injection / 
infusion so that is it affixed 
immediately after preparation is 
To promote the 
correct procedure 
and reduce errors 
Yes, note this 
procedure 
interrupts the 
aseptic steps in 
the procedure 
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Table 8     Comparison of written and observed procedures 3rd ward  
Procedure Purpose Observed 
complete. The label must specify 
the patient, name, additive, 
strength, diluent, route, date and 
time prepared, initials of staff 
involved in preparation and expiry 
date 
In wards / theatres / departments, if 
an injection is to be given by bolus, 
the name of the medicine must be 
affixed to the syringe (for example, 
using an additive label or specific 
drug-name label). The finished 
preparation and original containers 
must be kept in an individual tray 
between preparation and 
administration to patient 
To reduce errors All drugs were 
given as soon as 
prepared – 
negating this risk 
All prepared infusions / injections 
must be labelled with an 
appropriately sized label so as not 
to obliterate the name of the 
To enable rate 
checks 
Yes the label was 
applied so that 
although 
adhered, it could 
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Table 8     Comparison of written and observed procedures 3rd ward  
Procedure Purpose Observed 
infusion and to allow inspection of 
the solution and volume. For 
syringe drives, the label must be 
attacked in such a say to avoid 
obliterating the graduations on the 
syringe 
be lifted to 
identify the 
dosage 
On no account should prepared 
injections / infusions be 
administered that contain 
particulate matter 
To prevent 
complications 
Yes – drugs were 
checked to be 
clear of 
particulates 
Infusion bags must not be routinely 
used as multi-dose containers for 
the preparation of injections. In 
some clinical areas, devices are 
available that facilitate the use of 
infusion bags as multiple use 
containers for a restricted time 
period (for example, for drawing up 
small quantities to flush lines / use 
as a diluent). These devices should 
To prevent infusate 
contamination 
Not seen done 
but available for 
use on the ward 
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Table 8     Comparison of written and observed procedures 3rd ward  
Procedure Purpose Observed 
only be used after local risk 
assessment has been undertaken 
and procedures put in place that 
ensure patient safety at all time 
 
The procedure does not specify any asepsis checks. The procedure does specify 
the criteria which must be met to allow use of Dispensing Pins. However, this 
requirement is not in line with the MHRA (2010) guidance on single-use 
equipment.  From the researcher’s perspective, it is difficult to see how patient 
safety can be assured at all with the use of Dispensing Pins. 
 
8.4.6  Data Stream 3a – Opinions on Safety 3rd ward 
A total of 45 questionnaires were issued to staff in the ICU who were competent, or 
were in training for competency, in intravenous (IV) drug preparation; and a total of 
19 (42%) were returned. A summary of these data are given in Appendix 9. 
 
Statement 1 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 
The majority of respondents 15/19 (79%) thought that is easy to prevent asepsis 
failure on this wards. However, in fact given the risk of splash contamination, use 
of high-risk drugs and variability in procedure it is not easy to prevent asepsis 
failure on the ward. 
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Statement 2 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 
The responses to this statement were more variable. Less than half the 
respondents 9/19 (97%) agreed with the statement that it is easy to detect asepsis 
failure. As stated previously, it is easy to detect touch contamination. However, 
given that micro-organisms and significant microbial contamination can not be 
seen with the naked eye, it is not easy to detect asepsis failure. 
 
Statement 3 – The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 
Despite the observed complexity in the procedures, the majority of respondents 15 
(79%) stated that they thought the procedures on the ward were simple. 
 
Statement 4 – The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely  
Again the majority of respondents were in agreement with this statement, 15 
(79%). Three could not agree or disagree with this statement and one respondent 
strongly disagreed with it. 
 
Statement 5 – The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
Fourteen respondents (74%), agreed with this statement. The unit differed from the 
pilot ICU in size. It was much smaller and the drug preparation area could be used 
as it was much closer to the patients. Also, the next patient and therefore their 
nurse, was also much closer to hand and this nearby nurse was therefore able to 
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provide cover more easily should one nurse be away from the bedside to prepare 
drugs. 
 
Statement 6 - On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare 
IV drugs safely 
Only 6 respondents (32%) agreed with this statement. As many drugs were 
prepared in the drug preparation area (Figure 57) there was less distraction from 
the concurrent monitoring of the patient whilst preparing the drug and performing 
drug calculations. This diversity of response showed that some nurses find it 
difficult to avoid interruption and distraction when preparing drugs. 
 
Statement 7 – I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 
Again there was diversity in responses to this statement, with strong agreement 
and strong disagreement to it.  On this ward the ward manager was working on 
additional supporting materials, such as a resource pack and specifications for 
continued education that perhaps influenced the respondents.  A slight majority 10 
(53%) disagreed with the statement. 
 
Statement 8 – I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding 
preparing of IV drugs on this ward 
In agreeing with this statement 4 of the respondents (21%) stated they would be 
uncomfortable in raising safety concerns. Only 13 (68%) of the respondents would 
feel comfortable in raising safety concerns. These 4 respondents could be recently 
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qualified nurses who were had not yet felt confident enough, experienced an open 
invitation to express any concerns re safety. 
 
Statement 9 – I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 
More respondents disagreed with the statement that they could prepare drugs 
without distraction or interruption. Eight (42%) of the respondents could neither 
agree nor disagree with it.  
 
Statement 10 – Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this 
ward 
The majority 12 (63%) agreed that asepsis failure was a safety priority on this 
ward. What influenced 3 respondents to disagree with this statement is unknown. 
 
Statement 11 – If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 
There most frequent response to this statement was strong agreement.  Thirteen 
respondents (68%) stated they would report a personal error. This was not a 
universal response and 2 respondents strongly disagreed with the statement whilst 
4 neither agreed nor disagreed with it, indicating they were unsure what they would 
do should the situation arise. 
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Statement 12 – There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs  
A clear majority 15 (79%) stated that there was good support on the ward to those 
who prepare intravenous drugs. This evidence of support was observable in the 
resource pack made available from all the staff on the ward. 
 
Statement 13 – To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 
There was strong agreement with this statement. No one disagreed with it. So 
although not everyone stated they would report drug errors (Statement 11), no one 
disputed that there were not encouraged to do so.  
 
Statement 14 – I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 
Only 2 respondents agreed with the statement. The majority of respondents 
disagreed with this statement; they did not find IV drug preparation stressful. This 
may reflect the responses to statement 12, in which where the majority of 
respondents thought the support to those who prepare IV drugs. 
 
Statement 15 – Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 
The most frequent response was neither agreement nor disagreement. Yet again 
however, 4 (21%) or the respondents stated they did not get satisfaction from IV 
drug preparation procedures.  
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8.4.6.1 Additional comments on the questionnaires 
 
“If interrupted during drug mixing, for example, telephoning, cardiac arrest – restart 
again.” 
“Having previously made a drug error, I tend to be more cautious.” 
 
8.4.7 Summary of the safety opinion results on the 3rd ward 
The results from this safety questionnaire again indicate several aspects where 
there is an indication of a positive safety culture and others where the procedure 
could be at risk because of poor safety culture characteristics. 
Responses that indicate a positive safety culture include:  
o Procedures are not considered complex (Statement 3) 
o Resources on this ward are considered good (Statement 4) 
o Environment resources are considered good (Statement 5) 
o Willingness to raise safety concerns (Statements 8 and 11) 
o Asepsis is considered a safety priority (Statement 10) 
o Good support on the ward (Statement 12) 
o Encouragement to report errors (Statement 13) 
 
Responses that indicate a poor safety culture include: 
o Erroneous assumptions of safety (Statements 1 and 2) 
o Distractions and interruptions (Statements 6 and 9) 
o Lack of feedback on performance (Statement 7) 
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o Some willingness / concerns about returning errors (Statement 8) 
o Procedure found stressful by some (Statement 14) 
o Lack of job satisfaction from the procedure (Statement 15). 
 
8.4.8 Summary of the results from the 3rd ward  
The results from the 3rd study ward again identify infusate contamination risks that 
are present in the environment, the equipment, the drugs, the diluents and the very 
execution of the procedure which were not recognised as such by those who 
prepare the infusates. For example, there is a risk of splash from drugs prepared 
at the bedside, there is a risk of environmental contamination of drugs and diluents 
(particularly as multi-dose vials are routinely used), and the interrupted nature of 
the procedure poses a risk of touch contamination.  
 
The opinions of safety present a mixed safety culture picture with some statements 
indicating a positive attitudes towards safety, for example, the staff are encouraged 
to, and most stated they would, report errors However, other statements create a 
different picture, the majority stated they did not get feedback, there were 
continuous interruptions and distractions and some found it stressful. Additionally 
the results showed that opinions on the safety of the procedure, in the ability to 
prevent and detect asepsis failure, were at odds with the evidence.  
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8.5     Results from the 4th ward - A vascular surgery ward 
 
 
Data Stream 1 – Location Assessment (4th ward) 
Data Stream 2 – Observation of Intravenous Drug Preparations (4th ward) 
Contamination risks in the 4th study ward procedure  
How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 4th ward   
Data Stream 4 - Comparison of observed procedures with document review 
Data Stream 3a – Opinions of Safety (4th ward) 
 
 
 
 
Study took place on Tuesday 13th October 2009 
Researcher Evonne Curran  
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8.5.1 Data Stream 1 - Location assessment 
The data for the location assessment were obtained by interview with the ward 
manager and from the researcher’s observations during the study period. 
 
The ward and the patients they care for 
The ward is a 30 bedded vascular surgery ward. The beds are in four, 6-bedded 
areas and there are six single rooms (Figure 34).  
Figure 34    The plan of the 4th ward 
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The staff on this ward care for patients before and after vascular surgery, and for 
patients with leg ulcers caused by vascular diseases. The main healthcare 
interventions are vascular graft implants and the promotion of tissue viability 
through improved vascular circulation and advanced wound healing. 
Consequently, the ward cares for patients at extreme risk of infection; that is, 
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patients post aortic bifurcation graft and patients with chronic ulcers who will be 
colonised with, and shed into the ward environment, vast numbers of micro-
organisms such as Staphylococcus aureus. 
 
What vascular devices are used for intravenous drug administration? 
The main vascular access devices used to administer intravenous drugs are 
peripheral vascular catheters. Some patients have central vascular catheters.  
Individual patients on this ward do not require long-term vascular access devices 
and the drugs used are not highly-irritant to the vein. Peripherally inserted central 
catheters (PICCs) and Midline catheters are not routinely used. 
 
Approximately how many intravascular drugs are prepared in the ward? 
On average, approximately 18-20 intravenous drugs are prepared and 
administered in the fourth study ward each day. This averages to around 6,500 
drugs per year prepared in the ward. 
 
What intravenous drugs are prepared and administered? 
The main intravenous drug groups prepared for administration to patients are: 
antibiotics, anticoagulants, (for example, heparin), analgesia, (for example, 
morphine), insulin and steroids. 
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Does the ward use drugs associated with causing infusate sepsis? 
Several drugs prepared within the ward are recognised as being associated with 
infusate sepsis. Heparin, morphine and insulin are given via long-term infusion 
pumps of >12 hours duration which, if they are even minimally contaminated 
provides the micro-organisms with sufficient time to cause an IR-BSI over the 
lifetime of the infusate. There is infrequent use of lipid drugs such as propofol 
which are known to promote microbial growth. 
 
Are any of the intravenous drugs prepared from multi-dose vials? 
No drugs were issued in vials that could be used in a multi dose way. Most drugs 
are provided in snap-top plastic or glass vials. The drugs issued in rubber-topped 
vials required reconstitution.  
 
How long are the vascular access devices in situ for? 
The peripheral vascular catheters are in situ for a maximum of 72 hours. The 
central vascular catheters are left in situ with no set removal time. 
 
Is there a stable team that prepares and administers the intravenous drugs? 
Yes. Generally the population of nurses in the ward is stable. The off-duty is 
prepared to ensure there are sufficient staff on every shift who are trained to 
prepare and administer IV drugs. 
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Are all of the team familiar with all of the intravenous preparing procedures? 
Compared to the intensive care units, there is a more limited selection of drugs 
requiring preparation to meet the needs of their patients. By the time they are 
deemed competent, the nurses’ records should show that they have experience in 
preparing all of the frequently used ward drugs. 
 
Are there any drugs which vascular nursing staff do not prepare? 
The vascular nursing staff do not add drugs to total parenteral nutrition bags, 
prepare chemotherapy drugs or prepare intrathecal drugs. Potassium and 
magnesium additions to infusions are also not permitted. 
 
Where are the intravenous drug preparation procedures performed? 
There is a designated area within a generic preparation area which should be used 
solely for the preparation of intravenous drugs. It has a splash guard to protect it 
from splashes from the wash-hand basin, which it is adjacent to. (Figure 35). This 
Drug Preparation Area is small but uncluttered and visibly clean. The ward 
managers designed the area designated for drug preparation, including addition of 
the splash board to protect the drugs from wash-hand basin splash. 
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Figure 35  The multi-purpose area where drugs are prepared 4th ward 
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What written procedures are available? 
There are written procedures which are available in the ward manager’s office and 
in the drug preparation area. The procedures include 14 data items but none 
related to asepsis risk.  Other policies are available pertaining IV drug 
administration but these relate to permissions, self-certification, core drugs. They 
do not refer to asepsis except in the vaguest terms, for example, ‘Observe aseptic 
technique’.  There is one intravenous nursing standard which includes the 
process’s specification: ‘The drug will be prepared aseptically and safely in a clean 
quiet area.’ How to achieve this is not specified. 
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Displayed Poster Information 
A variety of poster information is available in the drug preparation area providing 
instructions on, for example, hand hygiene, dressing usage, blood transfusion and 
use of filters for IV drug administration. There is no poster detailing how to ensure 
asepsis during intravenous drug preparation. 
 
How often are the procedures referred to? 
The nurses frequently refer to the individual information on drugs regarding the 
compatibility of the drug and the method of administration. This occurs mainly 
when the drug is not often used on the ward.  
 
Are the intravenous drug preparation procedures generic or drug specific? 
The information sheets are drug specific. There is no procedure which specifically 
details the process of using the ward-available equipment, for example, the 
reconstitution device. There is a poster for use of the in-line filter.   
 
Do the intravenous drug preparation procedures include problem identification and 
if <this situation>, then <that action> should be done? 
The key, if this situation, then that action, is provided in the drug administration 
protocol which ends with:  
‘If a nurse has reasonable grounds to question the accuracy or completeness of 
the above information, she has a duty to question the prescription.’ 
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There are other ‘if this situation, then that action’ statements, for example, on the 
“Quick Guide to Blood Transfusion” 
 If any discrepancy – do not proceed 
 If transfusion reaction – stop transfusion and report to medical staff immediately 
 
What other procedures are done in the preparation areas? 
The area where the drugs are prepared is a generic preparation area for dressing 
procedures and preparation area for other aseptic procedures such as 
catheterisation. The controlled drugs cupboard is also in this area as are 2 drug 
trolleys. Consequently, during intravenous drug preparation concurrent procedures 
are performed frequently. However, apart from hand hygiene, none involve 
possible splash contamination, although they can and do involve disruption and 
general disturbance of the intravenous drug preparation procedure (Figure 35). 
 
What team operation support is there?  
There is seldom additional support available from out with the ward when, for 
example, there are an unusually high number of intravenous drugs to be prepared. 
At present there is no regular ward pharmacist. 
 
Is the lighting good making it easy to see to read instructions within the unit? 
Yes – there are no lighting problems. The lighting can be adjusted to suit the 
patient and the nurse. 
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What, if any, performance measures are available? 
The ward is not yet taking part in the Scottish Patient Safety Programme. At 
present the ward has no performance measures, such as catheter related blood 
stream infection data, with which to judge performance. 
 
Is there end product evaluated for sterility? 
There is no end product monitoring, that is, no guarantee that the drugs being 
prepared are sterile. 
 
What in-ward operator performance monitoring is done? 
The main part of the procedure is done by a single nurse not necessarily in sight of 
others. All checks are done with two persons as previously specified. 
 
What if any information is available during the preparation of intravenous infusion 
and how situation aware is the nurse? 
The nurse preparing the drug knows the amount of drug and diluent being 
prepared and what is required and whether there is undissolved drug, or 
particulates such as visible glass particles. The only information unavailable to the 
nurse is the sterile or non-sterile nature of the drug and the diluent. 
 
How frequently are drug errors reported? 
Drug administration errors are reported at a rate of approximately 1 per year. 
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8.5.2 Data Stream 2 - Observations of drug preparations 4th ward 
 
How many procedures were observed? 
It was a quiet day for ward with only 16 of the 30 beds occupied. A total of 5 
intravenous drug preparations were observed for 2 patients. 
 
What procedures were observed and how many drugs were administered? 
The following drugs were observed during preparation to pre administration of 
antibiotics: Flucloxacillin x 2, Benzylpenicillin x 2, Piperacillin / Tazobactam 1. 
 
How variable are the procedures? 
When a drug required reconstitution, and the drug was available in a rubber 
topped vial, a reconstitution device was used. This device considerably reduces 
any procedure variation. The reconstitution device (a shielded double-needle), 
reduces the amount of preparation and administration steps and effectively turns 
the procedure into a closed procedure.  
 
Table 9 shows the difference between the steps with and without a reconstitution 
device. 
Reconstitution device – 
facilitating closed system 
preparation of IV drugs 
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Table 9     Variation in procedure with a reconstitution device  
Procedure with reconstitution 
device 
Procedure without reconstitution 
device 
Expose bung of saline infusion Expose bung of saline infusion 
Disinfect bung of saline infusion Disinfect bung of saline infusion 
Open reconstitution device Open needle 
Connect reconstitution device to 
saline infusion bag 
Open syringe 
Disinfect rubber top of drug vial  Connect needle to syringe 
Connect reconstitution device to drug 
vial 
Draw up flush 
Shake and mix – invert to drain drug 
into infusion bag 
Disinfect rubber top of drug vial 
 Inject flush into drug 
 Shake and mix 
 Re-insert needle to draw up drug 
 Inject drug into saline infusion bag 
 
The reconstitution device can only be used when the diluent is sodium chloride 
0.9%. If the diluent is water, the drug preparation is as per the right-hand column. 
The difference may seem like only 4 steps – but it equates to a couple of minutes 
preparation time; when several drugs are to be prepared this represents a 
considerable amount of time. Furthermore as, the bulk of drugs used on this ward 
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are antibiotics which require reconstitution, the reconstitution device method is 
seen by staff as a considerable benefit. This essentially creates a closed system 
and also negates the problem of aseptic tasks being interrupted by mandatory 
non-aseptic tasks, which are followed by further aseptic tasks. 
 
The ward also uses a simple ‘draw up drug, draw up flush’ for direct bolus 
injections, but this is less common than preparing the drug as either a syringe 
infusion or infusion bag. There is less variation on this ward as the drugs used are 
less complex and require fewer specifics. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 36. 
Figure 36   The drug preparation procedures 4th ward  
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Administration of the drugs to the patient was not observed, according to the 
research protocol. However, the nurses reported that all drugs are infused via a 
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three-way tap in front of which is a 0.22µm in-line filter. To minimise a 
contamination risk during disconnection and reconnection, the filter includes an 
integral short arm extension and external clamp. 
 
How is the intravenous drug procedure performed? 
Figure 36 shows the process of intravenous drug preparation as seen and the 
reported administration procedure: 
• The nurse applies alcohol hand gel (AHG) to decontaminate hands and dons a 
clean plastic apron. 
• All drugs and diluents are gathered. 
• All sundry equipment is then gathered. 
• Alcohol hand gel (AHG) is then applied and non-sterile gloves put on. 
• The drug vial is then decontaminated with an alcohol impregnated wipe. 
• A reconstitution device (shielded double needle) is then applied to the drug vial. 
• The second part of the reconstitution device is then connected to a 100ml 
infusion of sodium chloride 0.9%.  
• With the drug vial still attached the liquid is inverted to mix the infusion with the 
drug. 
• Once the drug has been checked for complete dissolution, it is drained using a 
combination of gravity and the vacuum within the infusion bag. 
• A second nurse then checks the prescription for the following: 
o  The correct Drug (including expiry date) the Diluent (including expiry 
date), the Dose, the Duration of administration, that the drug is Due (and 
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has not been administered) and that the intended Route of 
administration is intravenous.   
o If the prepared drug is in excess of the prescribed drug it is then 
discarded with both nurses present.  [This type of preparation would not 
be done via a reconstitution type preparation]. 
o At this point the mixed solution is checked for precipitation and residual 
particulates.  
• Once the checks are completed, the first nurse dismantles the drug vial and to 
reconstitution needle is discarded. 
• The label is then completed and signed by 2 nurses. This is then applied to 
infusion bag.  
• Gloves are then removed and sundries discarded.  
• The infusion bag and prescription are taken to the bedside to check that there 
is a match.  
The following part of the procedure was discussed with the nurse and not 
observed, as per the ethics submission. 
• The infusion bag with drug is then connected to the administration set in the 
same way any infusion bag would be connected. The connection for the 
administration set is separate to the port used for the reconstitution needle. 
• The drug is then administered followed by the diluent. Occasionally the flush 
would come direct from a 3-way tap via an existing infusion. 
• During administration the patient is observed for abnormal reaction to the 
administration. 
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• The syringe or infusion is then disconnected and a new sterile bung is applied. 
• Sundries including gloves are discarded and alcohol gel is again applied to 
hands 
• Documentation is completed. 
 
Was there distraction during the intravenous drug preparation procedures? 
There were no observed distractions during intravenous drug preparations, 
possibly because the ward was quiet 
 
Is the equipment needed for intravenous drug preparation procedures close at 
hand? 
All equipment is kept within the generic preparation area (Figure 35). 
 
8.5.3 Contamination risks in the 4th study ward procedure  
This ward has a system which, even if contamination arises, would prevent 
organisms and / or their toxins being infused into the patient. Figure 37 shows how 
infusate contamination on this ward will not cause infection because of routine use 
of in-line filtration by a filter capable of removing bacterial contamination and 
endotoxins over the lifetime of the peripheral vascular catheter (up to 96 hours). 
Correctly from a patient safety perspective, the process of preparing drugs on this 
ward does not proceed on the basis that it is well defended, therefore requiring of 
less care. The procedure still aims to prevent primary contamination of the 
infusate.   
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Figure 37   Use of filters preventing infusate contamination causing IR-BSI 
What happens?
Filtration and protection of 
the catheter from microbial 
contamination and 
endotoxins
Infusate with low number of organisms 
for bolus infusion
Filtration and protection of 
the catheter from microbial 
contamination and 
endotoxins
High level contamination and infusion of 
organisms from contaminated drug or 
diluent
Low level contamination becoming high 
level over duration of infusion 
(>10hours)
Sterile infusate but contaminated syringe 
tip or 3-way tap female connection not 
effectively decontaminated and 
organisms infuse with the drug.
 
 
The filter used is a Vygon™ 96 hour in-line filter 0.22µm pore size. Manufacturer’s 
specification: 0807.01  
“A self priming 96 hour 0.22µm endotoxin retentive air eliminating filter. 
Supplied with a pre attached microbore PVC extension line with injection 
site and clamp and day change labels. Filter not suitable for use with lipids 
or blood products.” 
 
What is sterile and non-sterile at the start of the procedure? 
Figure 38 illustrates the sterile and non-sterile surfaces and materials used in the 
4th ward at the start of the procedure. The sterile surfaces/materials are: 
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Syringes, needles, internal contents of drugs ampoules, (internal contents of 
diluents, reconstitution device 
The non-sterile materials/surfaces are: 
The access point to any rubber topped vial, Outside containers of any drug 
vial and the surface on which the drugs are prepared. 
 
Figure 38   The sterility of equipment at the start of the procedure (4th ward) 
Internal 
contents only
If never used
Internal contents / surfaces and 
external surfaces
If ever used 
Sterility of 
internal 
contents not 
guaranteed?
Work surface contaminated
 
What are the critical surfaces that if contaminated, or not decontaminated, will 
prevent aseptic preparation?  
The critical surfaces during preparation are the connection points of the top of the 
syringe, the metal part of the needle that will come into contact with the drug.  
These surfaces should not be touched (Figure 39). The work surface should be 
considered contaminated and should be cleaned and be dry before the procedure 
commences. 
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Figure 39  The critical surfaces during the procedure (4th ward) 
External surface: 
(non-sterile, 
therefore 
decontaminate)
Connection points : (sterile, therefore don’t touch)
Key 
points 
protected 
by plastic 
shield
Work surface contaminated -
decontaminate before procedure commences
 
 
Immediately before administration what are the critical surfaces that must be 
protected from contamination or decontaminated?  
Immediately before the administration of the drug the critical surfaces are the hub, 
the tip of the syringe and the 3-way tap on the end of the catheter (Figure 40). As 
the 3-way tap is attached to the patient it must always be considered to be 
contaminated and to be covered with at least coagulase negative staphylococci, 
the leading cause of catheter related blood-stream infections. 
Figure 40  The critical surfaces just prior to administration (4th ward) 
Connected to the 
catheter
Connected to the 
administration set
NB the filter is not suitable for lipids or blood administrations
This ward does not use lipid infusions.
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Is the equipment used for intravenous drug preparation procedures free from 
environmental splash contamination? 
There were no observed procedures that resulted in splash in the area during 
intravenous drug preparation. The closed system reduces the risk of potential 
contaminated splashes reaching the infusate. 
 
Is the equipment adequate, that is does it aid the process of maintaining sterility of 
the infusate? 
The use of a reconstitution device reduces the risk of touch contamination; this is 
further reduced by an aseptic technique. Effective filtering prevents unidentified 
contamination from reaching the patient. All access points of drug vials were 
decontaminated, so potential risk of upper surface contamination being transferred 
to the infusate was negated.  
 
What are the intravenous drugs at highest risk contamination for the 4th ward? 
This ward at present has a procedure which is double-defended. The infusate is 
defended from contamination by a reconstitution device, and even if contamination 
of the infusate occurs, the patient is protected by a device for filtration of any 
microbial contamination including infusates. The drugs at highest risk on this ward 
are the infusions of >12 hours duration, but this risk is much lower than on other 
wards due to the procedure having 2 layers of defences.  Such long-term infusions 
could include: heparin, diamorphine and insulin.  Figure 41 illustrates the drugs 
and drug preparations at highest risk of contamination on this ward, and Figure 42 
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shows the effect of filtration as a defence barrier against microbial contamination 
and contamination with endotoxins negating these risks. 
 
Figure 41  Infusates posing the highest contamination risk (4th ward) 
Long Term Infusions (>12hours): heparin, diamorphine, 
insulin
Low level contamination becoming high level over duration 
of infusion.
This could occur with splash contamination during a 
procedure or, use of a contaminated diluent.
Bolus or short Infusions with low level contamination
Contamination from the environment or contaminated 
diluent/drug causing seeding of the catheter surface.
 
 
Figure 42    The prevention of contaminated drug infusion (4th ward) 
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drug, e.g. multi dose vial
Contaminated diluent 
(multi dose)
Contaminated antiseptic
Splash contamination 
during preparation
Use of unsterile 
(damaged) single use 
equipment
Administration 
through 
contaminated hub
Contaminated drug 
container (external)
Contamination by 
hands (direct contact) 
during preparation
Drug contamination at the 
manufacturers
Aseptic technique and 
reconstitution device
preventing contamination of the 
infusate
Filter, negating the risk of 
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Where is the procedure likely to produce errors in aseptic preparation? 
With a reconstitution device acting as a closed system, potential microbial 
contamination is significantly reduced as there is little opportunity for microbial 
access to the system. Microbial contamination of a long-term infusion is possible. 
However, as stated previously, with an effective in-line filter it should be possible to 
prevent microorganisms or their toxins harming the patient. 
 
8.5.4 How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 4th study ward  
The procedure as performed and shown in Figure 36 can be classified as: 
An interrupted (closed) aseptic procedure – performed by a single nurse with 
checker 
Colour-coding the written procedure (Figure 36), highlights the steps that are 
crucial to asepsis (orange), the steps that contain mandatory checks (blue) and 
other required steps that are not critical to asepsis (green). This enables the 
procedure to be seen as interrupted aseptic procedure and therefore identify when 
hand decontamination is required after steps which may contaminate hands.  
 
Overall, from what has been described and shown in the Figures (36-42), it can be 
seen that this is a double-defended procedure; the reconstitution device protects 
the infusate and the filter protects the patient.  There are however, no data to show 
that the procedure results in a sterile product, but the equipment used does 
provide plausibility of a sterile product.  Although the reconstitution device cannot 
be used for all drugs, as no lipid drugs are used in this ward, the filter can. For 
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optimal patient safety, however, the procedure should be assessed as though the 
defence (in-line filter) was not there.  As a consequence the following changes 
should improve the overall safety of the procedure. 
 
New step - decontamination of the work surface area 
To reduce the risk of contamination of critical surfaces of sterile equipment, the 
surface area where the drugs are prepared should be cleaned before the start of 
every procedure. This will prevent transfer of organisms from the surface to the 
hands of the nurse. This will also prevent transfer of organisms to the patients’ 
environments.  
 
New step - confirm drug and diluent are single-use sterile 
The addition of a new check to confirm that the drug and diluent are single-use 
sterile will reduce the risk of a single-use vial being inadvertently reused, and 
remind staff that diluents should also be single-use. Identifying critical drug 
information at this time, that is, before preparation commences should make the 
nurse alert to possible variations in procedure required to maintain patient safety. 
For example, whether the tops of vials are or are not sterile. 
 
Changed step - from glove use to hand hygiene at critical steps 
There is no additional asepsis benefit gained from the use of gloves and if the 
gloves come into contact with non-sterile surfaces they could, like hands, become 
contaminated. Although hands can be decontaminated, gloved hands cannot. 
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Hand hygiene, using an alcohol based hand gel, can be performed if an aseptic 
step is interrupted by a non-aseptic step followed by an aseptic step, for example, 
injecting drug to an infusion bag, applying a label, and then injecting another drug 
into a second bag. Therefore, replacing gloves with hand hygiene at critical points 
would reduce opportunities for contamination of the infusate. Alcohol based hand 
gel has been identified as being required after packs are opened, before 
disinfection of the hub and if disconnection is required, prior to administration of a 
flush before the disconnection.  
 
New step – confirm no critical surface contamination 
In addition to the checks of dosage and precipitation, an additional cognitive step 
of the nurse reflecting on the procedure and considering and confirming that there 
was no critical surface contamination before proceeding to administer, would again 
add to patient safety. Fixing the cross-reaction check at this point would introduce 
consistency. 
 
Changed step - when checks are performed 
In other areas the first set of checks are performed before the drug preparation 
steps of the procedure begin. In this ward with the reconstitution device the checks 
are done as a single set of checks (Figure 43). This is patient safe as the drug 
vials remain attached to the infusate and the person checking can be assured that 
what is used to prepare the drug. The amended procedure places the checks 
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before the drug preparation because, when the reconstitution device cannot be 
used, this is when the patient safety checks should occur.  
 
All the new steps are highlighted in Figure 43 and the entire procedure with colour-
coded steps is shown as Figure 44.    
 
Figure 43  How the procedure could be improved on the 4th ward 
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Figure 44   Colour-coded amended procedure on the 4th ward 
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The ward staff have been recently informed that as a cost-saving measure they 
should no longer require use in-line filters. Therefore, these assessments are only 
valid at the time of writing. 
 
8.5.5 Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparisons 4th ward 
This ward did have procedures; they were of an older type (circa 1996) and did not 
include the equipment or procedure being followed; that is, preparation with a 
reconstitution device, and thus direct comparison could not be made.  This older 
type of procedure was the closest of all the study wards to clear guidance on how 
to perform an aseptic procedure. Another anachronistic aspect of the procedure 
which made it outmoded is the reference to hand washing, when the evidence 
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suggests that alcohol based hand gels are as effective and less irritant to the 
nurses’ skin. 
 
8.5.6  Data Stream 3 – HCWs’ Opinions on Safety 4th ward 
A total of 15 questionnaires on the HCWs’ opinions of safety and redundancy 
checks were issued to all the nurses who prepared intravenous drugs on the 4th 
study ward; 8 (53%) were completed. A repeat reminder was issued to the ward 
manager via email – which resulted in 2 questionnaires being received and these 
have been included in the total. A summary of these data are given in Appendix 
10. The responses to the statements for this ward are as follows: 
 
Statement 1 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 
No respondents disagreed with this statement and the majority 7/8 respondents 
(88%) agreed that on this ward it is easy to prevent asepsis failure.  On this ward 
with the use of reconstitution devices this statement is correct. The closed system 
used for the majority of drugs make it easy to prevent asepsis failure. 
 
Statement 2 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 
There was a less uniform response to the second statement. Two nurses strongly 
agreed that it was easy to detect asepsis failure, and 2 disagreed with it. Four 
respondents (50%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.  Whilst it is 
easy to detect an obvious contact contamination microbial contamination, it is not 
easy to detect contamination from other sources, such as the environment. 
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Statement 3 – The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 
Seven of the 8 respondents (88%) stated that the procedures for preparing IV 
drugs on the 4th study ward are simple.  With the use of the reconstitution device, 
the observations made by the researcher concur with these opinions.  
 
Statement 4 – The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely  
All 8 respondents (100%) agreed with this statement that the resources on the 
ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs. Again this probably refers to the availability 
of the reconstitution device. 
 
Statement 5 – The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
There was less agreement with regard to the environment on the 4th ward.  Four 
respondents (50%), neither agreed nor disagreed and a further 4 nurses were 
equally divided in agreeing and disagreeing with the statement that the 
environment make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely.  These responses reflect the 
environment available for preparing drugs. The ward manager has tried to create a 
safe environment – but it is a small, shared space. 
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Statement 6 - On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare 
IV drugs safely 
Once again with there was a disagreement with responses to the statement. Four 
respondents (50%) agreed with the statement that distractions and interruptions 
make it difficult to prepare IV drugs. However, an equal number disagreed with the 
statement. It is possible that certain nurses, for example, the nurse in charge are 
more likely to be interrupted as holders of the ward keys. 
 
Statement 7 – I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 
All the respondents on this ward were in agreement with this statement, in stating 
that they did not get feedback on the quality of their IV drug preparation. 
 
Statement 8 – I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding 
preparing of IV drugs on this ward 
There were positive responses to this statement with 7/8 respondents (88%) 
disagreeing with this statement; therefore the nurses on this ward would feel 
comfortable in raising concerns regarding the preparing of intravenous drugs on 
the 4th study ward. No one agreed with the statement. 
 
Statement 9 – I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 
Only 2 respondents (25%) agreed with this statement, 4 (50%) strongly disagreed 
with it stating they could not prepare IV drugs without distraction or interruption. 
This concurs with the responses to statement 6. 
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Statement 10 – Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this 
ward 
The most frequent response 4 (50%) to the statement on to whether asepsis 
failure is a safety priority on the ward was neither agreement nor disagreement.  
Three respondents (38%) agreed that it was a safety priority and the remaining 
response was disagreement.  This may have been explained by the lack of 
performance data on the efficacy of the procedure and by the lack of outcome data 
(catheter related blood stream infection data).  
 
Statement 11 – If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 
Critical for patient safety, all the respondents on this ward 8/8 (100%) stated that if 
they recognised a drug error in their drug preparation they would report it. 
 
Statement 12 – There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs  
Again critical for patient safety, and in spite of a challenging environment, no 
respondents disagreed with the statement on good support being available on the 
ward for those who prepare IV drugs.  
 
Statement 13 – To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 
There was no disagreement with this statement and the most popular response 4/8 
(50%) was strong agreement, that is, to improve patient safety the nurses on the 
ward were personally encouraged to report errors to improve patient safety.  
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Statement 14 – I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 
Although 2/8 (25%) respondents stated they strongly disagreed, 2 also stated that 
they agreed with the statement and found it stressful. This might reflect practice, 
competence and / or confidence with the procedure. It might also however, reflect 
that even when the procedure is at its simplest with the use of a reconstitution 
device, because of the potential consequences to patients and to themselves, the 
procedure is stressful for some nurses. 
 
Statement 15 – Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 
On this ward no respondents found preparing IV drugs gave job satisfaction. The 
reasons for this are unclear and no background comments related to this were 
made. It is possible that the reconstitution device, in reducing the procedure to as 
safe and simple as it can be in a ward setting, leaves the nurse with little to get 
satisfaction from. 
 
8.5.6.1 Additional comments provided 
“Time constraints forcing haste. Time and personal constraints generally prohibit 
double checking the administration of IV drugs (excluding heparin and insulin 
infusions). Preparation is always double checked for drug / dose / expiry. ” 
“If I check an IV drug with a colleague I usually don’t stand and watch them make it 
up (unless I’m training them). It’s the duty of the individual nurse to ensure the 
procedure was aseptic.” 
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8.5.7 Review of the opinions of safety on the 4th ward 
Because of the use of reconstitution devices and in-line filters, the responses on 
this ward with regard to the HCWs safety opinions were more in agreement with 
the researcher; for example, it was easy to prevent asepsis failure on this ward. 
The overall scores as positive and negative indicators of a safety culture are listed 
below. 
Positive opinions of safety related to this procedure include: 
o It easy on this ward to prevent asepsis failure (Statement 1) 
o The procedures for preparing drugs are easy on this ward (Statement 2) 
o The resources on the ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs (Statement 3) 
o Willingness to raise concerns and report personal errors (Statement 8 and 
11) 
o Encouragement to report errors (Statement 13) 
Negative opinions of safety related to this procedure: 
o It is difficult to detect asepsis failure (Statement 2)  
o The environment does not make it easy to prepare IV drugs (Statement 5) 
o Distractions and interruptions do not make it easy (Statements 6 and 9) 
o There is no feedback on performance (Statement 7) 
o The procedure for some is stressful (Statement 14) 
o Preparing IV drugs does not give satisfaction (Statement 15). 
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8.5.8 Summary results from the 4th ward 
The nurses on this ward do not use drugs or diluents in multi-dose vials that 
increase the risk of contamination and do use equipment that would reduce 
contamination. Should contamination occur, an in-line filter capable of protecting 
the patient is used even the infusate is administered over a long period. The 
system is double-defended. Although the ward has thus far the smallest 
preparation area available, the nurse in charge tried to make the area and 
procedure as safe as possible, for example by use of the splash protection guard. 
The main recommendation on this ward is to clean the area before preparation 
begins and to consider replacing gloves with repeated hand hygiene at designated 
steps. There are several indicators of a good safety culture, including all the 
respondents saying that the resources make it easy to prepare IV drugs safety. 
Although this ward has the safest procedure reviewed thus far, they have been told 
to stop using filters to reduce cost and therefore this procedure will not be as safe 
or well defended in the future. 
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8.6 Results from the 5th ward – a neonatal intensive care unit 
(NICU) 
 
Data Stream 1 – Location Assessment (5th ward) 
Data Stream 2 – Observation of Intravenous Drug Preparations (5th ward) 
Contamination risks in the 5th ward procedure  
How to reduce potential contamination in the 5th ward  
Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparisons (written with observed)  
Data Stream 3a – Opinions of Safety (5th ward) 
 
 
Study took place on Thursday 15th October 2009 
Researcher Evonne Curran  
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8.6.1 Data Stream - 1 Location Assessment 5th ward 
The data for the Location Assessment were obtained by interview with the ward 
manager and from the researcher’s observations during the study period. 
 
The unit and the patients they care for 
This unit is a specialist neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) which cares for very 
small babies with a wide range of critical illnesses requiring medical and surgical 
interventions. Babies are not admitted to the NICU for being low-birth weight as 
such but rather, when specialist medical or surgical interventions are required after 
delivery of low-birth weight babies. The unit provides a variety of national and 
tertiary services including extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO). The 
unit provides regional cardiac services. The NICU comprises two 6-cot bays and 
one, 4-cot bay NICU (Figure 106). 
Figure 45  The layout of the 5th ward  
Offices, store cupboards
Corridor
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What vascular devices are used for intravenous drug administration? 
A variety of vascular access devices are used to administer intravenous drugs 
including: central vascular catheters, umbilical catheters, peripherally inserted 
central catheters and peripheral vascular catheters.  
 
Approximately how many intravascular drugs are prepared in the unit? 
A baby in the NICU could require between 10-12 drugs per day. An average of 10 
babies requiring this volume of drugs would give rise to approximately 100 
intravenous drugs per day and approximately 36,500 intravascular drugs requiring 
preparation within the unit each year.  
 
What intravenous drugs are prepared and administered? 
A variety of different intravenous drugs are required by the babies including: 
analgesia, anti-coagulants, steroids, heparin, sedation, antibiotics and cardiac 
drugs. 
 
Does the unit use drugs associated with infusate sepsis? 
The unit does use drugs associated with causing sepsis. Many drugs are infused 
over long time periods (>12hrs). Drugs such as heparin and lipids, which promote 
microbial growth, are also used. 
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Are any of the intravenous drugs prepared from multi-dose vials? 
The unit does not use drugs from designated multi-dose vials. Sometimes, 
because of the small volumes used from a prepared drug vial, there is 
considerable volume of paediatric drug dose remaining. In such instances, if 
another patient were on the same drug at the same time, the ampoule would be re-
used. This can be achieved without additional risk to the second baby, though 
technically the drug mix would be designated single-use. 
 
How long are the vascular access devices in situ for? 
As venous access is both difficult and critical for the babies in this unit, there is no 
planned routine replacement of catheters on this ward.   
 
Who prepares intravenous drugs for administration in the NICU? 
Any registered nurse, who has been through the approved NHS Greater Glasgow 
and Clyde training programme and has completed their assessment and 
examination, including a rigorous calculation test, can prepare and administer 
drugs on this ward.  
 
Is there a stable team that prepares and administers the intravenous drugs? 
Yes. There is a core team of long-term staff on the ward who have been deemed 
competent for sometime in intravenous drug preparation. The unit has become 
even larger recently due to amalgamation with another neonatal unit.  
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Are all the team familiar with all the intravenous preparing procedures? 
By the time the nurses are deemed competent their records should show that they 
have experience in preparing the wide variety of drugs required by babies on the 
neonatal intensive care unit. 
 
Are there any drugs which NICU staff do not prepare? 
The unit staff can if required, add drugs to parenteral nutrition but not to the lipid 
preparations. Due to the increased risk with intrathecal drugs, such drugs are also 
not prepared by unit staff.  
 
Where are the intravenous drug preparation procedures performed? 
Figure 46  The drug preparation area in the 5th ward 
Shelved mobile trolley
taken to the cot-side of each
patient every time a drug is to
be prepared
Locked drug cupboards 
and drug information
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The drug preparation procedures are performed on a mobile trolley which is used 
for one procedure, cleaned and then available for the next procedure (Figure 46). 
Drugs are dispensed from cupboards in the 6-cot area. These drug cupboards are 
topped up from a central store daily. 
 
What written procedures are available? 
The following instructions are available in the neonatal intensive care unit. 
Guidelines to safe administration: 
• Medical prescriptions must contain the prescribed medicine dose to be 
infused appropriate for weight. 
• Calculations of the drug must be done by 2 nurses independently. 
• Expiry dates of the drug and diluent must be checked. 
• The nurse must check the prescription has not already been 
administered. 
• The drug must not be administered if it is not free of particulates. 
• The drug must be of the correct quantity. 
• The line must be patent. 
 
‘A strict aseptic technique must be followed for all drug preparations to be 
given via central venous catheters. 
Aseptic technique must be used for all peripheral catheters’.  
The ward manager stated that all intravenous drugs were given using a strict 
aseptic technique regardless of the catheter type. 
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There was no specific written procedure for a ‘strict’ or (non-strict) aseptic 
technique available on the ward. Drug information sheets detailing: diluents, pH, 
osmolarity, compatibilities and incompatibilities were available for all drugs used in 
each of the 3 rooms where the patients were nursed and where the drugs were 
prepared and administered. 
 
Displayed Poster Information 
There are a few posters on hand hygiene within the 6-cot areas but, as this is a 
small patient area rather than an overt clinical preparation area, the poster displays 
are more limited.  
 
How often are the drug procedures and drug information referred to? 
The nurses often refer to the drug information sheets.   
 
Are the intravenous drug preparation procedures generic and drug specific? 
The drug information sheets are drug specific. However as stated previously, there 
are no specific written procedures available to detail how to prevent contamination 
of the infusates.  
 
Do the intravenous drug preparation procedures include problem identification and 
if <this situation> then <that> action? 
No such presentation of information is available. 
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What other procedures are done in the preparation areas? 
Apart from surgical procedures, all procedures are performed at the cot-side. 
However, while drug procedures are being performed no other procedures are 
ongoing for individual patients.  
 
What team operation support is there?  
There is good team support from within the unit and support from the ward 
pharmacist. 
 
Is the lighting good, making it easy to see for reading instructions within the unit? 
The lighting is good. However, to prevent the babies becoming irritated by the light 
and to facilitate a calm atmosphere, lighting is sometimes dimmed. (This can affect 
the ability of the nurse to visualise clearly the drug amount, presence of 
particulates or precipitation during checking procedures). 
 
What, if any, performance measures are available? 
There are no catheter-related blood stream infection (CR-BSI) data as yet. The 
unit is not yet taking part in the Scottish Patient Safety Programme. 
 
What in-ward operator performance monitoring is done? 
All intravenous drug preparation procedures are done with 2 nurses in attendance 
throughout. There is therefore no opportunity to do other than follow the accepted 
procedure. 
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What monitoring is done outside the ward? 
The microbiology department undertakes routine laboratory based surveillance of 
all blood stream infections – this is not sufficient to facilitate CR-BSI surveillance. 
 
What, if any, self-assessment of performance is done?. 
The unit is not as yet participating in the Scottish Patient Safety Programme. They 
are aware of their infection challenges related to blood stream infections. These 
are CR-BSI due to coagulase negative staphylococci. No specific data on this was 
available. 
 
How frequently are drug errors reported? 
According to the ward manager all errors are reported. No specific data was 
available. 
 
8.6.2 Data Stream 2 - Observations of drug preparations 5th ward 
How many procedures were observed? 
In a full ward, a total of 11 procedures were observed involving 19 drugs. Although 
no timing measures were done, the procedures on this ward seem to take longer 
and involve more manipulations and more cross-checking than any procedure 
observed thus far.   
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What procedures were observed? 
The intravenous drug preparations included:  
Antibiotics: vancomycin, metronidazole, cefotaxime, gentamicin,   
H2 antagonists: ranitidine, Analgesia: paracetamol, morphine  
Sedatives: Midazolam,  Diuretics: furosemide 
 
How variable are the procedures? 
The procedures do not vary extensively. Drug volumes are comparatively small 
and the babies’ veins delicate; therefore the procedures all involve careful 
calculations and dilution. Although the procedures in the neonatal unit are more 
involved they are not more variable. 
 
How is the intravenous drug procedure performed? 
The procedures on this ward are undertaken by 2 nurses throughout; one IV 
preparation nurse and one nurse assisting. 
The procedure is performed as follows: 
• The work surface of the trolley is cleaned using a detergent wipe. 
• Sundries and drugs are gathered from the shelves of the trolley below the 
locked drug cupboard within the 6-cot area. 
• The initial set of checks is done to determine that the drug can be prepared 
from the collected drugs, diluents and sundries. The two nurses check that: 
o  The prescription matches the name of the patient.  
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o The Drug [including expiry date], Dose [calculated independently by 
2 nurses], the Diluent [including expiry date], that the drug is Due and 
has not been given, the Duration of administration and that the Route 
prescribed is intravenous.  
• Labels are written. 
• A sterile pack containing a sterile towel is opened and tipped onto the 
cleaned trolley surface. The sterile towel is opened to cover the trolley 
surface. Table 10 shows how the procedure is performed with 2 nurses 
taking turns to progress the procedure. 
Table 10     How a 2 person non-interrupted procedure is performed 
IV Preparation Nurse Assistant Nurse 
Put on apron  
Wash hands Hand hygiene  
 Open sterile gloves on to trolley 
surface 
Put on sterile gloves  
 Open all sterile contents and tip on to 
trolley surface 
Connect syringes to needles  
 +/- decontaminate bung, or snap vial 
top 
 Present vial or ampoule  
Aspirate drug without touching  
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Table 10     How a 2 person non-interrupted procedure is performed 
IV Preparation Nurse Assistant Nurse 
outside of vial/ampoule 
Both nurses agree the excess drug over the prescribed dose to be discarded. 
Discard excess drug.  
Both nurses confirm correct drug volume in syringe 
 Snap diluent vial 
 Present vial  
Aspirate diluent without touching 
outside of vial 
 
Both nurses agree the amount of diluent to be discarded. 
Discard excess diluent  
Both nurses confirm excess diluent discarded 
Mix drug and diluent in same syringe  
Both nurses then agree the amount of mixed drug to be discarded. 
Discard excess mixed drug  
Both nurses agree the correct volume of mixed drug in the syringe 
 Present vial  
Aspirate diluent to the remaining drug 
to dilute to the finished infusion 
volume. 
 
Both nurses then complete a second set of checks 
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Table 10     How a 2 person non-interrupted procedure is performed 
IV Preparation Nurse Assistant Nurse 
• The dosage and prescription match 
• The prescription matches the patient’s identification 
• There are no particulates or precipitation in the infusion 
• There are no potential cross-reactions with the concurrent infusions. 
Disinfect hub, catheter extension and 
catheter near the hub, connect 
infusion 
 
Stick on label  
Both nurses agree the speed and settings of the infusion pump. 
• Unless the drug is a lipid, the administration is through a  filter. 
• The patient remains continuously monitored. 
• Sundries are discarded. 
• Personal Protective Equipment is removed. 
• Hands are decontaminated.  
 
This procedure is illustrated in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47  The drug preparation procedure on the 5th ward 
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to aspirate drug without touching ampoule; and then with separate 
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Was there distraction during the intravenous drug preparation procedures? 
The nurses who performed the above procedures were all focused on the trolley, 
its contents and the prescription. There were no observed interruptions. These 
nurses remained alert throughout, in particular to alarm calls from the various 
monitors. There are several notices pertaining to the need to create and maintain a 
calm environment for the benefit of the babies. 
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Is the required equipment needed close at hand? 
All the required equipment is on the trolley. With two nurses present throughout, 
the assistant forgetting a syringe or needle does not negate or interrupt the aseptic 
procedure, as the IV preparation nurse is always ably assisted. 
 
8.6.3 Contamination risks in the 5th study ward procedure 
Figure 6 is also applicable in this ward, and illustrates how long it takes for infusate 
contamination to cause symptomatic infection in patients. With Figure 6 as a guide, 
the procedures and data from the Location Assessment will be examined for their 
error-prone and reliability status. To do this, there is first an analysis of what is 
sterile/non-sterile, and of the critical parts of the equipment during preparation and 
immediately prior to administration.  
 
What is sterile and non-sterile at the start of the procedure? 
Figure 48 illustrates the sterile and non-sterile surfaces and materials used in the neonatal 
intensive care unit. 
Figure 48   The sterility of equipment at the start of the procedures (5th ward)  
Internal 
contents onlyInternal contents / surfaces and 
external surfaces
Contaminated trolley surface
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.At the start of the procedure the sterile products are: 
• All syringes, needles, administration sets, sterile trolley cover. 
• The internal contents of the drug vials. 
The non-sterile products at the start of the equipment are: 
• The external surface of the drug vials and the trolley surface. 
 
During the procedure, what are the critical surfaces that, if contaminated or not 
decontaminated, will prevent aseptic preparation?  
The critical surfaces during preparation are the connection points of the top of the 
syringe and the metal part of the needle that will come into contact with the drug.  
These surfaces should not be touched, or in the case of the drug ampoules, should 
be decontaminated (Figure 49). 
 
Figure 49  The critical surfaces during the procedure (5th ward) 
External surface: 
(non-sterile, 
therefore 
decontaminate)
Connection points: Although the nurse is wearing 
sterile gloves, preventing contamination of  these 
critical surfaces is still advisable
Contaminated trolley surface – therefore 
decontaminate before using surface
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Immediately before administration, what are the critical surfaces that must be 
protected from contamination or decontaminated?  
Immediately before the administration of the drug, the critical surfaces are the hub, 
the tip of the syringe and the needlefree device (Figure 50). As the needlefree 
device is attached to the patient, it must always be considered to be contaminated 
and covered with (at least) coagulase negative staphylococci, the leading cause of 
catheter related blood-stream infections. 
 
Figure 50  The critical surfaces just before administration 5th ward  
As this tap or this connector is 
in the patient’s environment it 
will always be contaminated 
with micro-organisms
Effective disinfection required 
to prevent infusion of 
organisms
Critical surface 
Do not touch
(even advisable with the use of sterile gloves)
 
 
Is the equipment used for intravenous drug preparation procedures free from 
environmental splash contamination? 
There is no possible splash from a sink during drug preparations.  
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Does the equipment aid the process of maintaining sterility of the infusate? 
Although not everyone decontaminated the rubber vial tops, all of the equipment 
employed, was used in a way to prevent asepsis failure and to prevent the 
disruption of an aseptic procedure. The filter used is a paediatric 96hr in-line filter, 
capable of removing microbial contents and endotoxins. 
 
What are the intravenous drugs at highest risk contamination for the 5th ward? 
Assuming the filter remains functioning throughout the duration of all infusates, the 
drugs at highest risk of contamination are lipids (Figure 51). These drugs cannot 
be filtered and are excellent growth media for micro-organisms.  
 
Figure 51  The limited drugs that pose an infusate risk (5th ward) 
Contamination of Lipid Drugs during preparation
Lipid drugs and infusions promote microbial growth and 
any open manipulation could result in contamination.
The longer the infusion, the greater the opportunity for 
single organisms to become millions within 24 hours.  
Lipids cannot be infused via filters.
Full aseptic procedure – including decontamination
of vial tops and use of a filter, negates risk
of contamination of the infusate.
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Where is the procedure likely to produce errors in aseptic preparation? 
Figure 52 illustrates the stages of the procedure at which contamination is most 
likely to occur, these are: 
• Accessing the sterile drug through a non-sterile access point with resulting 
contamination of the drug. 
• Preparing lipid drugs. 
• Immediately prior to administration. 
Figure 52  When is contamination of the infusate most likely to occur?  
 
Hand 
contamination of 
a critical surface 
contaminating 
the internal 
catheter surface 
or failure to 
decontaminate 
pre connection
Lipids cannot 
be filtered; 
inadvertent 
contamination 
cannot be 
eliminated
If not 
decontaminate,
accessing the 
drug through an 
unsterile access 
point, 
contaminating 
the drug.
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8.6.4 How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 5th ward 
 
This procedure can be classified as: 
A 2-person, uninterrupted aseptic procedure performed at the cot-side 
Because of the comparatively tiny patients, this procedure requires more 
manipulations and is far more complex than adult procedures. Some steps are 
done independently, for example, the independent drug calculations. Possibly due 
to the nature of paediatric drug doses, there appears to be no reconstitution 
devices or other similar equipment that could reduce the open nature of the 
procedure or the number of drug manipulations.  
 
The procedure is single-defended by an in-line filter but should be and is 
performed aseptically as though the filter is not present. The use of two persons 
enables the aseptic procedure to be performed uninterrupted. 
 
As the procedure is performed on a sterile surface and all equipment is free from 
touch contamination, there is no requirement for an additional identification of the 
critical surfaces. The only recommended changes to this procedure are as follows: 
 
New step - add hand hygiene after cleaning of trolley surface 
Although there is less opportunity on this ward for the trolley surface to be 
contaminated with environmental organisms, hand hygiene after the trolley surface 
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is cleaned will ensure that the procedure will not result in hand contamination and 
subsequent cross-contamination of equipment, the environment or the patient. 
 
New step - always decontaminate vial tops 
Although there is an in-line filter, always decontaminating the vial top would 
increase the reliability of this procedure. There is no indication that the filter is 
working. The drug could be inadvertently connected before the filter. The altered 
procedure is shown as Figure 53. 
 
Figure 53  Procedure on the 5th study ward with suggested amendment 
AHG
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New step - add confirmation of sterility of drug and diluent 
For further patient safety, add a confirmation that drug and diluent are single-use 
sterile prior to preparing drugs. 
 
Consideration of lighting modification 
To aid the nurses checking drug information, consider additional trolley lighting for 
when there is dim lighting in the unit for the comfort of babies. 
 
8.6.5 Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparisons 5th ward 
This is one of the 4 data streams; this question could not be answered as there 
were no written procedures which specify the aseptic procedure. 
 
8.6.6 Data Stream 3a – Opinions on Safety 5th ward 
A total of 45 questionnaires were issued to staff in the NICU who were competent 
or in training for competency in intravenous (IV) drug preparation; a total of 18 
(40%) responses were received. A summary of these data are given in Appendix 
11. The results to the statements on safety are given below 
 
Statement 1 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 
Most of the respondents 15/18 (83%) agreed with the statement on the ease of 
preventing asepsis failure on this ward. This is not surprising since it is a 2-person, 
uninterrupted aseptic procedure.  Only 1 person disagreed with this statement. 
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Statement 2 - When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 
 A high proportion of staff 13/18 (72%) thought it easy to detect asepsis failure. 
Obvious errant contact failures are easy to detect, but micro-organisms being 
invisible to the naked eye, asepsis failure is, in fact difficult to detect. 
 
Statement 3 – The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 
Fewer than half 8/18 (42%) thought that preparing IV drugs on the ward was 
simple. The procedures on this ward were the most complex of all the observed 
procedures.  Nevertheless, only 3 respondents disagreed with the statement. 
 
Statement 4 – The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely  
Nine of the 17 respondents [53%] (1 non-response) thought that the resources on 
the ward made it easy to prepare IV drugs safely. 
 
Statement 5 – The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
Only 6 respondents (33%) agreed with this statement. There were no comments 
as to what in particular within the environment increased the risk to their drug 
preparation procedures.  The researcher observed light – or the lack of light – as 
posing a potential risk. Further exploration of this may be useful. 
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Statement 6 - On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare 
IV drugs safely 
Seven of the 18 respondents (39%) agreed with this statement. The most popular 
response was to neither agree nor disagree with the statement. 
 
Statement 7 – I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 
Sixteen of the 18 respondents (89%) disagreed with this statement. Feedback on 
individual performance of IV drug preparation is not provided. 
 
Statement 8 – I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding 
preparing of IV drugs on this ward 
Most of the respondents 14/18 (78%) disagreed with this statement; that is they 
would feel comfortable in raising safety concerns on the ward. However, 4 (22%) 
respondents stated they would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns. 
 
Statement 9 – I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 
Ten of the 18 respondents (56%) disagreed with this statement (Figure 117).  They 
stated that they could not prepare IV drugs without interruption and distraction. The 
responses to this statement mirror the responses to statement 6. 
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Statement 10 – Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this 
ward 
Fifteen of the 18 respondents (83%) agreed with this statement. No respondents 
disagreed with it. What was observed in practice agrees with these responses. 
 
Statement 11 – If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 
Thirteen of the 18 respondents (72%) strongly agreed with this statement. Only 2 
respondents disagreed with it. 
 
Statement 12 – There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs  
Only 8 of the 18 respondents (44%) thought that there was good support to those 
who prepare IV drugs.  Three respondents disagreed with the statement. 
 
Statement 13 – To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 
The majority of respondents 11/18 (61%) agreed with this statement, that they 
were encouraged to report errors. Three respondents did not feel that this was the 
case. 
 
Statement 14 – I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 
Only 2/18 (11%) of respondents found IV drug preparations stressful; this is 
surprising considering the complex nature of the procedures, the consequences of 
any error to the patient and their family and, of course, to themselves. Stress may 
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have been reduced because they use a 2-person, non-interrupted aseptic 
procedure. 
 
Statement 15 – Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 
Almost as many respondents agreed as disagreed with this statement. Six of 18 
respondents 33% stated that did not get job satisfaction from preparing drugs and 
only 5/18 (28%) agreed. Clearly the respondents do not work in the NICU because 
they prepare IV drugs, but for some of the nurses it is in spite of the fact that they 
have to prepare IV drugs.  
8.6.6.1 Additional comments on the questionnaire 
“IV drug prep/admin is stressful when there is not enough experienced staff on 
duty. Also not having enough decent equipment, for example, pumps, is a real 
pain. So time the drug administration is like juggling balls. Availability of the 
medical staff to take levels is also an issue.” 
“Experienced neonatal nurses generally know when a dose which has been 
prescribed is not within normal and will check this using formulary if it seems 
high/low. Every dose of every drug would not be checked in this way.” 
 
“There are now differences in the way each ward makes up their drugs and 
infusions even though there is a monograph, there is a difference between PD + 
NICU and ITU.” 
 
 
 314 
8.6.7 Summary of the safety opinions on the 5th ward 
The responses to the statements indicate some positive indicators of safety as well 
as negative indicators. The opinions of safety which are negative indicators are as 
follows: 
o Asepsis failure is considered easy to detect when, in fact, it is not easily 
detected (Statement 2). 
o The procedures themselves are not simple (Statement 3).  
o The staff do not feel the environment makes it easy to perform IV drug 
procedures safely (Statement 5). 
o There is no individual feedback on performance (Statement 7). 
o The majority of nurses feel that they cannot prepare IV drugs without 
interruption or distraction (Statements 6 and 9). 
o Some nurses who prepare IV infusions do not feel that they are well supported 
(Statement 12). 
o Not everyone feels encouraged to report errors (Statement 13). 
o The nurses do not derive job satisfaction from the procedure (Statement 15). 
The positive indicators of safety from the statements are: 
o Most feel it is easy to prevent asepsis failure (Statement 1). 
o Staff stated they have good resources on the ward to prepare IV drugs 
(Statement 4). 
o The majority would feel comfortable raising safety concerns (Statement 8). 
o Asepsis failure is felt to be a safety priority on the ward (Statement 10). 
o The majority of staff would report an error if they identified it (Statement 11). 
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o In the main it is not a stressful procedure (Statement 14). 
 
8.6.8 Summary results from the 5th ward 
The procedure on this ward is performed differently to the previously 4 study wards 
in that 2 nurses perform the procedure together. The 2 nurses performing the 
procedure become, as far as is possible, oblivious to the world outside and 
concentrate on the multiple manipulations and calculations required to ensure the 
correct drug and an aseptic infusate. The only environmental risk is from a lack of 
light, created for patient comfort. There was no additional risk from equipment and 
no multi-dose drugs or diluents are used. The system is defended by filters.  Again 
however, and much to the surprise of the nurse manager, there are no written 
step-by-step aseptic procedures. The main safety concerns on this ward relate to 
the complexity of the procedure required to achieve a safe and correct drug, and 
not all the nurses feel supported.   
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8.7 Results from the 6th ward – a medical receiving cardiology 
ward (MRCW) 
 
 
Data Stream 1 – Location Assessment (MRCW) 6th ward 
Data Stream 2 – Observation of Intravenous of Drug Preparations (MRCW)  
Contamination risks on the 6th ward procedure 
How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 6th ward 
Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparison (written and observed) (MRCW) 
Data Stream 3a – Opinions of Safety (MRCW) 6th ward 
 
 
 
Study took place on Tuesday 27th October 2009 and Saturday 23rd January 2010 
Researcher Evonne Curran  
  
 
 317 
8.7.1 Data Stream 1 - Location Assessment 6th ward 
The data for the Location Assessment were obtained by interview with the ward 
manager and from the researcher’s observations during the study period. 
 
What patients does the unit care for? 
The ward is a 17 bed medical receiving cardiology ward. Fourteen beds are in 
Nightingale position, there is one cubicle (not en-suite) and one room of two beds 
(Figure 54). The population comprises emergency admission patients with chest 
pain following myocardial infarct, patients for angiogram, patients awaiting transfer 
to the Golden Jubilee hospital before cardiac surgery and the same patients on 
return from cardiac surgery. 
Figure 54  The layout of the 6th ward 
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What vascular devices are used for intravenous drug administration? 
The main vascular access devices used to administer drugs are peripheral 
vascular catheters. Some patients have central vascular catheters (CVCs).  
Individual patients on this ward do not require long-term vascular access and the 
drugs used are not highly-irritant to veins. Peripherally inserted central catheters 
(PICCs) are occasionally used. 
 
Approximately how many drugs are used per day? 
On an average day approximately 40 drugs are required by the patients on the 
ward. This is highly variable – there are days when no drugs are required (the first, 
second and third planned visit dates were postponed as there were no required 
drugs for intravenous administration).  
 
What intravenous drugs are prepared and administered? 
The main intravenous drug groups used and administered to patients are: cardiac 
drugs, inotropic drugs, glycerol trinitrate, antibiotics, insulin, anticoagulants, (for 
example, heparin), analgesia, (for example, morphine) and paracetamol. 
 
Does the unit use drugs associated with infusate sepsis? 
Heparin, morphine and insulin are given via long-term infusion pumps of over 12 
hours duration which, if they are even minimally contaminated, makes them 
vulnerable to becoming highly contaminated over the lifetime of the infusion. There 
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is no use of lipid drugs (such as propofol) which are known to promote microbial 
growth. The heparin and insulin infusions are prepared from multi-dose vials. 
 
How long are the vascular access devices in situ for? 
The PVCs are in situ for a maximum of 72hours. CVCs would be left in situ with no 
set removal time. 
 
Is there a stable team that prepares and administers the intravenous drugs? 
Yes. All the nurses on the ward are currently trained in the preparation and 
administration of intravenous drugs. 
 
What mentoring is done? 
Staffing levels do not permit 1:1 mentoring, although there is supervision when 
required. (At the time of the visit, all staff had been deemed competent in drug 
preparation). 
 
Are all the team familiar with all the intravenous preparing procedures? 
Yes. Once competent, the nurse can prepare and administer all the drugs in the IV 
Drug Monographs Folder held within the ward. (There are 153 drugs listed in this 
folder). 
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Where are the IV drug preparation procedures done? 
The intravenous drugs are prepared in a multi-purpose area of a combined nurses’ 
station, doctors’ station, drug preparation area, sundry storage, patient note trolley 
storage and general preparation area (Figure 55).  As a consequence of the 
above, the Drug Preparation Area is visibly clean - but cluttered. 
 
Figure 55 The multi-purpose room where drugs are prepared (6th ward) 
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Are there any written procedures? 
There are a few general guidelines and intravenous drug monographs, but 
according the ward manager there are no written procedures showing or 
illustrating how to make up intravenous drugs using an aseptic procedure. There is 
information on the use of reconstitution devices, but this has not been included 
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here as these devices have been removed from the ward.  There is also 
information on the 153 drugs in the ward formulary, but none relate to asepsis.  
 
The folder containing the information on the 153 drug monographs includes the 
following disclaimer: 
Disclaimer 
The information within the document has been carefully written and 
reviewed by a team of pharmacists and practice development 
representatives within the Southern General Hospital and the Victoria 
Infirmary.  However no responsibility can be accepted for any errors or 
omissions within the document. It is assumed that the users posses the 
necessary training skills and competence to interpret this information 
appropriately and to obtain information appropriately and to obtain specific 
advice when necessary.  
 
This 6th and final study ward had the least available resources in terms of 
environment and equipment. This disclaimer, in effect, says that if the authors got 
it wrong it’s the fault of the person using the information and not of those writing it. 
This is an example of blaming frontline workers for active failures caused by latent 
conditions and does not to the researcher seem reasonable. 
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The standard warning on each monograph is as follows: 
All vials and ampoules and infusions are for single-use only unless 
otherwise stated. 
Administer reconstituted medicines immediately. 
 
There is no information provided on infection risk. 
 
What posters are available in the generic preparation area? 
There are a total of 57 posters, the highest number in all of the study wards, in the 
generic preparation area. There is no poster detailing how to ensure asepsis 
during intravenous drug preparation. 
 
How often are the procedures referred to? 
The nurses frequently refer to the individual information on drugs regarding the 
compatibility of the drug and the method of administration.  
 
Are the intravenous drug preparation procedures generic and drug specific? 
The information sheets are drug specific.  
 
Do the intravenous drug preparation procedures include problem identification and 
if <this> then <that> action? 
The only information provided in this format is a generic: 
‘If unsure then ask.’ 
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What other procedures are done in the preparation areas? 
There is no restriction of concurrent procedures being performed when a nurse is 
preparing intravenous drugs. The full range of possible procedures is as follows: 
Preparation of dressings, catheters or other aseptic technique 
Controlled drug checking and preparation. 
Intramuscular drug checking and preparation. 
Office bustle including telephone calls (nursing and medical) 
Writing up of notes. 
Reviewing of X-rays on the computer. 
 
The preparation room is seldom empty. As the ward is a receiving ward, activity 
can increase rapidly; at such times numerous intravenous drug preparations will be 
required immediately, there will also be lots of admissions, lots of note writing, 
specimen sending, relatives calling and general healthcare activity. 
 
What team operation support is there?  
The ward manager feels there is little support here, from management or 
pharmacy staff. 
 
Is the lighting good making it easy to see to read instructions within the unit ? 
Yes – there are no lighting problems.  
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What, if any, performance measures are available? 
The ward is not yet taking part in the Scottish Patient Safety Programme. At 
present the ward has no performance measures, such as catheter related blood 
stream infection data, with which to judge performance. 
 
What in-ward operator performance monitoring is done? 
The drug preparation area is small and cluttered; although the ward manager tries 
to keep an overview of all her staff, it is difficult to do this when the observation of 
intravenous drug preparation is obscured by other concurrent activities. 
 
What, if any, information is available during the preparation of intravenous infusion 
and how situation aware is the nurse? 
The nurse preparing the drug can tell the amount of drug and diluent being 
prepared, what drug / dose is required and whether there is undissolved drug or 
particulates such as visible glass particles.  The only information unavailable to the 
nurse is the sterile or non-sterile nature of the drug and the diluent. 
 
What monitoring is done outside the ward? 
None. 
 
What, if any, self-assessment of performance is done? 
There is no ongoing self assessment of performance. Unlike other wards, the 
paucity of space makes it extremely difficult to watch the person preparing drugs. 
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How frequently are drug errors reported? 
No data were available on reported drug errors. 
 
8.7.2 Data Stream 3 - Observations of Drug Preparations 6th ward 
How many procedures were observed? 
On the first visit of 6 hours no intravenous drugs were prepared.  
During a second visit - 3 intravenous drugs were prepared the total number of 
intravenous drugs on that shift. 
 
What procedures were observed? 
The following procedures were observed: 
Antibiotics: Amoxicillin; metronidazole 
Analgesics: Paracetamol 
 
How variable are the procedures? 
The ward manager feels the drug procedures are not particularly variable. A 
narrow set of drugs is commonly used – despite the 153 monographs in the folder. 
 
How is the intravenous drug procedure performed? 
Figure 56 shows the process of intravenous drug preparation as observed and 
reported, after observations stopped (at the time the nurse was ready to go to the 
bedside). 
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• The nurse collected the drugs and diluents and sundries to prepare the 
infusate. 
• The label is written for application to the infusate immediately the drug is 
prepared. 
• The nurse checks with a colleague that the Patient and Prescription details 
matched those for whom the infusate is being prepared, and that it is the 
correct drug, diluent, the planned duration of administration, the route and 
that the drug is due and had not been given. 
• The nurse washes her hands and puts on non-sterile gloves. 
• The nurse opens the packs, syringes and needles. 
• The top of the rubber vials are flipped off and accessed without 
decontamination. 
• The drug is mixed with a prepared diluent. 
• The drug and diluent are then injected into a 100ml infusion bag. 
• The written label is then applied to the bag. 
The next part of the procedure was not observed as per the ethics submission but 
reported to take place as follows: 
• The needlefree access bung was disinfected (alcohol wipe). 
• The administration speed was checked. 
• A flush solution would be administered if required. 
• The patient’s response was checked throughout. 
• Sundries were discarded and hands decontaminated 
• Documentation was then completed. 
 327 
Figure 56  The drug preparation procedure on the 6th ward  
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Was there distraction during the intravenous drug preparation procedures? 
At this point in time (Saturday 5pm) the ward was quiet and there were no 
distractions. It was clear, however, that the need for intravenous drugs on this 
ward was highly unpredictable.  
 
Is the equipment needed for intravenous drug preparation procedures close at 
hand? 
Yes. The equipment is all kept within the generic preparation area (Figure 55). 
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8.7.3 Contamination risks in the 6th ward procedure  
Figure 6 is again applicable for this ward; this illustrates how infection could arise 
from contamination of either equipment or infusate and shows the length of interval 
before this is likely to become apparent, that is, over days or weeks if 
contamination starts as a biofilm or, almost immediately if there is heavy infusate 
contamination.  
 
What is sterile and non-sterile at the start of the procedure? 
Figure 57 illustrates the sterile and non-sterile surfaces and materials used in the 
6th ward. The sterile surfaces/materials are: 
• The internal contents of any diluents 
• The external and internal surfaces of sterile needs and syringes 
• The internal contents of single-use vials 9that have been used once). 
 
Figure 57  At the start of the 6th ward procedure, what is sterile? 
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Internal contents / surfaces and 
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The non-sterile materials/surfaces are: 
• The surface on which the procedure is performed 
• Internal contents of multi-dose vials 
• The external surface of rubber topped vials 
 
What are the critical surfaces that, if contaminated or not decontaminated, will 
prevent aseptic preparation?  
Figure 58 illustrates what should be avoided at the start of the procedure and what 
is contaminated and requires decontamination. The work surface requires 
decontamination before the procedure commences. Surfaces on the top of vials 
also require decontamination.  If ever the sterile contents cannot be guaranteed 
they should not be used. 
Figure 58 Critical surfaces during the procedure in the 6th ward 
External surface: 
(non-sterile, 
therefore 
decontaminate)
Connection points : (sterile, therefore don’t touch)
Work surface could contaminate sterile surfaces 
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Immediately before administration what are the critical surfaces that must be 
protected from contamination or decontaminated?  
Immediately before the administration of the drug, the critical surfaces are the hub, 
the tip of the syringe and the 3-way tap on the end of the catheter (Figure 59). As 
the 3-way tap is attached to the patient, it must always be considered to be 
contaminated and to be covered with (at least) coagulase negative staphylococci, 
the leading cause of catheter related blood-stream infections. 
 
Figure 59  Critical surfaces immediately prior to administration (6th ward)  
As this tap or this connector is 
in the patient’s environment it 
will always be contaminated 
with micro-organisms
Effective disinfection required 
to prevent infusion of 
organisms
Critical surface 
Do not touch
 
 
Is the equipment used for intravenous drug preparation procedures free from 
environmental splash contamination? 
There is a sink, which could create splash, in the same multi-purpose area where 
the drugs are maintained – no splash was seen during the observations. 
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Does the equipment aid the process of maintaining sterility of the infusate? 
Multi-dose vials increase the risk of infusate contamination on this ward. These 
vials are mainly used for heparin infusions. 
 
What are the intravenous drugs at highest risk contamination for the 6th ward? 
The high-risk drug preparations are the infusions of >12 hours duration or longer. 
These pose a risk of sufficient time for heavy growth of micro-organisms from an 
original contamination of a very few organisms. Such infusions on this ward would 
include heparin and insulin. Figure 60 illustrates the drugs and drug preparations 
at highest risk of contamination. 
 
Figure 60  The drugs at highest risk of contamination on the 6th ward 
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Bolus or short Infusions with low level contamination
Contamination from the environment or contaminated 
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Where is the procedure likely to produce errors in aseptic preparation? 
There are three parts of the procedure which are likely to cause contamination. 
Firstly, the non-decontamination of the work surface area could lead to potential 
contamination of the critical surfaces. Secondly, failure to decontaminate rubber 
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vial surfaces could lead to contamination of the drug. Repeated access and use of 
multi-dose vials would contaminate the drug and thus the infusate. Lastly, failure to 
decontaminate the needle-free device / catheter hub will lead to infusion of 
organisms along with the infusate. 
 
Figure 61    During what steps of the procedure is contamination possible 
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8.7.4 How to reduce potential contamination risks in the 6th ward 
The researcher questions whether, regardless of changes to the procedure, the 
preparation of intravenous drugs could be performed safely in this ward 
environment.  Assuming, therefore, that a suitable place could be found, the 
following amendments are suggested to increase patient safety. 
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This procedure as observed was: 
A single person, interrupted aseptic procedure performed with a checker. 
 
The main suggestions for change in this procedure (apart from a change of the 
environment), are a reordering of steps, an increase in hand hygiene, 
decontamination of the work surface at the start of the procedure and 
decontamination of rubber vial tops (Figure 62). These changes are indicated as 
yellow steps in the written procedure. The reason for these changes is to reduce 
the likelihood of contamination from equipment and hands. 
 
Increase of hand hygiene is suggested, as opposed to the use of gloves, as the 
gloves can become contaminated and, once contaminated, cannot be 
decontaminated. If gloves are being used to prevent skin contamination with drug, 
then using them immediately before accessing the drugs would prevent skin 
contamination. Removing them after this step, and using alcohol hand gel after all 
non-aseptic steps, would allow completion of an aseptic procedure. 
 
Due to the lack of space on this ward, the infusates are extremely vulnerable to 
contamination; therefore as previously used in this ward reinstating reconstitution 
devices would clearly reduce the risk of contamination by closing the procedure 
and reducing the opportunities for contamination, such as occur when a syringe 
and ampoule are open to airborne contamination.  Stopping the use of multi-dose 
vials would significantly reduce the risk of infusate contamination. The same drugs 
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are available in non-multi-dose vial format in other wards within the NHS board.  
Confirming at the start of the procedure, that all drugs and diluents are single-use 
sterile could be done to confirm this.   
 
The procedure, as witnessed, contains the elements of an aseptic procedure but it 
is not performed as one. By following the reordering, adding the hand hygiene, and 
by confirming that drugs and diluents are single-use sterile the contamination risk 
would be reduced. Significant risk reduction would be added by performing the 
procedure in a better environment with adequate space. 
 
Colour-coding the written procedure, as discussed with the other study wards, will 
identify for the nurses the points at which the aseptic procedure is interrupted, and 
consequently, where hand hygiene is required. Figure 63 shows the modified 
written procedure with the changes colour-coded to show clearly when there is an 
interruption in asepsis and, consequently, a need to restart the aseptic procedure 
with hand hygiene.  
 335 
Figure 62  Suggested modified procedure for reliability in the 6th ward 
Get 
drugs 
and 
diluents
Gather 
sundries
Open 
packs
Connect and 
administer flush
Check: Patient & Prescription match
Check: Drug; Dose; Diluent; Duration of 
admin, Due not given and Route
Confirm drugs and diluents are single use 
sterile
Check 
patient 
response
Discard 
sundries& 
gloves AHG
Sign given
and report
any effect
Disinfect and discard red 
bung / 3way tap 
or disinfect bionector®
or put up infusion
Draw up diluent
Mix with drug
Draw up mixture
as bolus or as infusion
Draw up flush 
Draw up drug
Draw up flush
Check: Dosage & 
prescription match; ID patient 
No precipitation or 
particulates present Identify 
potential cross-reactions 
Administer
at right speed
Action not critical to asepsis
Action critical to asepsisChecks 
Code
stick on 
labels
‘If required’ step
AHG
Prepare drug + / -
diluent& flush
Write up 
labels
Clean 
work 
surface
AHG
Decontaminate
drug vial top if not 
‘snap and enter’
ID critical 
surfaces
& critical drug 
info
AHG
AHG if 
disconnect
required
Suggested new step
 
Figure 63  Colour-coded amended procedure for the 6th ward 
Get 
drugs 
and 
diluents
Gather 
sundries
Open 
packs
Connect and 
administer flush
Check: Patient & Prescription match
Check: Drug; Dose; Diluent; Duration of 
admin, Due not given and Route
Confirm drugs and diluents are single use 
sterile
Check 
patient 
response
Discard 
sundries& 
gloves AHG
Sign given
and report
any effect
Disinfect and discard red 
bung / 3way tap 
or disinfect bionector®
or put up infusion
Draw up diluent
Mix with drug
Draw up mixture
as bolus or as infusion
Draw up flush 
Draw up drug
Draw up flush
Check: Dosage & 
prescription match; ID patient 
No precipitation or 
particulates present Identify 
potential cross-reactions 
Administer
at right speed
Action not critical to asepsis
Action critical to asepsisChecks 
Code
stick on 
labels
‘If required’ step
AHG
Prepare drug + / -
diluent& flush
Write up 
labels
Clean 
work 
surface
AHG
Decontaminate
drug vial top if not 
‘snap and enter’
ID critical 
surfaces
& critical drug 
info
AHG
AHG if 
disconnect
required
 
 
 336 
 
8.7.5 Data Stream 4 – Procedure comparisons 6th ward 
This analysis could not be undertaken because there are no written procedures 
which included the aseptic steps available on the ward.  
 
8.7.6 Data Stream 3a – Opinions of Safety 6th ward 
As on all the study wards and in compliance with the ethics submission, the 
manager was given the questionnaires to disseminate to her staff who are deemed 
competent to prepare and administer intravenous drugs. The questionnaires were 
contained with a letter of introduction and information regarding the research and a 
stamped addressed envelop. I was informed there ‘were about 15’ staff who could 
prepare and administer drugs. The ward manager appeared willing to disseminate 
the information to her colleagues. Only 2 questionnaires were returned completed. 
During the second visit, a repeat sample of 15 forms, letters, stamped addressed 
envelopes was left and the senior staff nurse assured me they would be distributed 
to all those who could prepare intravenous drugs. No further responses were 
received. 
 
This ward was the least rich in resources and equipment space. This ward’s 
procedure was least rich in steps for asepsis, for example, the surface, small 
though it was, was not cleaned before the procedure began, a plastic apron was 
not worn and, non-sterile gloves were used, but it was unclear why. It is possible 
that the nurses were not prepared to state when they did and did not do 
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redundancy checks, as this would implicate their practice as being poorer than 
others. The following information was gained from the 2 respondents: 
• The respondents differed in how difficult they thought it was to prevent 
asepsis failure (one considered it difficult, one neither agreed nor disagreed) 
• Both agreed strongly that it was easy to detect asepsis failure  
• Both agreed strongly that the procedures on the ward were simple  
• Both agreed strongly that the resources on the ward made it easy to 
prepare IV drugs safely 
• Both agreed strongly that they were encouraged to report errors 
• Both agreed that distractions and interruptions made it difficult to make up 
drugs safely [concurred with  statement 9] 
• Both agreed strongly that they did not get feedback on their performance  
• Both agreed that asepsis failure a priority on the ward  
• Both agreed strongly that they would report errors 
• Both agreed strongly that they are encouraged to report errors  
• Differed in finding the procedure stressful (one strong agreement one 
neither agreed nor disagreed) 
• Differed in the degree of job satisfaction from the procedure (one strong 
agreement and one selected neither agree nor disagree). 
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8.7.7 Summary results from the 6th ward 
The infusates in this ward are at a higher risk of contamination because of the 
environment, the procedures and the equipment. There is a risk from 
environmental splash from a nearby sink, the multi-purpose room is inadequate in 
size and creates multiple distractions when it is busy. Long-term infusions are 
prepared from multi-dose vials and there is a lack of defences. Safety equipment 
(reconstitution devices) has been removed. Additionally, there are no filters used. 
Of all the study wards, this ward is least rich in terms of resources, equipment and 
facilities. One of the reasons for volunteering to be included in the study was, 
according to the manager, ‘the hope of better facilities’.  On this ward, only 2 
nurses completed the opinions of safety questionnaire; this is perhaps not 
surprising, given the paucity of facilities and the equipment available to them.  
There are no data available to the ward staff to indicate their level of performance.  
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8.8 Comparative results on redundancy checks from 5 study 
wards  
The questionnaire on opinions of safety also contained the questions on 
redundancy checks, Appendix 3b. The respondents were asked whether they 
‘always, sometimes or never’ performed a redundancy check at various stages of 
the procedure. There were 71 respondents from the six study wards.  The data is 
analysed by ward. On the 6th study ward only 2 questionnaires were returned and 
therefore this data was deemed too unrepresentative to analyse separately and 
unsuitable for adding to another ward’s data for analysis. 
 
The redundancy checks were divided into three categories as follows: 
• mandatory checks of right drug, right dose, right diluent and right patient 
• technical checks related to the infusate being free from precipitation and 
particulates and the infusion being administered at the right speed 
• asepsis checks including the aseptic access of the ampoules or vials, 
decontamination of catheter hubs, hand hygiene and glove use as well as a 
catch-all of the overall procedure being performed aseptically. 
 
The numbers of respondents in each ward varied (range 7 – 19). Larger numbers 
of responses were from wards where more nurses were able and required to give 
intravenous drugs; specifically the adult and neonatal ICUs. The response rates for 
individual wards have been presented in the individual ward results for Data 
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Stream 3a.  The responses agree with the researcher’s observations, suggesting 
that what is reported as being done equates to what is actually done. It is possible 
that the nurses would perform differently when the researcher was not present, but 
given the number of procedures observed, this is considered unlikely. The results 
are presented in a table of the average percentage of the ‘always’ responses in 
each of the categories; mandatory checks, technical checks and aseptic checks.  
Figures 64-68 show the responses to each opportunity for a redundancy checks in 
the 5 study wards with sufficient responses. 
 
Table 11     The percentage of redundancy checks ‘always done’ 
 
χ2 square test not valid 
The key points from these results are: 
• The highest frequency of ‘always done’ redundancy checks is of the 
mandatory checks (range 54-100%).  Only one ward, the NNICU, (the 5th 
study ward), performed 100% of the mandatory checks. This is a non-
interrupted 2-person aseptic technique.  
• The second highest frequency of ‘always done’ redundancy checks if of the 
technical checks (range 28-94%). Again the highest number of checks was 
in the 5th study ward. 
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• The lowest frequency of ‘always done’ redundancy checks is of the asepsis 
checks, (range 10-90%). 
• The 2 person non-interrupted aseptic procedure performed on the 5th study 
ward is the only procedure with 100% of reported ‘always done’ mandatory 
redundancy checks. 
• All patients in the 2nd ward are in cubicles and this explains why there is a 
lower number of reported redundancy checks on the patient in this ward – 
average of always done mandatory redundancy checks – 54%. 
 
8.8.1 Summary of the redundancy check comparisons 
The number of steps in the procedure of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to perform a redundancy check at every 
opportunity. What these results show, however, is that aseptic steps are not 
considered as high a priority as the mandatory or technical redundancy checks, 
and unless a 2 person uninterrupted procedure is undertaken they do not get 
performed. 
 
These results also show that the environment, for example all patients being in 
single rooms, can affect whether a redundancy check of ‘right patient’ is done. 
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Figure 64 Stated Redundancy Checks in the pilot ward 
I perform a double check with a colleague to check that ....  
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Figure 65 Stated Redundancy Checks in the 2nd ward 
I perform a double check with a colleague to check that ....  
2nd ward a bone marrow transplant unit (n = 7)
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Figure 66  Stated Redundancy Checks in the 3rd ward 
I perform a double check with a colleague to check that ....  
[Third ward an ICU (n = 19)]
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Figure 67 Stated Redundancy Checks in the 4th ward 
I perform a double check with a colleague to check that ....  
4th Ward  a vascular surgery ward (n = 8) 
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Figure 68 Stated Redundancy Checks in the 5th ward 
I perform a double check with a colleague to check that ....     5th Ward  a neonatal ICU (n = 18)
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8.9 Review of other information available in the study wards 
Although the wards differ in design and in how the procedures are performed, 
certain other information is common to the nurses in all wards. This section 
reviews the common information available to the nurses and is divided into 4 
sections: the hand hygiene guidance, information from the pharmaceutical 
companies, information on the use of antiseptics and information available on 
infusate labels. This review presents evidence that the nurses are not 
equipped with sufficient information to warn them of the potential risks of 
infusate contamination and of IR-BSI detection. 
 
8.9.1 Information on hand hygiene available to the nurses  
Posters from the World Health Organization (WHO) showing how and when to 
perform hand hygiene, which have been incorporated into the Health 
Protection Scotland Hand Hygiene campaign and Hand Hygiene Model Policy 
(Health Protection Scotland 2009), were seen in all of the study wards, in 
particular in the areas where drugs for intravenous infusion were prepared. As 
this information is so immediately available and present this section will asses 
whether the WHO guidance on hand hygiene is sufficient to prevent asepsis 
failure. 
 
As part of the patient safety challenge Clean Care is Safer Care, the WHO 
began working on international guidelines for hand hygiene in August 2004. 
The theory and methodology were published in advance of the guidance, 
which was issued finally in May 2009 (Sax et al. 2007, World Health 
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Organization 2009). The guidelines contain contributions from more than 100 
international experts  and are intended for implementation in any situation in 
which healthcare is delivered (Pittet et al. 2009). There is an extensive 
literature review accompanying the guidance, which also takes cognisance of 
behavioural science and human factors, with an objective to produce 
guidelines for safe practice that are easy to remember, to comprehend and to 
visualise.  As a consequence, it was hoped the guidance would also be easy 
to audit and enable the production of compliance reports. The guidance, like 
the methodological framework for this thesis, therefore is considers the human 
factors required to enable the nurses to do the right thing. 
 
The WHO guidance, on when to perform hand hygiene to minimise the risk of 
one of the 4 negative outcomes occurring, has been reduced to just 5 
moments: 
Before touching a patient  
Before a clean/aseptic procedure  
After body fluid exposure risk  
After touching a patient 
After touching patient surroundings (World Health Organization 2009).  
 
The WHO guidelines divide the healthcare environment into 2 zones the 
patient zone and the healthcare zone. The patient zone contains the patient 
and their immediate surroundings. The healthcare zone contains all surfaces 
in the healthcare setting outside the patient zone. Within the patient zone 
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there are 4 critical site categories, one of these critical site categories is 
‘device associated’ and specifically includes vascular catheter hubs (World 
Health Organization 2009). The WHO guidelines are based on two key 
assumptions, that all objects going in and out of the patient zone are cleaned, 
and that everything within the patient zone is potentially contaminated with the 
patient’s own micro-flora (World Health Organization 2009).  
 
The questions raised by the WHO guidance in relation to the task of aseptic 
preparation of intravenous drugs are: 
o If followed, would this guidance be sufficient to prevent asepsis failure 
in the preparation of intravenous drugs? 
o If followed, would this guidance facilitate aseptic administration of 
intravenous drugs? 
 
In trying to prevent asepsis failure in the preparation of intravenous drugs, the 
document does not provide hand hygiene guidance for interrupted aseptic 
tasks performed initially outside the patient zone, with subsequent entry into 
the patient zone; for example, aseptic preparation in a drug preparation area 
with drug administration within the patient zone. The only moment that could 
be said to apply is moment 2, before an aseptic task. However, since most 
procedures outwith the patient zone are still interrupted aseptic procedures, 
then to perform hand hygiene for aseptic preparation only before commencing 
a task would be insufficient to prevent asepsis failure. The assumption that all 
objects going into the patient zone are ‘cleaned’ is not the reality for aseptic 
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preparation outside the patient zone, where critically, the contents of the 
syringe should be sterile.  
 
For aseptic administration all five of the moments could be involved. Critically, 
the document specifies that for moment 2, before aseptic procedure, hand 
hygiene should take place between the last exposure to a surface and 
immediately before access to a critical site with infection risk for the patient. 
To this extent, the hand hygiene would be effective in preventing 
contamination from the hands of the nurse administrator to the catheter hub, 
assuming this part of the procedure was uninterrupted – as in the 5th study 
ward. If there were interruptions in the procedure, as in the 1st, 2nd,3rd, 4th, and 
6th study wards, (that is, aseptic steps followed by non-aseptic steps), followed 
by aseptic steps, repeated hand hygiene would be required if subsequent 
contamination occurred. This repeat step is not specified in the WHO 5 
moments.  As important, however, is the concept that hand hygiene 
performed as per the WHO 5 moments within the patient zone will not prevent 
the micro-organisms on the outside of the hub being infused along with the 
patient. How to decontaminate the hub is not included in this hand hygiene 
guidance.  HCWs are not advised to seek other guidance at this point.  
 
In dealing with a single procedure (hand hygiene) and a single mode of 
transmission (contact via hands – both direct and indirect) this vast guidance 
does not cover the risks associated with splash contamination, the need for 
decontamination of other items such as hubs and with aseptic procedures 
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performed outside the patient zone which can have life-threatening 
consequences to the patient. In reading this WHO guidance, HCWs could be 
led to the erroneous assumption that ‘hand contact’ is the only mode of 
transmission relevant during aseptic procedures. This is not the case. 
Adherence to the WHO 5 moments for hand hygiene as specified in the WHO 
guidelines is therefore insufficient of itself to facilitate aseptic preparation or 
aseptic administration of intravenous drugs. 
 
8.9.2 Drug Information from the Pharmaceutical Companies 
The pharmaceutical literature provided for each of the high-risk drugs 
identified (heparin and propofol) was reviewed.  Three of four heparin leaflets 
made by Leo contain no information related to possible risk from microbial 
contamination and subsequent infection. There is no instruction to use an 
aseptic technique during preparation of the drug. The drug could be used as a 
multi-dose vial as there is a clear instruction to do so up to 14 days post first 
use. There is no space on the vial to mark the opening date. The flush heparin 
made by Wockhardt, includes a warning to use an aseptic technique with this 
drug; ‘Aseptic techniques should be used at all times during [this drug’s] use 
to avoid contamination.’ The product information states ‘Any portion of the 
contents not used at once should be discarded.’ Therefore, this product 
should be considered single-use. 
 
These leaflets have all been written as if the primary readers were the patient. 
There is no indication here that heparin is associated with infusate 
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contamination, as has been published in the literature. The heparin 
information from Leo printed in 2008 provides less warning on infection risk 
than that prepared in 2002. Information is not provided to validate the safety of 
these multi-dose vials which can be pierced as often as drug remains in the 
vial until the expiry date is reached. Even with a 14 day usage, there needs to 
be clear instruction to label the vial so that the date the vial is to be discarded 
is visible to subsequent users. There is no indication of the validity of the 14 
day usage, that is, what rates of deliberate contamination have been used to 
challenge the preservatives, and whether there was endotoxin within the vial 
thereafter. Of note, contamination of multi-dose heparin vials containing 
preservative has been reported (Nogler-Semenitz et al. 2007). The 
information on all 4 heparin leaflets is of an easily readable print size. 
Information leaflets reviewed: 
o Leo Heparin (mucous) Injection BP 1,000 and 5,000 and 25,000 Units/ml: 
2002 
o Leo Heparin (mucous) Injection BP 1,000 and 5,000 and 25,000 Units/ml: 
2008 
o Leo Heparin sodium 10 IU/ml I.V. flush solution: 2007 
o Wockhardt Heparin sodium 10 I.U. ml Flushing solution for maintenance of 
patency of intravenous devices: 2007. 
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8.9.2.1 Drug Information from drugs at high-risk of infusate 
contamination  
Propofol (Diprivan®) 10mg/ml Injectable emulsion 
The pharmaceutical information on propofol is provided on 3.5 sides of A4 in a 
very small font which is not easily readable. It is written for the prescriber and 
contains detailed information on the pharmacokinetics. There is a warning on 
the sterile nature of the drug, how easily it can be contaminated and how it 
can provide a medium for micro-organisms to flourish and what to do to 
prevent asepsis failure: 
‘Strict aseptic technique must always be maintained during handling. 
Diprivan injectable emulsion is a single-use parenteral product which 
contains 0.005% disodium edentate to retard the rate of growth of 
micro-organisms as it is not an antimicrobially preserved product under 
USP standards. Accordingly, strict aseptic technique must be adhered 
to. Do not use if contamination is suspected. Discard unused portions 
as directed within the required time limits. There have been reports in 
which failure to use aseptic technique when handling Diprivan 
injectable emulsion was associated with microbial contamination of the 
product and with fever, infection/sepsis, other life-threatening illness 
and or death. 
Prepare for use just prior to initiation of each anaesthetic/sedative. 
Complete administration within 6 hours. 
Change administration lines after use.’ 
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Comment on the propofol information 
The information required by any nurse preparing propofol is available as a 
stark warning. This is essential, given the outbreaks that have occurred as a 
consequence of propofol contamination (Krumholz et al. 1994, Veber et al. 
1994, Bennett et al. 1995, Kuehnert et al. 1997, Langevin et al. 1999, 
Trepanier and Lessard 2003). There is, however, one problem with the 
provided information; although emboldened, the information is in very small 
print on the second side (4th column) of the leaflet. As such, for all it is 
emboldened, typographically, it is also de-emphasised.  
  
8.9.2.2 Other drug information leaflets reviewed 
A review of a selection of 8 other drug information leaflets available in the 
study wards found: In only 1 of the 8 leaflets is there instruction to use aseptic 
technique, is it stated the product is sterile and is there instruction on when 
and how to decontaminate a drug vial. In only four of the eight leaflets did it 
state ‘single-use’ product. 
 
Drug information leaflets read:  
Flucloxacillin (CP pharmaceuticals); Lidocaine 1% (TARO); Vancomycin 
(Wockhardt); Ceftriaxone (Wockhardt); Lidocaine hydrochloride 2% (Hameln); 
Benzylpenicillin (Genus pharmaceuticals); Cefotaxime (Wockhardt); 
Meropenem (AstraZenica UK Ltd). 
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8.9.2.3 Comment on additional drug information leaflets 
It is clear from reviewing this small selection of pharmaceutical information 
that critical information related to infection risk is not made readily-available 
nor sufficiently well highlighted to those who, when preparing intravenous 
drugs, should take special actions and require to follow steps to prevent 
contamination.    
 
8.9.3 Information from the manufacturers of antiseptics  
For aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs, several antiseptics were 
observed being used as follows: 
o Steret® - Isopropyl Alcohol BP70%v/v 
o Clinell® Chlorhexidine gluconate 2% BP & Isopropyl alcohol 70% ‘ 
o Alcowipe® Isopropyl Alcohol BP70%v/v  
 
All the antiseptics were dispensed in the form of an impregnated wipe, 
presented in a sealed single-use package. The antiseptics observed used 
contained a paucity of information ‘use wipe to clean site’, ‘use as directed’ 
and ‘For external use only’. 
 
There is a paucity of information related to disinfection in terms of which 
disinfectant should be used, how the disinfectant should be applied and 
crucially, when the disinfectant should be applied. In addition, there are no 
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visible clues to show the nurse preparing the drug that sufficient disinfection 
has been applied and disinfection as such has been achieved.   
 
Disinfection is not as effective a process as sterilization, that is, the removal of 
all micro-organisms. Disinfection, according to the Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) (2010: 7), is ‘a process used to reduce 
the number of viable infectious agents but which may not necessarily 
inactivate some microbial agents, such as certain viruses and bacterial 
spores’. Chemical disinfectants, can under defined conditions, achieve 
disinfection, but are the least effective means of achieving disinfection (heat is 
the most effective). Chemical disinfectants, however, are used when heat 
poses a hazard to either the integrity of the equipment being disinfected or the 
safety of the patient. Antiseptics are the least effective of the chemical 
disinfectants; antiseptics are disinfectants that are safe to use on skin (and 
some mucous membranes). As antiseptics are weak disinfectants it is not 
surprising that some outbreak reports have cited contaminated disinfectant as 
a cause (Nasser et al. 2004, Weber et al. 2007, Romero-Gomez et al. 2008).  
As a consequence, the majority of antiseptics used in healthcare are 
dispensed or packaged as single-use products.   
 
There are parameters set for the purpose of validating both sterilisation and 
disinfection processes which take account of the variety of unknowns prior to 
either process commencing. For chemical disinfectants to achieve disinfection 
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and not themselves cause harm to the equipment or the patients, these 
unknowns include: 
o What type(s) and how many micro-organisms are likely to be 
present? 
o What organic material is present and how will this affect the 
antiseptic–surface contact and consequently the kill times of the 
micro-organisms present? 
o How the chemical disinfectant should be manoeuvred to ensure 
sufficient contact with the surface? 
o How long the chemical disinfectant needs to remain in contact with 
the surface? 
o What environmental conditions need to be maintained prior to the 
surface being considered disinfected? 
o Is type of surface being disinfected compatible with the disinfection? 
 
Antiseptics are required several times during the thesis procedure: 
o To decontaminate the surface on which the procedure will be 
performed 
o To decontaminate the bungs on the top of vials and all ampoules 
that do not have sterile access points, 
And although not part of the observed study, 
o To decontaminate the bung / needlefree device or three-way tap 
and distal catheter section, immediately prior to the drug being 
administered.  
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There is an evidenced-based guidance on information relating to the 
application of disinfectants to the skin, prior to the insertion of the catheter and 
for application to the skin for cleansing prior to the application of dressings. 
The epic2 (Pratt et al. 2007), provide information on when antiseptics should 
be used. However, there is no evidence-based recommendation for the use of 
antiseptics for the preparation of a surface area or pertaining to the 
decontamination of vials and ampoules. In addition, epic2 (Pratt et al. 2007) 
does not include specifics on how long the antiseptic should be left in contact 
with a surface or what type of contact should occur. The makers of antiseptics 
do not also make the catheters or the sundry equipment to which disinfectants 
require to be applied. Giving more specific information in their literature about 
disinfectants and disinfection application could leave the antiseptic 
manufacturers open to litigation should a device failure occur as a 
consequence of antiseptic application. This paucity of information does not 
help the nurses who want to identify and perform evidence-based practice. 
 
8.9.3.1 Infusate Additive Labels 
The labels added to intravascular-drugs vary in size but not in the information 
which requires to be completed. This information includes details of the drug, 
the patient, the diluent, the batch number, the expiry date and time and the 
route of administration. The labels contain an implied warning “Discontinue if 
cloudiness or precipitate develops”. The implication here is that it is only 
cloudy infusates which pose a risk. As previously discussed, infusates can be 
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heavily contaminated with >106 micro-organisms without making the fluid 
appear cloudy (Gilat et al. 1958, Maki and Martin 1975).   
 
Errors have been reported where labels were not used and confusion had 
arisen as to what drug was being administered. It is these errors that led to 
the standing instruction to adhere a label immediately a drug had been added 
to an infusion and not before. It is the addition of this label at this time, which 
for most clinical areas, changes the antiseptic procedure from an 
uninterrupted procedure to an interrupted procedure.  
 
8.9.4 Summary of review of sundry information available to nurses 
This review of the sundry information available to nurses to assist them to 
perform evidence based procedures shows that the information is poor, poorly 
presented or absent altogether. The drug information does not include known 
infection risks and when it does include them, such information is 
deemphasised. The antiseptic information lacks an evidence-base and 
contains no specifics. The infusate label hints that only cloudy infusates are 
contaminated when this is not the case. These can be seen as latent 
conditions which could lead the nurses to erroneous assumptions of safety 
and consequently to unsafe acts.   
 
From all these cumulative evidence sources the system profile of aseptic 
preparation of intravenous drugs has been produced. 
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8.10 The system of intravenous drug preparation and how it 
works in practice 
The objectives of this thesis are to produce a procedure profile of the system 
of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs and to identify the system’s error-
prone and reliability characteristics. The system profile described below is 
derived from a synthesis of all of the results. What the system profile shows is 
that this common, safety-critical, complex procedure is performed by nurses in 
environments which pose contamination risks, with equipment that can either 
increase or decrease contamination risks, and using methods that need to be 
modified for safety. The information provided to the nurses, from multiple 
sources, is insufficient to alert and inform them about contamination risks and 
how to prevent them. Additionally, there is minimal system feedback at a 
personal level on performance and no data is available on the quality of the 
end product, or the frequency of IR-BSI. However, despite the system being, 
at present, more error-prone than reliable, it is clear that the nurses and ward 
managers are committed to patient safety and to doing the best they can with 
all of the resources available to them. 
 
8.10.1 Intravenous drug preparations 
The preparation of intravenous drugs is a common, complex, safety-critical 
procedure performed by nurses approximately 3,000,000 times a year in 
clinical care settings.  The way the procedure is performed varies depending 
on the drug, the need for a diluent, the equipment which is accessible and 
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whose use is understood, and the preferences and ways of working that have 
evolved over time in individual clinical areas. The procedure can be likened to 
a magic trick; the objective is to remove sterile contents from one or more 
containers and transfer them to another container without contaminating the 
contents – the infusate. This is difficult because although the internal contents 
of a drug vial should be sterile, the air, the environment and the usually gloved 
hands of the nurse preparing the infusate are not. It is expected that an 
aseptic technique will enable the nurse to achieve this. However, there is no 
written procedure for aseptic technique and there are no visual or audible 
indications at the end of the procedure as to whether the objective has been 
achieved. Additionally, there are no quality control data to confirm 
achievement of the objective.  
 
The procedure is performed differently in different clinical settings, for 
example: 
Single person interrupted procedure (with checker) 1st, 3rd 6th wards 
Single person (closed) interrupted procedure (with checker) 4th ward 
Single person non-interrupted procedure (with checker) 2nd ward 
Two person non-interrupted procedure (including checker) 5th ward 
All procedures include several redundancy checks of right: drug, dose, diluent, 
due not given, duration of administration and route of administration. There is 
no written requirement to undertake redundancy checks on asepsis steps. 
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The complexity of the procedure varies between the wards because of the 
different types of drugs that patients with different clinical conditions require. 
The procedures in the ICUs, where patients frequently have multiple critical 
conditions and often require many drugs at the same time, are more complex 
than the drug procedures on the general wards. The neonatal ICU procedures 
are most complex of all, involving mixing, dilution and discarding of excess 
drug pre administration. But, even in the non-ICUs, patients require a myriad 
of drugs which require different diluents, different calculations and different 
flush regimens. There are also various methods of administration, for 
example, by syringe driver, bolus injection or gravity drop infusion, which add 
to the complexity. In addition there may be post-administration instructions, 
which create further variation in the procedure. General drug preparation 
instructions are available on computers, in manuals and on posters, but also 
mainly in the individual memory of those who regularly prepare them. 
Instructions to prevent asepsis are not visible. In the ICUs and the BMTU a 
significant proportion of most days are spent preparing intravenous drugs. 
 
The clinical care environments where the procedures are performed also vary. 
Some procedures were observed to be done at the bedside / cot-side, others 
in a designated drug preparation area and 2 were performed in a small 
designated area within a multi-purpose room. In one area where there was a 
purpose designed facility this was so far away from patients that it had been 
found to be unsafe to use it as the staff were away from their patients for too 
long.  
 363 
 
There had been no risk assessments of the environments where drugs are 
prepared in any of the study wards; the ward managers themselves are left to 
design and create areas safety. All of the environments in the study wards 
include at least one latent condition which increases the risk of unsafe acts. 
Study wards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 have a risk from possible splash contamination. 
Study ward 5 has a risk of error of misreading resulting from low lighting for 
patient comfort.  
 
All of the environments where the drugs were prepared were visibly clean; 
only one was not free from clutter. Non-bedside / cot-side preparations varied 
considerably in the amount of space available to the nurse preparing the 
infusions from, a single shelf in 2 study wards, to a large open plan room or a 
single designated procedure room. None of the facilities had access to a drug 
preparation cabinet which would have removed airborne particles or droplets.   
 
Not only do the procedures vary, but the equipment varies also. Only in the 4th 
study ward are drugs prepared using a reconstitution device, which saves 
time and reduces the risk of contamination. Another ward had previously used 
them, but these had been removed by the management due to cost. The 
nurses using the reconstitution devices on the 4th study ward consider that 
they could not do without them, whilst 3 other wards had not heard of them. 
Two wards use filters, capable of removing endotoxin and micro-organisms 3 
others did not (one uses an inappropriate filter). Dispensing pins are used to 
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save time and money, but this use poses an unrecognised infection risk to 
patients by turning a sterile diluent into a multi-dose vial and potentially 
contaminating infusates. The variability in the use of equipment engenders 
variable levels of infusate contamination risk.  
 
The use of drugs prepared from multi-dose vials is prevalent on some wards 
and completely absent on others. The risk of infusate contamination of multi-
dose vials is not well-recognised by the nurses. This is possibly because the 
manufacturers state that the vials can be used for 14 days and also because 
there can be significant contamination without changes in the visual 
appearance of the drug within the vial. 
 
To train the nurses in this procedure they are provided with a single day or 
two day course followed by supervised practice in the clinical area. Once 
deemed competent, no further training is mandatory at present; although this 
is under review in one ward. Many nurses are unaware of critical information 
about safety, for example, the need to decontaminate vial tops. For some 
nurses, the task is reported as being stressful and some receive no job 
satisfaction from it. It seems to be a necessary chore rather than a much-
loved nursing procedure.  
 
8.10.2 The system’s error-prone characteristics 
There are many latent conditions relating to the way this procedure is 
performed that make the nurses undertaking it more prone to performing 
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unsafe acts. These latent conditions begin with the lack of a written procedure 
that is easy to follow and that reflects what is done and what equipment is 
used. The quality control of this procedure is achieved by one competent 
nurse checking that another competent nurse is following the same local 
procedure. There is no reassurance that the drugs, diluents or completed 
infusates are sterile. There are no visual clues that could indicate that the 
infusates are contaminated. Due to a lack of visual clues, and possibly the 
lack of a procedure telling them to do so, accessing the drugs through a non-
sterile bung is not routinely preceded by decontamination, potentially 
introducing contamination into the drug. Not all errors that could occur were 
recognised as such, for example, there are no instructions to consider an 
infusate the source of sepsis should the patient develop a pyrexia.  
 
Nurses who prepare drugs in the adult ICUs are in effect multi-tasking, in that 
they also continue to observe their patients and are attuned to several 
monitoring alarms for signals that their patients’ critical signs are deteriorating. 
Concurrent procedures are allowed in all three of the facilities where drugs 
were prepared away from the bedside / cot-side, increasing the risk of 
distraction and interruptions and possible loss of situation awareness. 
 
The ward mangers also commented that there is an inability of the system to 
respond to capacity surges. If the wards are busy, with more dependent 
patients and more requirements for intravenous drugs, there are seldom 
additional staff to assist in undertaking the additional workload.  
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There is clearly a lack of overall organisational control on what equipment 
could, should and should not be used to enhance safety and reduce costs. 
For example, the pilot ward should not use either Dispensing Pins or 
inappropriate filters. The 6th study ward with the poorest facilities could have 
used reconstitution devices to improve safety. The accessibility of safety 
equipment was based on the individual ward budget dependent and not on 
any safety risk assessment. Finally, the lack of recognition of infusate 
contamination as a listed adverse incident also downplays its significance.  
 
8.10.3 Identification of the system’s reliability characteristics 
It is more difficult to identify reliability characteristics with regard to the 
environment, the equipment and the way the procedure is performed in the 
context of a procedure with latent conditions which could potentially produce 
errors. However, the nurses were committed to being safe; this is evidenced 
by them volunteering for this study in the hope of improving their facilities and 
procedures. The data from the opinions of safety survey also confirms that 
nurses were encouraged to report errors, and that they would report personal 
errors in order to make the system safer. However, because infusate 
contamination and IR-BSI are not listed adverse events, even if they did 
recognise a contaminated infusate as causing an IR-BSI, it is uncertain if it 
would be recognised and reported as an adverse drug error. The procedure 
within each study ward is performed reliably, that is, it is performed the same 
way, and was checked to ensure it was performed the same way. The 
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problem with these ‘reliable’ methods was that the same way was itself 
unreliable in terms of being able to guarantee a sterile product. 
 
8.11 Summary of the results including the system profile  
The results from all the data sources have enabled the production of a profile 
of the system of intravenous drug preparation in clinical settings. This system 
profile indicates that this common, complex, safety-critical procedure is 
performed by nurses in environments which could pose contamination risks, 
with equipment and drugs which can either increase or decrease 
contamination risks, and using various methods that can be modified to 
decrease the risk of contamination. The information provided to the nurses 
does not indicate to them with sufficient clarity the infusate risks. 
Consequently, the nurses who perform these procedures are largely unaware 
of the contamination risks posed by the equipment, the drugs, the 
environment or the methods they use.  
 
Despite all the identified latent conditions rendering the system at present 
more error-prone than reliable, there is evidence that patient safety is a 
priority for those who perform the procedure. The next chapter will discuss 
these results and identify what is making the system unsafe and what makes 
it perform as it does.  
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9 Discussion 
In this chapter the results from all the data sources, including the system 
profile set out in the previous chapter, are discussed to answer the research 
questions: ‘What is the system of intravenous drug preparation in clinical care 
settings in NHS Scotland?’ and, ‘How does it work in practice?’ This 
discussion will thereby identify what makes the system of aseptic preparation 
of intravenous drugs error-prone and vulnerable to contamination in individual 
clinical care settings. How these findings relate to the methodological 
framework set out in chapter 4 is also discussed. This chapter is set out as 
follows: the results from the Location Assessments, the observations and the 
opinions of safety are discussed first. Explanations for the variability in the 
observed procedures, with particular reference to the variations in aseptic 
technique, the use of gloves and the use of filters, are then given. This will be 
followed by a review of what is making IR-BSI invisible. This section will show 
that IR-BSI prevention is not well specified in the regulatory framework, that 
national guidance does not include IR-BSI prevention in sufficient detail, that 
IR-BSI reports are difficult to find in the literature, and that the information 
presented to those who prepare infusates does not highlight with sufficient 
clarity the problem of IR-BSI. The section thereafter includes discussion on 
who will be held to account for IR-BSI, the challenges that HCWs face and 
what can be done to reduce IR-BSI locally and nationally. The final section 
demonstrates that this thesis has confirmed the stated assumptions regarding 
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the system’s vulnerability, and shown the utility of the methodological 
framework needed to undertake this research. To counter this, recognition of 
the limitations of the study are provided. This chapter concludes that the 
system is error-prone and that unless the system changes, IR-BSI will remain 
under-diagnosed, under-investigated and under-reported.  
 
To identify the system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical 
care settings different data sources were used. Six locations where drugs 
were prepared in 5 different hospitals in Glasgow were examined, 78 
intravenous drug preparations were observed, the opinions of safety of 71 
nurses who prepare intravenous drugs were considered, data on when the 
nurses stated they perform redundancy checks were collected and, finally, 
observed practice was reviewed in the context of all the information available 
to those preparing the drugs. The data from each of these sources are 
presented in 3 sections: The Location Assessments, The Procedures 
Performed and the HCWs’ Opinions of Safety (safety culture measure).  
 
9.1 The Location Assessments 
Data from the Location Assessments identified that the environments in which 
the nurses prepare intravenous drugs vary significantly in terms of suitability 
as determined by the available space, the multi-purpose use of the space, the 
proximity to a sink and the potential for direct infusate contamination. More 
importantly, however, the contamination risks posed by these environments 
are not recognised as such by the nurses.  The 4th study ward and the 6th 
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study ward are afforded a shelf in a multi-purpose room (Figures 35 and 55) 
on which to perform the procedure. These wards’ procedures are exposed to 
splash contamination from close-by sinks. Distractions in the busy multi-
purpose overcrowded room on the 6th study ward indicate a clear risk of 
environmental capture. It is difficult to see how this space could ever be 
considered safe enough for the preparation of intravenous drugs. 
 
The 2nd study ward is the only ward where the nurses always used a 
designated room (Figure 16). However, in this ward droplet spray from a scrub 
sink is a potential contamination risk, but is not recognised as such.  The 
droplet spray itself was recognised by the nurses, they stand sideways when 
washing their hands so they do not get wet, but the potential contamination 
hazard from droplet spray to the infusates is not recognised. Consequently, on 
this ward where a full scrub is performed before each procedure, sterile towels 
are used to prevent contamination from the trolley surface and all sundry 
equipment is decontaminated before placement on the trolley, the 
environmental contamination risk has not been identified.   
 
Procedures performed at the bedside in the adult ICUs (1st and 3rd wards) are 
exposed to a lesser extent from potential spray contamination from ventilators 
and thereby pose a risk of contaminated surfaces on which they prepare 
drugs – these surfaces are not always decontaminated before the procedure 
commences. There was less risk of spray contamination in the 5th study ward, 
the neonatal ICU, where spray from disconnected ventilators would be 
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minimal.  Lighting here makes reading and visible detection of contamination 
difficult. 
 
Concurrent procedures are permitted during the preparation of intravenous 
drugs, in the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th study wards; this increases the risk of 
distractions and leading to the nurses potentially losing situation awareness. 
During these concurrent procedures other contamination could occur, for 
example, via droplet contamination to the preparation areas.  In the 2nd ward, 
where IV drugs were prepared in a separate area, so many drugs were 
prepared concurrently by different nurses that distractions and interruptions 
were inevitable. The separate preparation room in the 2nd study ward was also 
the first place to look for a nurse, which was another distraction risk.  This 
inability of being able to prepare IV drugs without distraction or interruption, 
was also highlighted in the survey of opinions of safety; the majority response 
of staff in all 6 wards to the statement ‘I can prepare drugs on this ward 
without interruption or distraction’, was to disagree with it. This is corroborated 
by responses to statement 9, ‘On this ward distractions and interruptions 
make it difficult to prepare IV drugs safely’, with which most respondents 
agreed. 
 
Although it is easy to criticise these environments from an infection control risk 
potential, it is not those who perform the procedure who determine the 
environments they have at their disposal; it is the organisation’s responsibility 
to provide safe environments. These environments have created latent 
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conditions capable of provoking unsafe acts during the preparation of 
infusates; this is as described in human error theory and as included in the 
methodological framework (Chapters 5 and 6). As stated previously, the 
CRAG (2002: 17) statement on the environment is that aseptic preparation of 
intravenous drugs should be carried out in a ‘suitable’ environment without 
specification of what is meant by ‘suitable’. Without specification of 
environmental standards that can be measured, there can be no guarantee of 
safety or awareness of how remote from safety a particular environment is. 
The NPSA recommend that the environment be ‘uncluttered and free from 
interruption and distraction’ (National Patient Safety Agency 2007), the RCN 
guidance does not include environmental standards (RCN IV Therapy Forum 
2003). What is clear from this study is that an environment free from 
interruption and distraction is not always available in the NHS in Scotland. In 
the ICUs, the nurses were also multi-tasking, monitoring their patients and 
their patients’ alarms whilst preparing intravenous drugs.  
 
Nurses who are specialists in intensive care, or bone marrow transplant care, 
are not necessarily specialists in hazards posed by plumbing equipment. 
Consequently, a formal risk assessment against set environment standards 
performed by those who are experts, is the only way to ensure recognition 
and negation of risks posed from the environment.  Had the CRAG (2002) 
document set standards for the environment, rather than providing a vague 
objective ‘suitable’, this situation may not have been allowed to prevail. The 
environment is one key determinant of whether the drug is likely to be 
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contaminated. What the results show, in particular in the 2nd study ward, is 
that it is possible to have a safe procedure performed in a poor environment, 
thus exposing the infusate to potential contamination. The need for a 
minimum standard for the environment in terms of space, and negation of any 
potential hazards within the space, is clearly indicated for patient safety. 
Viewing the ward layouts and drug preparation areas (Figures 3- 4, 15 - 16, 
25 -26, 34 - 35, 45 - 46 and 55 - 56) some wards, in particular the 4th and 6th 
wards, (Figures 34 and 56) may not have sufficient space within the ward that 
would meet set criteria. There is also a clear requirement that national 
guidelines should not, without specification, use terms such as ‘safe’, 
‘appropriate’ or ‘suitable’. Additionally, given that environments cannot (at 
least at present) be guaranteed interruption free or distraction free, exactly 
how nurses are assisted to negate such hazards needs to be addressed. Of 
note, the 1st ward had a well designed environment that was so far away from 
the patients as to be effectively out of useful reach. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that at the design stage, testing the practicalities of environments 
should be considered before building commences. 
 
The data from the Location Assessments supports the human error theory put 
forward in the methodological framework, in that there are latent conditions in 
the system design which provoke errors by frontline workers – the nurses. In 
this case, the environments in which the nurses have to prepare intravenous 
infusions can provoke loss of situational awareness through distractions and 
can result in contaminated infusates through droplet contamination. What can 
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be concluded is that whilst nurses were observed trying to achieve safety, 
during the procedures, there were systematic flaws in the observed 
environments in all clinical settings making their aseptic preparations prone to 
error and microbial contamination. The next section will discuss the results 
from the observed procedures and assessment of equipment available to 
perform them. 
 
9.2 The observed procedures and available equipment  
Having discussed how the different environments vary in their potential to 
increase the risk of contamination, similar differences in the observed 
procedures and equipment available to perform them will now be discussed. 
The procedures also vary markedly in how they are performed depending on 
the type of ward. The contamination risks in the observed procedures vary 
depending on the type of equipment used, whether multi-dose vials or diluents 
are used and whether defences are built into the system.  
 
The procedure which appears to pose least contamination risk is performed 
on the 5th ward. This procedure is performed by 2 nurses who are present 
throughout. The second nurse assists the nurse preparing the infusate by, for 
example, holding vials for piercing as well as by being present to perform 
redundancy checks – including asepsis-related redundancy checks (Figures 
47, 68 and Table 10).  Additionally, there are no multi-dose vials or diluents on 
this ward and, finally, the system was defended by the use of an effective in-
line filter. Reconstitution devices cannot be used on this ward (equipment size 
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not available). Therefore, should contamination arise on this ward, defences 
are present to prevent contamination of the infusate causing an IR-BSI. The 
one flaw in this procedure, which is seen in all wards, is that the nurses did 
not know that the tops of vials were non-sterile and therefore do not always 
decontaminate the top of the vial.  
 
Because of the risk of drug calculation error on the 5th study ward, it has been 
agreed that 2 nurses should be present throughout and that all calculations 
will be done independently by 2 nurses. Therefore, the 2-person procedure on 
this ward, done in the main to ensure right drug and right dose facilitates an 
uninterrupted aseptic technique. Other wards are less well staffed. 
 
Although performed in a multi-purpose room, the nurses on the 4th study ward 
(Figure 35) use a procedure that negates risks and is well defended. Risks are 
firstly negated by the use of a reconstitution device which closed the system 
to potential contamination from, for example, droplets from the nearby sink. 
Additionally, the nurses on this ward use snap-top ampoules of high-risk drugs 
such as heparin, and do not use multi-dose vials. Finally, the system is 
defended, should contamination occur, by an in-line filter capable of removing 
microbial contamination. Should these defences fail, then there were real 
contamination risks, (Figures 36 and 37). The preparation surface is not 
cleaned before the procedure begins and, again, decontamination of vial tops 
is not routinely performed.   
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The single person, non-interrupted procedure on the BMTU (2nd study ward) 
poses potential contamination risks due to the lack of decontamination of vial 
tops. Additionally, there are no data to confirm their decontamination of 
everything going onto the trolley is effective at decontamination (Figure 17). 
Filters are not used on the infusates in this ward. 
 
The two ICUs (1st and 3rd) wards use similar single person, interrupted 
procedures, similar equipment and consequently their procedures pose similar 
risks (Figures 5 and 27). The multi-use diluent on the 1st ward and intermittent 
use on the 3rd ward, facilitated by the Dispensing Pin, turns a sterile diluent 
into a potentially contaminated one available for use over a 24 hour period. As 
previously stated, outbreaks have been caused by use of multi-use diluents 
(Narayan et al. 2009).  On the 3rd ward, multi-dose vials of heparin are used 
which pose an unrecognised risk. Filters used on the 1st ward are of an 
unsuitable type and consequently it can not be considered that any microbial 
protection is afforded by them. On these wards (1st and 3rd), the procedure 
has the ingredients of an aseptic technique but it is not performed in a way 
that ensures it. For example, the purpose of the use of non-sterile gloves is 
not clear. Putting on of gloves and then collecting equipment means that the 
aseptic steps are interrupted. This was acknowledged by one nurse who 
decontaminated gloved hands in an attempt to maintain an aseptic procedure. 
The need to stick on labels immediately a drug has been added is critical to 
safety. This is because the failure to do so has resulted in erroneous 
administration of drugs. This safety-critical step interrupts the aseptic nature of 
 377 
the procedure (the label is not sterile) and poses an additional risk of asepsis 
failure by interrupting asepsis. However, as has been shown by suggested 
amendments to procedures, it can be overcome (Figures 14 and 33) by 
recommencing the procedure with hand hygiene.  Again, as on all wards, the 
decontamination of vial tops is not performed as part of the aseptic technique. 
This is not surprising, given the lack of information provided by the 
manufacturers of drugs who do not highlight that the vial tops are non-sterile 
and require decontamination prior to access. 
 
The 6th ward which, as already stated, is at risk from environmental 
contamination and distractions causing loss of situational awareness, is also 
at contamination risk from the use of multi-dose vials. This single person, 
interrupted procedure is performed without the use of reconstitution devices or 
filters to defend the system (Figure 56). Vial tops are not decontaminated. 
However, the nurses do the best possible with the very limited resources 
available to them. Their reason for taking part in the project was the possibility 
of improving the facilities for this procedure.  
 
Aseptic technique for drug preparation has clearly evolved within the six study 
wards differently. The 5th study ward uses a 2-person procedure which, is 
perhaps, the original model. Other ward procedures have evolved based on 
what resources and equipment are, and are not, available. The requirements 
in this procedure, of right drug, right dose, right patient, stick on label as soon 
as drug added, all compete with performing an aseptic technique. At present, 
 378 
from a human-factors perspective, it is not easy for the nurse to do the right 
thing, or to be sure exactly what is the right thing to do. Colour-coding of 
written procedural steps as either ‘critical to asepsis’, or ‘mandatory checks’ or 
‘required but not for asepsis or a check’, enables for the first time all the steps 
to be visible and to ensure they are all performed at optimal times for patient 
safety, making it easy for the nurses to do the right thing.   
 
The requirement to stick on a label as soon as a drug is added to an infusion 
bag or syringe is a safety-critical step that interrupts all procedures. The 2nd 
ward tries to negate an interruption at this step by wiping the sticker with an 
antiseptic wipe. The 5th study ward prevents interruption of asepsis by having 
a second person do it. The 4th study ward has a closed-system and therefore 
the need for asepsis at this point is negated, but the remaining wards carry on 
regardless with ‘aseptic’ steps. The aseptic procedure in the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th 
wards is naturally interrupted at the point where the label is stuck on. The 
colour-coded figures (14, 33, 44 and 62) show that, by re-introducing hand 
hygiene after the sticker is adhered, an antiseptic procedure can subsequently 
be restarted. Colour-coding the step, as either aseptic or non-aseptic, 
provides a visual check of when the procedure is interrupted and when hand 
hygiene needs to recommence.  
 
What the colour-coding does for the first time is to allow the critical non-
aseptic steps of the procedure to be reviewed concurrently with the aseptic 
steps and not as a separate procedure. In this way, the elements of the 
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procedure can be seen and agreed on with managers and infection control 
teams. It can be used to teach the procedure and it can be modified and 
examined for optimal safety as new equipment or variations of the procedure 
are deemed necessary. Additionally, if the procedure for any given unit is 
accompanied by periodic culture of infusates, then it could also be validated. 
The critical checks of right drug, right dose, right duration, right diluent, due 
and not already administered, and right route are fundamental to patient 
safety; however they are arguably no more important to patient safety than 
right aseptic technique. Focusing on right drug, right dose, right patient, has 
deemphasised the risks posed by failure of aseptic technique.   
 
The acceptance in some wards of the risks posed by the use of multi-dose 
drugs and diluents reflects the lack of emphasis on such risks in national and 
local guidance. What is also striking is the degree to which the systems are 
and are not defended, or are exposed to contamination risk. To some extent 
these variations can be explained again by a lack of specifics in the national 
guidance. As stated in Chapter 4, the Healthcare Commission (2007a) 
recommends regular competency checking, and regular quality control without 
specifying what is meant by the term ‘regular’. The Nursing and Midwifery 
Council (2006) negates to specify when hand hygiene is required in their 
statement on medicines management. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society 
(2005) fails to mention multi-dose vials as posing a special risk. Even the 
CRAG (2002: 6) guidance defines the term ‘high-risk’ loosely ‘Where the 
hazard associated with preparation is likely to have a serious risk.’ The NPSA 
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competency statement (2007), in specifying that aseptic technique means 
avoid touching areas where bacterial contamination may be introduced, again 
lacks specifics. The evidence that multi-dose vials and in particular heparin 
pose a risk is abundant in the literature (Katzenstein et al. 1999, Al-Saigul et 
al. 2000, Nasser et al. 2004, Centers for Disease Control 2005, Perz et al. 
2005, Siegman-Igra et al. 2005, Centers for Disease Control 2006, Held et al. 
2006, Pan et al. 2006, Peiris et al. 2006, Safdar and Maki 2006, Gordin et al. 
2007, Grobner et al. 2007, Nogler-Semenitz et al. 2007, Vonberg and 
Gastmeier 2007, Gershman et al. 2008, Souza Dias et al. 2008, Yang et al. 
2008, Blossom et al. 2009, Motamedifar and Askarian 2009, National Patient 
Safety Agency 2009, Ross et al. 2009). 
 
There are several sources of written material available to the nurses from the 
organisation, from the pharmaceutical information, from the World Health 
Organisation on hand hygiene. None of these sources provides clear, 
accessible information on what the nurses needed to do and not do to prevent 
possible contamination of infusates. There is no written procedure on any 
ward which described what is done on the wards for aseptic preparation of 
intravenous drugs. One ward manager spent several hours on the ward 
searching for an aseptic procedure that, to her disappointment and disbelief, 
does not exist. 
 
To try to explain some of the variation in the observed procedures on the 
study wards, three aspects are discussed further: variation in aseptic 
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technique, variation in the use of gloves and variation in the use of filters. 
Additionally, there is discussion as to whether specifics in drugs or patients 
can explain variations in the procedures. To begin with, a brief discussion of 
the possible reasons for variation in the observed aseptic technique is given. 
 
9.2.1 Variation in aseptic technique  
Aseptic technique is a method of carrying out procedures so that there is a 
minimum risk of microbial contamination and subsequent infection. It is 
achieved by the sterility of equipment and a non-touch method (Cape and 
Dobson 1974, Boakes 2009). According to a leading manual of nursing 
practice, it is a set of specific practices and procedures performed under 
carefully controlled conditions with the goal of minimising contamination by 
pathogens (Dougherty and Lister 2004). Both, these definitions are clear that 
aseptic technique is not like sterilisation, an absolute term, but more like 
disinfection, a way of achieving something which it is hoped will not expose 
the patient to harm. It is a title bestowed on a selection of procedures, such as 
dressing changes, insertion of urinary catheters and operative procedures. 
The findings from this thesis indicate that there has been what can be called 
‘procedure drift’; and, that the time has come to revisit such definitions and 
agree the specific environmental conditions and usage of equipment which 
are sufficient to prevent contamination and the patient from acquiring 
infection.   
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There is clearly a lack of standardisation in the performance of aseptic 
technique in the six study wards. There is also a lack of written procedures to 
remind staff exactly what requires to be done and when in the procedure it 
should be performed. A standardised and visually appealing version of aseptic 
technique is available. Aseptic non-touch technique™ (ANTT™) was first 
published as an evidence-based theory to practice development in 2001 
(Rowley 2001). ANTT™ comes with pictorial presentations of the individual 
steps of the procedure which are visually appealing. This technique has clear 
advantages over the existing and often variable practices. Indeed one of the 
goals of ANTT™ was to reduce variation in practice. Other advantages 
derived from a standardised approach include reduction in cost, decrease in 
poor practice and removal of unnecessary, labour intensive practices; these 
benefits are similarly laudable. However, there are problems with ANTT™. 
Rowley (2001: VI) explains that the theoretical framework on which it is based 
is that ‘10% of all endemic infections in hospital are airborne… therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that the airborne route is small in comparison to direct 
contact’. This assumption is referenced to two papers. The first paper does 
estimate nosocomial airborne infections at 10%; though this work relates more 
to airborne infections such as tuberculosis (Eickhoff 1994). The second paper 
suggests that the reported increase in Gram positive organisms, which are 
resistant to desiccation, may indicate an increased role of airborne 
dissemination in micro-organisms (Schaal 1991).  However, what is also 
absent from the theory for ANTT™ is the use of the literature on the 
pathogenesis of catheter-related sepsis, including infusate contamination, of 
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which none is included. The routes of infusate contamination discussed in 
Table 2 are also absent from Rowely’s (2001) work.  
 
In later work, the theory has developed and there is now acknowledgement 
that, as micro-organisms are present in the air, sterility is not achievable in 
healthcare settings (Rowley and Clare 2009). The authors of ANTT™ choose 
to accept that environmental contamination risks are present without an 
evaluation of how big a risk they pose or what can be done to negate them; 
there are categories of cabinet that can negate environmental risk. 
 
Recently, ANTT™ has been registered as a trademark and become an 
advocated procedure in parts of England.  ANTT™ is a condensed procedure 
compared to the 50 plus steps in the NPSA statement (2007) and there is 
much to be welcomed in this approach. However, the crucial flaw is that in the 
Rowley (2001: VIII) steps ‘gather all the equipment and drugs’ and ‘prepare 
the drug aseptically’ there is a paucity of information and no mention that the 
drugs, diluents and sundries need to be and to remain sterile, There is also no 
ANTT™ requirement to decontaminate vial tops (Rowley 2001). There are 
specifics missing that might be in other materials produced by Rowley, 
however these are available through a commercial route. ANTT™ is better for 
the patients and more cost effective for organisations than what has gone 
before – but real safety has yet to be demonstrated. There is no evidence of 
outcome validation, that is, infusions made following ANTT™ being sterile; as 
such it is difficult to advocate this as an evidence-based approach.  Aseptic 
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technique is a system designed by humans and, as stated in the 
methodological framework, systems designed by humans are fallible. One of 
the key issues with the aseptic procedure of preparing a sterile infusate is that 
it is performed concurrently with the procedure of administering a drug safely 
to the right patient. Therefore, to ensure that all of these procedures are 
performed without error, the instructions need to be written and described as 
combined procedures. Such an approach would result in improved patient 
safety through reduced human error. Again this is recognised in the 
methodological framework in the statements on patient safety, human error 
and human factors. Another variation in the observed procedures will now be 
discussed, the use of gloves. 
 
9.2.2 Variation in the use of gloves 
The use of gloves during the procedure in the study wards is also variable. In 
wards where non-sterile gloves are used (1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th wards), it is 
difficult to determine why they are being used at all. That is whether it is to 
protect the nurse from drug contamination, or whether it is to protect the 
infusate from contamination. Once gloves are put on however, the difficulty in 
performing an aseptic procedure is clear, particularly if an additional piece of 
equipment is required. Rowley, (2001) in describing ANTT™, advocated 
gloves as a requirement under the Control of Substances Hazardous to 
Health Regulations (Rowley 2001). However, this requires more explanation 
than is given. If there is a hazard from the preparation of drugs which requires 
the use of gloves, precisely what that hazard is not specified. If the risk is from 
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drug spill onto hands, then gloves may protect the nurse. However, if the risk 
is from unexpected drug spray during a disconnect, then the risk will be to a 
greater surface area than the hands, for example, the forearms and such 
sprays could also be inhaled. COSHH regulations mandate that, wherever 
practical, people should be protected from the recognised hazard (Health and 
Safety Executive 2009). For example, this could be by the use of equipment 
that negates the risk of spray, such as reconstitution devices. If the risk of 
unintended drug contact cannot be negated, then control measures must be 
used, in this case the gloves or, via the use of cabinets which control the 
preparation conditions. Additionally, there is a requirement to monitor any 
residual exposure (Health and Safety Executive 2009). As stated previously, 
there is no evidence in any of the 4 study wards that used non-sterile gloves 
that they know why they are wearing them. They also do not appear to know 
whether a risk assessment of personal contact with drug during preparation 
has been done, and whether the use of gloves is an effective means of 
negating any such risk. To enable clarification of risk, a full risk assessment of 
possible unintentional drug exposures to those preparing infusates and the 
measures to reduce such exposure should they occur, is necessary. It would 
be better if this risk assessment were done by specialists, as drug 
contamination is not easy to visualise, and at a clinical area the required 
expertise may be absent.   
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9.2.3 Variation in the use of filters 
Incorrect use of in-line filters were seen used in the 4th and 5th wards. Those 
seen used in the 1st ward were not in-line filters and therefore not effective in 
removing contaminants. Use of inappropriate filters has been associated with 
an outbreak of Ralstonia mannitolilytica. This occurred in an oncology ward 
where Mini-spike Plus® filters (0.2 µm) were in use (Grobner et al. 2007). It 
was found that the outbreak micro-organism could pass through this filter. The 
Mini-spike Plus® filter is not an in-line filter, but a filter used with a combined 
dispensing pin to prevent transfer of organisms and particulates from a diluent 
to an infusate.  
 
There are no national pharmaceutical or infection control guidance documents 
that recommend the use of in-line filters to negate the risks of infusate 
contamination. However, from the evidence in the literature, and from the 
observations made in this thesis, there is a good case to be made for their 
use. IR-BSI is caused by contaminated infusates (Vonberg and Gastmeier 
2007). The environments where nurses prepare drugs can be exposed to 
splashes which are a recognised source of environmental Gram negative 
organisms that have caused outbreaks. (Deliere et al. 2000, Grobner et al. 
2007, Kilic et al. 2007, Ceyhan et al. 2008, Cholley et al. 2008, Erbay et al. 
2008). The duration of some infusions provides sufficient time for the 
organisms to multiply to significant numbers causing IR-BSI (Siegman-Igra et 
al. 2005, Peiris et al. 2006). Multi-dose vials remain in use and they are a 
recognised risk of IR-BSI (Vonberg and Gastmeier 2007). IR-BSI is difficult to 
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detect as it can arise some time after an infusion is started or even after it has 
finished (Centers for Disease Control 2006). Finally, in a recent review of the 
all the arguments for filter use, the case for the use of filters was considered 
strong and the authors questioned whether it would be lawyers or practitioners 
who would eventually make the successful case for their use (Ball 2003). 
Therefore, in the absence of data showing that sterile infusates can be 
produced in clinical care settings, there is a need for defence of the catheter 
(and thereby the patient) from micro-organisms which grow well in nutritionally 
poor fluids, and from the endotoxins the micro-organisms produce. 
 
Having described the need for filters to prevent contaminated infusates from 
being administered, the next section will demonstrate that no drugs can be 
considered immune from contamination. 
 
9.2.4 Are some drugs immune from contamination? 
Although some infusates are antibiotics, this does not make them immune 
from contamination. Antibiotics usually act against a particular range of micro-
organisms and other classes of micro-organism are unharmed - and can even 
flourish - in such an infusate  (van Houten et al. 2001, Blot et al. 2002, Safdar 
and Maki 2006). 
 
Some of the heparin supplied to the 3rd study ward is provided as multi-dose 
vials which contain a preservative (manufactured by Leo). A study of in-use 
multi-dose vial contamination showed found 4 of 96 vials were contaminated 
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(Nogler-Semenitz et al. 2007). Three of these contaminated vials contained 
preservatives; therefore preservatives cannot be considered as a guarantee of 
internal content sterility.  Multi-dose vials with a preservative are usually given 
an in-use shelf-life. On the 3rd study ward the shelf life was stated as 14 days. 
Of note, the multi-dose vial contamination study also found that 28% of the 
multi-dose vials that were in-use were not marked with a date of opening, 
highlighting the potential error of use beyond the stated shelf-life (Nogler-
Semenitz et al. 2007). Failure to note a start date was also seen on the 3rd 
study ward’s multi-dose vials. 
 
An outbreak of IR-BSI has also been reported in chemotherapy drugs which 
are noted for their toxicity to humans (Mauri et al. 2009). There were multiple 
errors noted during the investigations, but what perhaps facilitated this 
outbreak was extremely long hang times of up to 48hours (Mauri et al. 2009).  
There are no drugs that can be considered immune to microbial 
contamination, and all drugs can thus cause IR-BSI. What is required is 
equipment, environments, skilful participants and procedures that prevent this 
event from happening. 
 
This section has highlighted the no drugs can be considered immune from 
contamination and that some drugs, such as multi-dose vials, are more at risk 
of contamination that others. Additionally there are visual clues that 
erroneously suggest that drugs should be considered sterile when that is not 
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the case. There are several aspects of the methodological framework which 
are relevant, but key are the following 2 bullet points.  
• Patient safety – it is not safe for patients that the nurses cannot 
determine the sterility of drugs. 
• Human error / human factors – it is easy for the HCW to use a non-
sterile drug without recognising this.    
 
The next section will discuss whether drug preparations for some patients 
require additional precautions.  
 
9.2.5 Does the patients’ immune status explain procedure variations? 
The final explanation which needs to be explored with regard to the variations 
in procedure is whether patients with a poor immune status require a higher 
standard of aseptic technique. Infusate contamination will not discriminate 
between patients. More robust immune systems will not protect against a 
direct infusion of micro-organisms. However, patients with an immature or 
defective immune system may suffer greater ill-health, being less able to 
mount an immune response. What is more important for patients who require 
vascular access for long periods (months), is that the catheter becomes a 
lifeline; IR-BSI can result in immediate sepsis as well as longer term problems 
due to biofilm formation and low level seeding of micro-organisms following a 
flush or administration of a contaminated drug. The immune suppressed 
patients in the bone marrow transplant unit (2nd ward) will have problems 
because of their poor immune responses, and low platelet counts. Low 
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platelet numbers causes poor clotting and, as a consequence, replacing 
infected catheters in these patients could result in severe haemorrhage.  
 
The longer the catheter remains in situ, the greater the risk of potential 
exposure to infusate contamination. Arguments can be made for greater 
‘asepsis’ for these patients. However, as stated throughout this research 
thesis, there can be no acceptable level of contamination; the question is not 
what extra precautions are required for certain types of patients, but what 
level of precautions will provide microbiologically sterile infusates for all 
patients. These arguments on risk and the acceptable level of risk, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and as set out by Fischhoff et al. (1981) are difficult to 
assess in this context as there are no surveillance or IR-BSI data and no 
process data in any of the study wards. All wards should be using sufficient 
asepsis precautions to prevent contamination of both the infusate and the 
patient. This required level of asepsis and environmental controls cannot be 
specified without further research. The risk of infusate contamination and IR-
BSI, as stated throughout this document, increases with the use of multi-dose 
vials, certain drugs and longer term infusates; these can be easily removed or 
defended against by the use of filters. 
 
Having discussed the variations in performed procedures and possible 
explanations for this, the next section will comment on the results from the 
safety culture survey of the nurses’ opinions of safety. 
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9.3 The HCWs’ opinions of safety – the safety culture 
This is the first time the HCWs’ opinions of the safety of a specific procedure 
have been canvassed to produce a measure of the procedure safety culture 
and as such the data must be interpreted with caution. What can be 
concluded, however, is that in each ward with sufficient results, some 
characteristics of safety are prevalent alongside other characteristics that 
denote system vulnerability. For example, staff on all 5 wards said they were 
encouraged to report errors and they would report errors; these are positive 
safety characteristics. However, they also reported that they did not get 
feedback on their procedure, that there were frequent interruptions and 
distractions, that the procedure was stressful, and when it got really busy, they 
did not get support or additional help. These latter factors denote potential 
weakness in the systems’ safety.  It is possibly better therefore, to consider 
these results not as a composite safety culture measure, but like a spider 
graph with the individual components denoting safety and procedure 
vulnerability clearly identified.  
 
The vast majority of nurses in five study wards stated that they would report a 
drug error and that they felt comfortable in reporting personal drug errors. This 
shows a strong commitment to safety. Much work has been ongoing to create 
such an environment where errors are seen as a way to improve safety and 
not to blame individuals. However, what has to be recognised is that drug 
errors related to IR-BSI are extremely difficult to detect. As such, willingness 
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to report in the absence of a detectable error will not be an effective means of 
achieving safety. Additionally, some nurses stated that felt that it was easy to 
prevent and detect asepsis failure when on their particular ward this was not 
the case. Therefore, as an indicator of a system’s risk or vulnerability such 
safety culture measures should be considered as data requiring verification 
from other sources. 
 
Only two nurses on the 6th ward completed the questionnaire despite repeated 
requests to do so. This is the ward with the poorest facilities and the lowest 
level of personal protective equipment. On this ward the procedure is 
performed without the safety checks observed in the other wards. It is 
possible that the staff in the 6th study ward were unwilling to state what they 
did and did not do in relation to redundancy checks or state how they felt 
about the procedure. But the comment made on one of the two returned forms 
‘we have nothing here’ seems a fair reflection. 
 
The methodological framework described a measure of the safety culture as 
being critical to the overall safety of the procedure. More research on the 
utility and validity of such measurements is clearly needed. However, there 
was very useful data gained from the respondents in this study, in that nurses 
demonstrated erroneous assumptions of safety and highlighted that this is not 
a much loved nursing procedure.  
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It is clear from the data collected in the Location Assessments - the 
observations of procedures, the opinions of safety and review of all existing 
information available - that the procedure is variably performed, lacking 
standardisation and quality control. Moreover, there appears to be a complete 
lack of risk assessment pertaining to the procedure, from both the nurse 
preparing the infusion, and the patient receiving the infusion. Additionally, to 
the nurses who prepare drugs, IR-BSI is almost invisible.  Before identifying 
what can be done to reduce IR-BSI locally, there needs to be a full 
understanding of what is making IR-BSI invisible to nurses. 
 
The results of the Location Assessments, observations of practice and 
opinions of safety have identified the system of aseptic drug preparation and 
concluded that there are multiple factors in the environment, the equipment 
and the methods that make the system error-prone. This next section explores 
what is making the system perform as it does. 
 
9.4 What is making IR-BSI invisible to nurses 
There is a chain of external influences which contribute significantly to 
rendering of IR-BSI invisible to those who prepare, administer and manage 
systems. If there is a single primary external influence from which all others 
stem, it is perhaps that historically IR-BSI was considered so rare and of such 
low significance that it has continued to remain under-recognised as an 
important factor in infusion therapy (O'Grady et al. 2002). Other external 
influences flow from this history of under-recognition of the problem which 
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include, a lack of specification in the regulatory framework, IR-BSI prevention 
is not well specified in the national guidance, IR-BSI reports are not easy to 
identify and extract from epidemiological studies in scientific literature, IR-BSI 
is not under surveillance and would be difficult to survey should the need for 
surveillance be recognised and, finally, IR-BSI as a risk is not well explained 
or well recognised by those who prepare intravenous drugs. There is a chasm 
between the US and UK with respect to the requirements and the 
environments for the preparation of intravenous drugs. All of these links in the 
chain provide an understanding as to why the system of aseptic drug 
preparation is, as has been described, error-prone.  
 
The following section will begin with a discussion of the regulatory framework, 
including the differences between the US and UK regulations. This will be 
followed by explanations of why IR-BSI is invisible in the national guidance, 
invisible the literature, currently not under surveillance and invisible in clinical 
practice.  
 
9.4.1 How the regulatory framework contributes to IR-BSI invisibility 
There are strict regulations in the UK that govern the aseptic pharmacies 
which produce intravenous medications under licence in sterile suites. These 
are the same regulations that also govern pharmaceutical companies 
manufacturing any drugs (MHRA 2007). The aseptic pharmacies and 
pharmaceutical companies produce aseptic drugs under licence from the 
MHRA. The MHRA works under various European Directives that have been 
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transposed into UK law. All of the regulations which must be adhered to in 
order to gain and maintain a manufacturer’s licence from the MHRA are 
summarised in the Rules and Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
and Distributors (MHRA 2007).  
 
The MHRA (2007) guidance is extensive, covering all aspects of the process 
from drug preparation to the storage and delivery of the sterile drugs (MHRA 
2007). The guidance includes specification of the environment, including the 
air-quality within the room, the air-quality within the cabinet where the drugs 
are made, the air-locks as staff enter the preparation area, the location of 
sinks in the preparation area itself, specification of the decontamination of the 
cabinet, the standard and use of personal protective equipment to be worn by 
those preparing the drugs, the markings on the product packaging, the quality 
control on the products, the training of staff who produce the products and the 
filtration processes of the final product. None of these EU Directives and 
MHRA rules applies to the intravenous drugs seen prepared on the wards in 
this study. The only guidance available for HCWs preparing intravenous drugs 
in clinical care settings in Scotland, are the ‘Good Practice Statements for the 
preparation of injections in near-patient areas’ where have been produced by 
an expert group under the auspices of the Clinical Research Audit Group 
(CRAG 2002). One statement from CRAG (2002) is that ‘Injections prepared 
in near-patient areas should be administered immediately’ (CRAG, 2002: 18). 
There is an assumption here that by giving the infusion immediately, there will 
be no time for micro-organisms to multiply and infect the catheter or the 
 396 
patient. However, as already explained, drugs may be commenced 
immediately but, if being administered by a pump at 1ml per hour, a 20ml 
syringe will take 20 hours to infuse. This is sufficient time for very small 
numbers of micro-organisms to multiply exponentially and cause IR-BSI over 
the lifetime of the infusion. The outbreak reports related to heparin pumps 
illustrate the lack of safety in the CRAG statement (Siegman-Igra et al. 2005, 
Peiris et al. 2006). This instruction for immediate administration is additionally 
recommended by the NPSA (National Patient Safety Agency 2007). The 
NMC’s A-Z advice sheet for medicines management contains no specification 
for immediate administration (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2006). The 
advice sheet has now been superseded by Standards for Medicines 
Management, Standard 20 of which related to intravenous medication; this 
standard now only refers to the need for two registrants to check the 
medication. For all other aspects of intravenous medication, registrants are 
referred to the RCN’s document on intravenous standards (RCN IV Therapy 
Forum 2003, Nursing and Midwifery Council 2009). Section 8.1 of the RCN 
Standards for IV therapy contains no specific requirement for immediate 
administration and states that any drug added to an infusion bag should be 
discarded after 24hours (RCN IV Therapy Forum 2003).  There is a clear 
failure in all the available national guidance to recognise the risk from 
medicines prepared in a clinical care area that are not completed until 20 
hours post preparation, regardless of whether they are commenced 
immediately. 
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One final omission from the CRAG (2002) guidance is the failure to recognise 
the unique risks posed by drugs such as heparin and propofol, long-term 
infusions and multi-dose vials. Risks associated with these infusions can be 
easily reduced by making HCWs understand the problem, banning multi-dose 
vials and having long-term infusions prepared under truly aseptic conditions. 
The large outbreaks in the US related to contamination of heparin, for 
example, are the result of systematic errors in aseptic preparation on a 
sizeable level due to a lack of quality control and quality in production (Nasser 
et al. 2004, Centers for Disease Control 2005, Centers for Disease Control 
2006, Held et al. 2006, Gershman et al. 2008, Blossom et al. 2009). These 
outbreaks are a direct result of trying to find the cheapest components, 
without ensuring sufficient safety controls.  
 
The good practice statements from CRAG can only be considered the starting 
point of what is required for the safe preparation of drugs in clinical care 
settings. The expert group, in stating that national environmental standards 
need to be devised, acknowledges the deficits within the CRAG guidance 
(CRAG 2002). Additionally, the standard operating procedure included as an 
appendix to the CRAG guidance does not contain the latest evidence base on 
hand hygiene, instead stating that hand washing rather than hand 
decontamination with alcohol should be used. There are several opt outs in 
which the reader is referred elsewhere. For example, when referring to the 
need to use gloves it states ‘in all cases staff should refer to local policies’ 
CRAG (2002: 29). The document does, however, clearly identify the need to 
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decontaminate rubber vial tops, which was not seen done and not clearly 
recommended, in all pharmaceutical information leaflets, despite being 
necessary for asepsis CRAG (2002: 30).   
 
There are several other problems with the CRAG (2002) document, and the 
RCN IV Therapy Forum’s guidance (2003). Firstly, the process by which the 
evidence to support the standards was gathered is not stated (CRAG 2002, 
RCN IV Therapy Forum 2003). For the CRAG document, the distribution list 
for the document is not included, there are no responsibilities allocated to 
specific professionals for any of the standards and, most notably, there is no 
implementation plan or implementation money to accompany it. Therefore, 
there can be little surprise to find that the evidence supporting the statements 
is incomplete, not all risks have been identified, (for example, removing multi-
dose vials, increased risks with long-term infusions and the good practice 
statements have not been implemented in the study wards). The inadequacy 
in the supporting literature is exposed with the statement that ‘…most 
[microbial] contamination does not lead to sepsis’ (CRAG 2002).  Only one 
paper supports this statement and none of the recent papers highlighting 
delayed-onset IR-BSI are recognised. This is an erroneous assumption of 
safety and hints at an acceptable level of contamination, when the latest 
evidence of delayed-onset IR-BSI clearly supports a zero acceptable level of 
contamination. The CRAG (2002) guidance identifies an aspirational 
contamination rate of 0.1%; it does not provide a road-map to achieve this.   
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With regard to the cornucopia of pharmaceutical and infection control 
guidance (discussed in section 3.4) that is available to produce local 
guidance, what can be concluded is that it merely illustrates the complexity 
and risks associated with the procedures, but provides minimal assistance to 
enable those carrying out the procedure to do so safely. The voluminous 
content does not make it easy, or sometimes even possible, for the HCW to 
do the right thing. The UK guidance needs to be evaluated in the context of 
the US guidance, where as stated previously, infusate contamination has 
been described as rare (O'Grady et al. 2002). This is discussed below. 
 
9.4.2 Variation between UK and US regulations 
There is significant variation between aseptic pharmacy (MHRA, 2007) 
regulations in the UK and the regulations for compounding pharmacies in the 
United States of America. The key difference is that in the United Sates the 
regulations apply to all practice settings where intravascular drugs are 
compounded (Kastango and Bradshaw 2004). These US regulations apply not 
only to pharmacists but to whoever compounds drugs, which would include 
nurses in clinical care settings and all the drugs observed being prepared in 
this study. The US regulations became law in 2004 and are known as United 
Sates Pharmacopeia (USP) National Formulary, chapter 797.  The purpose of 
chapter 797 is:  
 
‘To prevent harm and fatality to patients that could result from 
microbial contamination (non sterility), excessive bacterial 
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endotoxins, large content errors in strength of correct 
ingredients and incorrect ingredients in compounding sterile 
preparations (CSPs).’ (Kastango and Bradshaw 2004). 
The responsibilities of those compounding drugs are stated and include 
maintaining appropriate cleanliness as well as providing labelling and 
supplementary instructions for the proper clinical administrations of CSPs 
(Kastango and Bradshaw 2004). Chapter 797 classifies all drugs into one of 
three levels of risk. The drugs observed being made in clinical care settings in 
this study would fall into chapter 797 category of low-risk.  If preparing low-risk 
level drugs in the US the following requirements must, by law, be met:  
o The preparations must be compounded from sterile commercial drugs 
using sterile commercial devices 
o Compounding must take place in a class 5 environment at all times 
o Compounding procedures involve only a few closed-system, basic 
simple aseptic transfers and manipulations 
o Routine disinfection and air-quality testing is used to maintain a class-5 
clean room 
o Adequate personnel garb for sterile preparation 
o Correct identification and quantification of components reviewed before 
and after compounding 
o Final visual inspection for each CSP 
o Annual media-fill test procedure for each person who compounds, 
performed to validate proper aseptic technique. 
(Kastango and Bradshaw 2004) 
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The training for personnel who compound sterile preparations under chapter 
797 is not specified in terms of the number of hours that should be included in 
the education programmes, but on one key outcome measure is specified, in 
that the programme should include, as well as a written examination, a 
practice evaluation of aseptic technique using growth media. This ensures 
that those compounding drugs, and the procedures they use, are capable of 
producing a sterile product. 
 
All finished CSPs must be checked by a pharmacist before they are 
dispensed to ensure that the preparation is sterile and accurate. Methods to 
do this include: physical visual inspection and verification of compounding 
accuracy by a second person.  
 
There are, however, two key exceptions to chapter 797. Chapter 797 does not 
apply to what are classified as ‘immediate use’ CSPs. Immediate use CSPs, 
which are exempt from all the chapter 797 regulations, includes all emergency 
drugs such as those used in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, or in the 
emergency room. The is one additional exemption, in what seems to be a 
possible (complete) escape clause, is that, low-risk drugs may be classified as 
‘immediate use’ when only simple aseptic measuring and transfer are needed, 
no more than two entries are made to any container and administration starts 
within one hour of preparation (United States Pharmacopeia 2009). There is 
no limit on finish time. The degree to which this exemption clause is used is 
unknown. Informal discussions with a leading member of the American 
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Practitioners in Infection Control have revealed that it is only in out patient 
settings that there is difficulty in applying chapter 797 regulations in America 
(Personal Communication). Compliance with chapter 797 in hospital ward 
settings is good; that is, wards have access to compounded sterile drugs. 
 
The United Sates Pharmacopeia have set legally enforceable environmental 
controls and standards for drug compounding in clinical care settings far in 
advance of those in Scotland or the rest of the UK. In providing exceptions of 
low-risk drugs commenced within the hour, they have omitted to consider 
drugs which, although commenced within the hour, are not completed for up 
to 20 hours later (for example, heparin or morphine infusions). However, 
although there are some exemptions, it seems that there are standards, 
environmental controls, processes and checks to ensure the sterility of drugs 
prepared in hospitals, regardless of who prepares them. There is a 
conundrum here, in that the United Sates Pharmacopeia considers such 
standards and controls to be necessary when the assessment of the hazard 
from infusates in the Centres for Disease Control Guidance is that IR-BSI is a 
rare event (O'Grady et al. 2002).  The United Sates Pharmacopeia clearly 
regards the risk of microbial and or endotoxin contamination of infusates as 
much more real than do the Centre’s for Disease Control’s Hospital Infection 
Control Practices Advisory Committee, and unlike the UK, have decided 
exactly what should be done about it  (O'Grady et al. 2002, Kastango and 
Bradshaw 2004).   
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It is clear that there is a chasm between the regulations in the US, where 
there is quality control, environmental specification, validated processes and 
general standards, and Scotland, where there are no environmental standards 
and good practice statements which are more of a wish list than a national 
policy, and where the quality of the end product is untested and not validated. 
It has been argued that anything other than compliance with chapter 797 
would not be scientifically, morally or ethically acceptable (Kastango and 
Bradshaw 2004). Explorations into any public health implications of a lack of 
regulatory framework in the UK should be fully evaluated. 
 
National guidance documents, as discussed in this section, are derived from 
evidence in the scientific literature. How the scientific literature is influencing 
the invisibility of IR-BSI will now be discussed.  
 
9.4.3 IR-BSI is hidden within the literature and absent from guidance 
Evidence contained within the scientific literature is extrapolated and forms 
the basis of evidence based guidance, detailing how best to undertake clinical 
practice for patient health and patient safety. What has become clear in 
searching for the literature for this thesis is that there are many different 
aspects to IR-BSI causation and prevention. Currently, and perhaps 
erroneously, IR-BSI is included under the umbrella domain of the prevention 
of central vascular catheter (CVC) sepsis - this is problematic. IR-BSI occurs 
via drugs that are infused through peripheral vascular catheters as well as 
intrathecal catheters. Therefore, looking at the CVC literature alone would be 
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incomplete. Epidural infusates have, alarmingly, been found to have a 
contamination rate of 1.5% (Yuan et al. 2008).  Recently an extensive review 
of the literature and risks associated with peripheral vascular catheters (PVC) 
concluded similarly that PVC-related BSIs is under recognised as a problem in 
clinical practice by those in infection prevention and control (Zingg and Pittet 
2009). PVC-related BSIs can be caused by infusates. 
 
Although this study focused on extrinsic infusate contamination, many lessons 
were learned from the literature on intrinsic contamination, for example, the 
delayed onset IR-BSI of up to 481 days after the last contaminated exposure 
identified by Gershman et al. (2008). Extrinsic contamination causing IR-BSI 
outbreaks often involves contamination resulting from mass-production and 
therefore the outbreaks are larger and occur over wider geographical areas. 
Large outbreaks necessitate more detailed investigations and greater 
understanding of what happens when infusates are contaminated (regardless 
of where that contamination occurs). Once an outbreak is recognised, 
investigators also know the particular organism they are looking for and can 
request microbiologists to report a specific organism should it be isolated from 
blood cultures (Perz et al. 2005, Held et al. 2006, Gershman et al. 2008, 
Souza Dias et al. 2008, Blossom et al. 2009). Consequently, when preparing 
guidance for the prevention of extrinsic contamination causing IR-BSI, the 
pathogenesis of intrinsic contamination causing IR-BSI should also be 
considered. 
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Despite using multiple different searches of different databases (Medline, 
CINHAL, EMBASE and Cochrane) the majority of reports of infusate-related 
outbreak were still only found in the references of other infusate-related 
reports and not in the searched database outputs. There seems to be a lack 
of uniformity in the use of the index of Medical Subject Headings (MESH) 
terms, for example. some papers whose primary purpose was to report an 
outbreak of IR-BSI or discuss factors related to it, omitted in their key words 
the terms ‘infusate’ and ‘contamination’ (Macias et al. 2005, Nogler-Semenitz 
et al. 2007, Mauri et al. 2009).   
 
If producing evidence-based guidance to prevent an infusate contamination, 
then the first step should be to fully understand the disease and its 
epidemiology; where the micro-organisms come from and how the micro-
organisms gain entry to the infusate as well as how infusate contamination 
can be prevented.  
 
From the identification of the literature for this thesis, it appears the only 
complete way to ensure all necessary papers are identified is to use a search 
strategy with the impossibly over sensitive terms of ‘bacteraemia’ or 
‘septicaemia’ or ‘blood stream infection’ and ‘drug’ or ‘infusion’ or ‘infusate’ or 
‘heparin’ or ‘propofol’ or ‘flush’ or ‘outbreak’. (A continuous search of these 
terms has been ongoing during this thesis.) The epic2 guidance, however, 
being a systematic evidence based guideline, listed the search terms used, 
crucially, the omission of the terms ‘infusate’ and ‘microbial contamination’, led 
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the authors to make erroneous conclusions regarding risks from contaminated 
infusates (Pratt et al. 2007). The epic2 team have asked the researcher for 
key words prior to new guidance being produced. It can be concluded thus far 
that IR-BSI is poorly prevented by recommendations in the national guidance, 
and poorly reported and indexed in the scientific literature. To be included in 
national guidance, IR-BSI must be extractable from the literature; to get into 
the literature, IR-BSI must be reported.  
 
In relation to this topic, the literature comprises mainly outbreak reports; the 
next section highlights the properties of IR-BSI which add to the detection 
difficulties and thereby its surveillance and entry into the literature. 
 
9.4.4 IR-BSI is not under surveillance  
Reductions in the rates of Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) illustrates what 
can be achieved if an infection is under surveillance. The early years of this 
millennium were marked by significant outbreaks of CDI (Healthcare 
Commission 2007b). One of the many recommendations of an external report 
on a high-profile outbreak of CDI was that the illness must be treated as a 
disease in its own right. The specific comments relating to this were: 
‘The diagnosis of C. difficile needs to be respected as a 
diagnosis in its own right, with proper continuity of 
management for patients with this illness. When the diagnosis 
is made, the condition needs to be taken seriously, as a 
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potentially life-threatening condition. Investigations should be 
carried out.’  Healthcare Commission (2007b: 112). 
The need for the external outbreak review came about because the public and 
politicians became increasingly concerned about a disease that healthcare 
professionals noted was mounting, but were not controlling effectively. 
Patients with CDI were found to have been treated so poorly that they were 
dying when, if they had received aggressive resuscitation and specialist 
interventions, they may have survived. Since the widespread publication of 
these outbreak reports, there has been production of national guidance on the 
prevention and control of CDI and the setting of individual NHS Boards’ CDI 
reduction targets, all of which has resulted in sustained decreases in CDI 
incidence. This reflects the findings of Beck (1996) (discussed in Chapter 4) 
as a move from an industrialised society to a risk society. CDI has one clear 
advantage over IR-BSI - it can be counted. By being counted, the high-profile 
nature of CDI is maintained, CDI can be kept under both local and national 
surveillance and the impact of control measures on the incidence can be 
determined. Benchmarking NHS board against NHS board can motivate 
HCWs to take actions to improve local situations. Executives can be held to 
account if they do not have effective systems to achieve the national targets. 
All of this can, and is, being done because CDI can be counted.  
 
IR-BSI cannot be counted. It is not caused by one organism, but by a myriad 
of micro-organisms that do not even form a recognised microbiological group 
(Table 1). It can be easily missed as a clinical diagnosis, as there is no 
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available information on the clinical picture it presents. Delayed-onset 
presentations mean that unless there is a recognised outbreak and tracking of 
a specific organism, cause and effect are often not established.  
 
As IR-BSI cannot be counted, it is difficult to see how success from any 
interventions or system changes could be measured. System changes will 
also require significant investment. It should be noted that equipment that 
would reduce the risk of this IR-BSI had been, or is about to be removed, from 
two of the study wards because it was deemed unnecessary and of no cost-
benefit (6th ward had reconstitution devices removed, 4th ward to stop using 
filters). Doubtless, as there is no guidance available to the contrary, the 
managers thought their actions were a boon to prevent waste in the NHS.   
 
Having identified that IR-BSI is difficult to identify and survey, to get reported 
in the literature and to extract from the literature for use in national guidance, 
the next step is to identify what in clinical practice is making IR-BSI invisible.  
 
9.4.5 What is making IR-BSI invisible in clinical practice  
There are subtle warnings that IR-BSI could arise as a consequence of 
intravenous drug preparation; for example, in the six study wards’ available 
policies there is a requirement to ‘follow aseptic technique’ and on the study 
wards’ drug addition labels, it reads ‘DISCONTINUE IF CLOUDINESS OR 
PRECIPITATE DEVELOPS’. These warnings, as they exist, are inadequate. 
As already stated, 106 micro-organisms per ml of solution will not appear 
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cloudy (Gilat et al. 1958, Felts et al. 1972, Maki and Martin 1975, Macias et al. 
2005). It should be noted that it would be difficult to detect opacity in syringe 
contents with a large yellow label on the syringe set against the background of 
the pump holder. Additionally there is no acknowledgement of the existence of 
infusate contamination in the listed drug errors in the six study wards’ 
documentation. There are also no clinical descriptions of what symptoms to 
be observant for and what should be done if these symptoms are present; that 
is, stop the infusion, seek medical help, sample both the infusate and the 
patient’s blood and start a new infusion through a new catheter. 
 
Reports of IR-BSI in the scientific literature are published in specialist infection 
prevention and control journals, thus de-emphasising the problem to clinicians 
and reducing further its likely recognition in clinical settings. There are 
significant reports of IR-BSI, but they are scatted uncoordinatedly throughout 
the literature and are incapable of mounting the sustained presence 
necessary for full notification and action.  Consequently, as there is no clear 
effective guidance available promoting IR-BSI as a possible clinical outcome, 
IR-BSI is invisible in clinical practice.  
 
It has been noted that if problems are invisible to HCWs they are considered 
trivial (Berwick 2003); this may explain the lack of focus on this topic to date. 
Vincent (2006: 154) argues that the hardest problems to solve are the ones 
that are not recognised as problems. The difficulties in recognising a 
potentially contaminated infusate as a cause of a BSI has significant 
 410 
implications for practice.  HCWs in the study wards, and in general, are 
currently not directed to consider infusate contamination in patients with 
significant pyrexia and thereby may not move to stop a contaminated infusion, 
leaving the patient to suffer the life-threatening implications of a BSI without 
removing the cause – the contaminated infusate. This situation is similar to 
that of another life-threatening nosocomial disease which was initially 
frequently under diagnosed – Legionnaires’ disease. 
  
In 6 hospitals where Legionnaires’ disease had never been reported, 
researchers asked the hospital executives if they would be willing to allow 
microbiological sampling of their hospitals’ water supplies. The researchers 
found Legionella spp in the water supplies of 5 out of the 6 hospitals. In 3 
hospitals with positive water supplies that allowed the study to continue, cases 
of Legionnaires’ disease were found when appropriate samples were taken 
from patients (Goetz et al. 1998). These findings emphasise the fact that there 
needs to be a belief or recognition of the possibility that a disease may occur 
before it is likely that the disease is diagnosed. Legionnaires’ disease 
outbreak investigations have shown that, although not detected, cases were 
present before the outbreaks began (Goetz et al. 1998).  
 
As a first step to the prevention of IR-BSI, there must be: recognition that IR-
BSI is a disease, recognition that IR-BSI could happen anywhere that drugs 
are prepared, recognition of what causes IR-BSI and recognition of how to 
diagnose and treat IR-BSI. This is supported by the reports of heparin 
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infusions being unexpectedly associated with BSIs, and the look-back 
exercises that identified more, previously missed incidents (Siegman-Igra et 
al. 2005, Peiris et al. 2006).  The clinical significance of IR-BSI needs to be 
brought to the attention of all HCWs who prepare infusates and those who 
care for patients receiving infusates. Awareness should be raised of the 
clinical signs and symptoms which should trigger an assessment as to 
whether a contaminated infusate could be the source of the patient’s 
symptoms. Education is required to ensure HCWs are aware of the immediate 
action necessary for patient safety. Plotting IR-BSI outbreak reports from the 
literature by year of publication as shown in the graph below, highlights the 
possibility that perhaps IR-BSI is becoming more visible. The extent to which 
this is due to reporting bias is, as yet, unknown. 
 
Figure 69 Publications of IR-BSI outbreaks by year 1990-2009 
Publications of infusate contamination by year of publication  N = 109
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9.4.6 The current training  
This thesis did not set out to evaluate the training programme. However, 
another of the external influences that prevent optimal practice of intravenous 
drug preparation within the study wards is the national guidance on the correct 
preparation of intravenous drugs (RCN IV Therapy Forum 2003, Nursing and 
Midwifery Council 2006, National Patient Safety Agency 2007, Nursing and 
Midwifery Council 2009)  which impacts on the NHS board’s education 
programme. The mandatory training and its content, a single day or two days 
for ITU staff, together with mentored practice, at present reflects the perceived 
level of risk of IR-BSI; that is, the risk is low. The instructions and training at 
present focus on drug calculations to prevent wrong drugs, or drugs being 
given to the wrong patient. Only one page of the NHS board’s 43 page 
training document is dedicated to aseptic technique and preventing infection  
(NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde 2009). This prevention of infection includes 
generic principles only. For example, it states that ‘infection is serious and can 
be prevented by, hand washing, cleaning of ports, changing of administration 
sets, minimising the number of manipulations to prepare a medicine and use 
of closed system (reconstitution devices)’ (NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde 
2009). Given that there is a clear recommendation in this package to use 
reconstitution devices it is difficult to understand why they could have been 
removed from the 6th study ward. 
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What is also difficult to understand, however, is how a single standardised 
education programme could result in the very different procedures as seen in 
the six study wards; for example, the variety of personal protective equipment, 
aprons and gloves used, variation in performance of redundancy checks and 
the variation of equipment utilised within the wards, are all worthy of note. The 
training as it exists at present is clearly focused on principles and lacking in 
specifics. The board’s training document gives no indication as to how 
infection develops in a patient and what to do should the patient present with 
symptoms of infection that may be related to an infusate (NHS Greater 
Glasgow and Clyde 2009). Those writing the document have built in failures at 
the knowledge-based level, specifically, ‘selectivity’ not including all the things 
that can go wrong and the ‘availability heuristic’, ignoring that which is not 
visible (Reason 1990: 88).  
 
The local training document and the training and the mentorship that follows, 
is insufficient to prevent IR-BSI. Increased training and competency 
assessment, involving microbiological testing of infusates, will not be required 
unless and until IR-BSI is recognised for what it is; a real and present danger 
to patients, which needs to be prevented by adequate training and validation 
of procedures’ efficacy. 
 
Having identified that there is poor national guidance, difficulties in extracting 
data from the literature, difficulties in determining the size of the problem 
through surveillance and reporting, difficulties in recognising the problem in 
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clinical practice and also a lack of specifics in infection prevention training, 
accountability for IR-BSI should it occur will now be examined.  
  
 
9.5 Who would be held to account should a patient suffer an 
IR-BSI? 
If a patient were to develop an IR-BSI or worse, there was an outbreak of IR-
BSI, the question of who would be held to account needs to be examined. IR-
BSI outbreaks are different to other healthcare related outbreaks in that, 
although many outbreaks result from a failure to wash hands, precisely by 
whom, at which point and for which procedure hands were not washed can 
never usually be identified. However, finding which infusate was implicated 
and who prepared it is much easier for IR-BSI – the person who prepared it 
will have recorded a signature to that effect.  Internationally, criminal 
investigations have been commenced following outbreaks of IR-BSI (Macias 
et al. 2005). In a short paper, the question was asked: Is it safe for nurses to 
prepare intravenous drugs? to start debate on this issue, considering the 
implications for nurses from a UK perspective (Curran et al. 1999). This 
question still needs to be fully debated and answered: would it be the nurse 
who has performed the unsafe act, or would corporate responsibility fall to 
those who wrote inadequate procedures that could not guarantee sterile 
infusions? Would it be managers who did not provide, or removed safety 
devices, or would it be those who wrote national guidance which from an 
aseptic perspective are insufficient to prevent IR-BSI? It could be all of those 
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described above. Any individual nurse would probably have difficulty in 
proving that the IR-BSI arose not because he or she that did not follow the 
aseptic procedure, but because the procedure itself was insufficient to prevent 
infusate contamination.  
 
9.6 What are the challenges to preventing IR-BSI? 
The final objective of this thesis was to detail the challenges that HCWs face 
in the aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs. It can be concluded that these 
challenges are that they work in sub-optimal environments, have poor local 
procedure guidance and have poor product guidance from manufacturers, 
there are time constraints, equipment constraints and their human resources 
are finite. If it becomes busy, then they too have to get busy without additional 
support. It is not the complexity of any given procedure that seems to be the 
problem, but the factors that work in combination. The guidance that is 
available is, at times, undoable; for example, to prepare drugs in a quiet area 
free of distraction. Such areas do not always exist in the NHS in Scotland. 
Crucially, if an infusate is contaminated, then the nurses will not be able to 
detect this, and if it causes patient harm - an IR-BSI - nurses may not have 
the skills or guidance to enable them to recognise it. From these results it can 
be concluded that the procedure of aseptic drug preparation of intravenous 
drugs is more error-prone than reliable.  
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9.7 What can be done locally to reduce the risks of IR-BSI? 
For each ward a process map has been provided optimising the procedure 
within the current available resources (Figures 14, 24, 33, 45, 53 62). Each 
ward manager was provided with the assessments of their ward and it was 
suggested that these assessments be shared with the local infection control 
team. If re-ordering the steps of the procedure to reduce potential 
contamination will reduce risk from asepsis failure, the second easy step to 
reducing risk for the patients is to alert all nurses as to the possibility of IR-
BSI, the best early detection measures and appropriate early actions. These 
are clear infection control improvements, but they are not validated and a 
process of validation is needed. 
 
Those who prepare and administer intravenous drugs should be made aware 
of IR-BSI and how the condition presents. Most importantly they should know 
the actions required if a patient becomes pyrexial whilst receiving intravenous 
drugs, that is, immediate reporting to medical staff, consideration of stopping 
and replacing the infusion, sending the infusate off for culture along with blood 
cultures from the patient and continuous monitoring of symptoms. Infusate 
contamination and IR-BSI should be added to the list of drug errors in all 
clinical areas.   
 
The definition of high-risk drugs prepared in near patient areas should be 
extended to include long-term infusions and lipid infusions. If these drugs 
could arrive on the ward in a ready to administer form safety would be 
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significantly enhanced. Additionally, the removal of all multi-dose vials would 
also considerably enhance patient safety. 
 
It has been suggested that certain organisms, such as Burkholderia cepacia, 
isolated in patients who receive intravenous therapy and do not have any 
additional risk factors, should indicate the possibility of contaminated 
intravenous products (Held et al. 2006).  The results from the six study wards 
concur with this assertion; that is, monitoring for possible IR-BSI through 
investigation of positive blood cultures could provide a trigger for a more in-
depth investigation of systems. Exactly how infection control teams should 
investigate IR-BSI needs to be determined; the notion that infusate 
contamination may be an intermittent problem must be considered when 
investigations are deemed necessary; ergo, a single infusate which is shown 
not to be contaminated is not a guarantee of batch-free contamination (Austin 
and Elia 2009, Blossom et al. 2009).  
 
9.7.1 Building human factors in to the procedure 
Included within the methodological framework of this study are human factors. 
This is crucial because the study procedure is designed by humans and 
heavily reliant on humans – and as a consequence vulnerable. As stated 
previously, human factors study is about making it easy for the HCW to do the 
right thing. There are many steps already discussed which could be taken to 
make it easier for the HCWs to perform aseptic preparation of intravenous 
drugs. The main human factors that would help the HCWs are firstly, a written 
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procedure that is simple to follow and combines all of the aseptic, non-aseptic 
and mandatory checks. Use of checklists and posters which pictorially 
illustrate the steps and use colour codes to denote steps that identify the 
steps critical to asepsis would enhance the overall safety of the procedure and 
also allow discussions of change to take place when, for example, 
consideration is given to using a new piece of equipment. Like the drug safety 
information, this should be available where the drugs are prepared. It would 
also aid teaching and thus potentially increase reliability by being easy to 
remember and refer to. Secondly, the environment and workflow require 
expert assessment. These assessors should have the power to designate 
areas as unfit for the preparation of intravenous drugs if deemed necessary. 
The environmental assessments need to be performed at a time when drugs 
are being prepared and when the wards are at their busiest. 
 
The third change to facilitate aseptic preparation of infusates would be to 
review all available sundries and use equipment throughout that reduces the 
number of steps as equipment to reduce the opportunity for microbial entry to 
a system. To do this there needs to be a multi-disciplinary team approach 
including clinical experts, practice development, infection control, 
management, procurement and pharmacy staff. It is impossible for the ward 
staff to have optimal safe systems without this level of support. 
 
A more radical approach would be to start again and consider whether drugs 
should be made up in clinical areas at all. Examination is required as to 
 419 
whether a separate area off the ward, with delivery of drugs to the ward in 
ready-to-administer form would be safer for both patients and staff. Perhaps 
‘who prepares drugs’ is also a question which needs to be asked again. 
Nurses inherited this role but, from a patient safety perspective, it may be 
better done by HCWs whose only task is to prepare intravenous medications 
rather than the continuously multi-tasking nurses.  
 
What is not currently achievable locally is the recommendation by the Audit 
Commission that aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs at ward level 
should cease (Audit Commission 2001). However what is not acceptable, is a 
ward-prepared infusate contamination rate of 5% (CI 0.8-13.1); this was 
identified in a recent systematic review of the infusate contamination involving 
19 published studies (Austin and Elia 2009). None of the wards in this study 
participated in any end product testing. Clearly, some level of validation of end 
product is required to guarantee patient safety. 
 
9.8 How to make IR-BSI visible at a national level?  
The recommendations to reduce locally the risk of IR-BSI are also relevant 
nationally. To transform IR-BSI into a disease that is visible within the 
literature requires the scientific community to agree a uniformity of reporting 
MESH terms for IR-BSI. Healthcare related outbreak reports differ from other 
reports in the scientific literature in that they do not always produce new 
science, but what they do is highlight that healthcare remains unsafe, and 
more requires to be done to prevent the problem as it has arisen. IR-BSI 
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needs better recognition firstly, within the infection control community and 
secondly, in the guidance produced to prevent vascular access device related 
infections (peripheral and central) a sub-set of which are IR-BSI. The frontline 
healthcare community looks to scientists in infection prevention and control for 
evidence-based guidance on the prevention of infection. This is the 
opportunity that must be grasped to explain and highlight IR-BSI. National 
agencies such as Health Protection Scotland, who receive data from all 
laboratories in Scotland, should look at available blood culture data to 
determine if evidence is already available to enable detection of at least some 
organisms that cause IR-BSI.  
 
 Guidance on environmental standards with minimum specifications must be 
set and an understanding of why there are such variances in international 
guidance developed. 
 
This invisible disease cannot be prevented until it is made visible. Although no 
single organism indicates an IR-BSI, infection control teams should, in 
particular, consider which environmental Gram-negative organisms isolated 
from blood should trigger an ‘alert organism’ response; that is, an infection 
control nurse investigating to determine whether the primary source of the BSI 
was an infusate. Finally, research is required to better understand the nature 
of IR-BSI and how to prevent it. 
 
 421 
9.9 Review of the methods, methodological framework and 
the results  
The methodological framework set out in Chapter 6 of this thesis has proven 
invaluable. The results have shown that ,from a patient safety perspective, the 
preparation of intravenous drugs in clinical care settings is inherently 
dangerous. From a human error and human factors perspective this system 
designed by humans is fallible. The unsafe acts that can cause infusate 
contamination in the preparation of intravenous drugs are provoked by the 
current conditions of work, specifically the environments, staffing, invisibility of 
IR-BSI as a significant problem, training, equipment and the methods used.  
 
The HCWs’ opinions of safety provided useful data showing indicators of 
safety and indicators of vulnerability within the system which have been. It is 
difficult to see the utility of this data as a composite safety measure or safety 
culture score. Making interpretation of the data more difficult is the finding that 
the opinions of safety of those who perform the procedure do not always 
equate to the evaluation of the safety of the procedure by the researcher. 
More research is required here to understand how such surveys can add to 
the understandings of safety related to an individual procedure. 
 
Patient safety and human error characteristics that make the system more 
error-prone included procedure complexity, procedure variation, lack of 
feedback, time constraints and erroneous assumptions of safety.  
Characteristics that make the system reliable have also been identified; these 
 422 
included the commitment of staff to performing a safe procedure and the 
reason for volunteering for the study – to improve their local systems.  
 
Having measured and understood the procedures, and considered the human 
factors of how it can be made easier for the nurses to do the right thing, 
improvements can be identified in all six study wards. The nurses were 
pleased with the simplification of the colour-coded presentations and how they 
can be used to enhance safety. Measures of output are more difficult to 
identify as there is currently no validation of the end product. 
   
With regard to the methods used, it is clear that no single data stream, for 
example, observations of practice, survey of opinions of safety or Location 
Assessments would have given so complete a picture of the system.  
Additionally, the system needs to be assessed at the level of the individual 
working, that is, ward-by-ward and not at a higher level. Individual wards 
varied and are likely to continue to vary significantly in their resources, their 
environments and their procedures. 
 
The Location Assessment tool developed from the Vincent et al. (2004) profile 
has been shown to have utility and could provide the skeleton framework for 
the study of any dynamic system.  
 
Measuring the opinions of safety related to a single complex procedure may 
prove useful for other types or procedure undertaken by specific healthcare 
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worker groups. There are lessons to be learned for the NHS Board in the 
results from the opinions and redundancy checks data. These issues pertain 
to what level of redundancy checks they would be happy to achieve for their 
patients, and whether what they think needs doing is what is actually done or 
understood by those performing the procedure. 
 
On completion of the thesis minor amendments could be made on 
improvement of all of the data collection forms, but these are minor, on the 
whole they proved extremely valuable and could be used by others to 
examine systems. 
 
9.10 Assessment of the initial arguments 
This evaluation of the system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs in 
clinical care settings confirms the arguments put forward at the beginning of 
the study, but expands on their importance, namely: 
• There is and will continue to be a hazard to patients from the status 
quo. 
• It is even more difficult than initially considered to recognise infusate 
contamination as a cause of BSI.  
• The opportunities for asepsis failure are numerous and the prevention 
strategies are limited.  
• Current national guidance and local guidance is extensive yet 
insufficiently focused on asepsis failure, with no requirement for 
ongoing quality control.  
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• The system of aseptic preparation is extremely complex and that 
complexity is increasing. 
• The financial climate means that safety equipment is being withdrawn 
from service with unrecognised potential consequences. 
All six study wards use the same error reporting system which is biased 
towards the frontline worker being at fault. It is the frontline worker who will 
have prepared the drug erroneously or missed out steps. But, as highlighted 
by the nurses from time to time, they have to increase capacity of workload 
without an increase in capacity of workers, thus increasing the likelihood of 
accidents; this is without recognition that the system is at increased risk.  The 
role of understaffing being associated with CVC-related BSI has been 
reported (Fridkin et al. 1996). Reason (2005) identified the term ‘vulnerable 
system syndrome’ this is indicated by three perpetuating elements: the 
blaming of frontline workers when things go wrong, denying the existence of 
systemic error-provoking weaknesses and the blinkered pursuit of financial 
indicators. Aseptic drug preparation in Scotland fits into this definition 
because: 
• When errors occur it is the last act (active failure) by the nurse that is 
considered the error. This was evidenced in this thesis by, for 
example, the error reporting systems used throughout and by the 
disclaimer on information provided by pharmacists in the 6th study 
ward. 
• There are systemic error-provoking weaknesses, for example, there 
are poor environments, insufficient staff when patient-dependency 
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increases, multi-tasking, and resulting lack of ability to comply with 
available guidance.  
• The pursuit of low costs by the removal of safety devices due to 
potential cost savings at the expense of patient safety. This was 
evidenced in the 4th and 6th study wards. 
In defence of managers, the professional bodies have not produced clear 
guidance to counter the last two of these points. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis is that, as long as the perception of IR-BSIs is 
that it is a rare problem and while specific guidance and equipment to prevent 
it are absent, infusate contamination and IR-BSI will remain under-diagnosed, 
under-investigated and under-reported. 
 
9.11 Limitations of this thesis 
This thesis set out to identify the system of aseptic preparation of intravenous 
drug preparation in Scotland, with the objectives of identifying the systems’ 
reliability and error-prone characteristics. To undertake this task, a variety of 
data sources have been used including assessments of the locations where 
drugs are prepared, observations of drugs being prepared and collection of 
the opinions of nurses who performed the procedure. As a consequence of 
the results of this research in one large NHS board, the system of aseptic 
drug preparation in clinical care settings is described as more error-prone than 
reliable. It could be assumed that if more data were to be gathered from other 
NHS boards, different conclusions could be made. However, the NHS board 
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where the research was undertaken comprises a third of all healthcare in 
Scotland. Because the national guidance has been reviewed alongside the 
system evaluation, it is reasonable to assume that other NHS boards could be 
advocating similar methods and providing similar environments. The findings 
of this study are that environments where drugs are prepared can pose a risk 
of contamination, some of the equipment used increases the risk, and the 
ward staff are not familiar with what is and what is not sterile at the start of the 
procedure; therefore, the likelihood that some proportion of drugs are 
contaminated and that IR-BSI occurs seems logical. The problem might be 
rare, but even a 0.5% contamination rate – which is optimistic – would mean 
approximately 150,000 contaminated drugs are infused each year. The 
proportion that would go on to cause IR-BSI is unknown. 
 
The procedures were observed from the initial step of gathering the 
equipment until the nurse went to administer the infusate. It is clear, however, 
that the administration of the infusate is another part of the procedure where 
asepsis can be interrupted by, for example, identification of the patient 
(particularly if the patient is unable to assist the nurse).  
 
This research did not include the identification of the response of infection 
control teams to the isolation of an organism, for example, from environmental 
Gram negative organisms, the type noted in the literature for causing IR-BSI.  
In effect, this could have been seen as part of the system of preparation of 
intravenous drugs.  
 427 
 
The arguments that lead to the assessment of the thesis procedure being 
considered a hazard to patients rely in the main on published outbreak and 
case reports, and as such this could be considered a limitation. This is 
because for ethical considerations, there can be few randomised control trials 
performed in the in the field of infection prevention and control. However, even 
when available, evidence from randomised control trials seldom provides a 
complete picture. For example, Safdar and Maki (2006) undertook a 
systematic review of the randomised control trials to determine the efficacy of 
vancomycin-containing lock solutions. This review had three fundamental 
errors, namely, infusate contamination was not listed as a cause of CVC-
related BSI, ‘infusate’ was not one of the search terms used, and lastly, 
because their search was limited to randomised control trials and incomplete 
search terms were used, they excluded a report of an outbreak with the very 
solution they were looking to evaluate the efficacy (Held et al. 2006).     
 
Lastly, it could be considered that the Location Assessment data, 
observations of drug preparations and survey of opinions are insufficient in 
number from which to draw wider conclusions. However, because of the lack 
of national environmental guidelines, it seems reasonable to assume similar 
systems to those examined are prevalent elsewhere in NHS Scotland. 
 
This study was designed to describe a system and did not use microbiology 
methods although opportunities for such investigations presented themselves.  
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For example, the sampling of infusates produced with and without using 
reconstitution devices and or dispensing pins would have yielded useful data. 
However, the system being described was not known before the study began 
and therefore this line of investigation was not possible as ethical permission 
had not been sought in advance, and funding for microbiology had not been 
secured. Additionally, such investigations would require a much larger study 
powered to produce rates of contamination with small confidence intervals. 
Such work could be undertaken in the future to enhance the knowledge base 
around this topic. 
 
Information on the significant variation of equipment used in the different 
clinical areas arose during the study. Several assertions were made regarding 
the utility of the different types of equipment and potential risks / benefits 
including time, cost, safety and reliability. The need for a full cost-benefit 
evaluation of the different equipment was not considered before the study 
began and ethical permission was not requested for this. Therefore, as no 
cost-benefit analysis was done this limits the overall evaluation of the 
equipment information provided. This work should be done in the future.  
 
9.12 The strengths of this thesis  
The strengths of this research lie in the methodological framework, which 
enables a complete systems approach to be applied to the thesis procedure. 
The methodological framework included elements of patient safety, human 
error and human factors study, as well as the safety culture. Most importantly 
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however, the complete systems approach includes the people, the 
environment, the methods and the available and (unavailable) equipment.  By 
focusing the study on the areas where intravenous drugs are prepared in 
high-quantities and which the evidence from the literature has identified as 
posing a risk of outbreak, the likelihood of recognising system elements which 
could provoke weaknesses has been increased.  
 
As a nurse who has professionally prepared intravenous infusions and 
investigated IR-BSI, the researcher was able to bring a unique insider 
perspective to devising of the data collection tools and to the analysis of the 
data.  
 
This approach could be repeated in different settings or modified for different 
procedures. Those who volunteered to take part in the study did so because 
they hoped the procedure would result in affirmation that their procedures 
were sound or that the outcome would result in improved safety for the 
patients who receive the drugs. The nurse managers all stated they found the 
outputs useful. If required to start again, there is little that the researcher 
would change in the way the research was performed. 
 
 This study has identified perspectives from which to view the procedures in 
order to enable greater safety to be embedded by those preparing 
intravenous drugs.  
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10 Conclusions 
Despite a willingness by nurses and by ward managers to provide safe 
systems, and a readiness report errors in order to improve the safety of 
procedures, it must be concluded that aseptic intravenous drug preparations 
are safety-critical procedures (performed approximately 3,000,000 times a 
year in NHSScotland) at times without optimal environments, without optimal 
equipment, with minimal asepsis guidance and without quality control. As a 
consequence this procedure is error-prone and from a safety perspective is 
unreliable. 
 
10.1 Conclusions related to the regulations and guidance  
As there are no national environmental standards and risks of potential 
environmental contamination were detected in five of the six study wards, it 
seems reasonable to assume that other hospitals will be allowing preparation 
of drugs in similar sub-optimal environments and using similar sub-optimal 
procedures. 
 
Despite extensive documentation, the local guidance available for those 
preparing intravenous drugs to prevent infusate contamination is limited. The 
standards within the guidance available were also in part not achievable and 
failed to take account of the circumstances in which the nurses worked; on the 
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basis of the environments sampled, quiet areas free from distraction and 
interruption do not appear to exist in NHSScotland. 
 
There is a lack of recognition in the national and local guidance of the risks 
posed by specific infusates, for example, long-term infusions,  infusates made 
from multi-dose vials (even if containing preservative) and by certain drugs 
such as heparin and propofol. 
 
There is no extant national guidance which considers IR-BSI as a real and 
present danger to patients. Guidance that is available uses non-specific terms 
such as ‘appropriate’, ‘safe’, and ‘suitable’ which are inadequate for those 
providing the environments or trying to perform the procedures safely. 
 
In both local and national guidance, IR-BSI is not considered a drug error, the 
signs and symptoms to look for are not well known or highlighted to the 
clinical teams who prepare and infuse drugs. 
 
The manufacturers’ drug labels need to be improved to indicate clearly to 
those preparing infusates whether the drug is accessed through a sterile or 
non-sterile port and whether the individual drug poses a significant infection 
risk.  
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Manufacturers’ guidance on the use of antiseptics should clarify how long the 
antiseptic needs to be applied to the device, or to the skin, in order to achieve 
decontamination.  
 
In the UK there is no published standard aseptic procedure or mandatory 
guidance specific for intravenous drug preparation which takes account of the 
risks from the environment, external drug vial surfaces, internal contents of 
drug vials and the necessary interruptions of the procedure caused by the 
need for mandatory checks or application of labels.  
 
There is significant variance in regulation and quality control between UK and 
US guidance with the US mandating wide-ranging environmental and quality 
assurance controls. The rationale for this variance needs to be examined and 
explained. Either the US is over-regulated and over-cautious or in the UK the 
NHS is exposing patients to unnecessary risk. 
 
10.2 Conclusions related to the risks 
As there is no ongoing surveillance of IR-BSI or of infusate contamination 
rates, the degree of infusate contamination and IR-BSI that occurs as a 
consequence of these procedures is unknown. However, the risks identified in 
this research show that the risk of contamination is real, even if the size of the 
risk is yet to be quantified. In future research it would be useful to correlate 
specific environment-related microbiological data with data on infusate 
contamination rates. 
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Without instruction to the contrary, managers can and do remove safety 
devices that protect patients from IR-BSI. 
 
10.3 Conclusions related to the system 
Overall, aseptic preparation in clinical areas can be considered as meeting the 
criteria for a ‘vulnerable system syndrome’ in that the front-line workers are 
blamed for errors, there are unrecognised systemic error-provoking 
weaknesses, and cost is used as a reason to reduce safety precautions. 
 
In relation to Human Error Theory, HCWs could easily perform unsafe acts 
when completing intravenous drug preparation procedures because of latent 
conditions in the organisation and culture and the current conditions of work. 
Additionally from a Human Factors perspective, it is not easy for the HCWs to 
do the right thing or to be sure what is the right thing to do. 
 
The study has identified systematic errors about which the nurses who 
prepare the drugs were unaware in each of the six study wards visited in 
relation to either the environment and or the procedure. 
 
Although, this is, in theory, a single procedure, it has evolved very differently 
on different wards. It varies due to the environment, the equipment available 
for use and the perceived risk to the patient, even though the risk of an IR-BSI 
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is not dependent on the patient’s underlying condition. The variations in 
individual procedures enhance the error-prone nature of the system. 
 
The nurses in this study have made the best of the environmental resources 
available to them and want to known how to make their systems better.  
 
The majority of aseptic procedures performed are interrupted by, for example, 
the need to put a label on the infusate as soon as the drug had been added or 
the need to undertake mandatory checks which involve touching non-sterile 
items. The need to recommence the aseptic procedure is not preceded by 
hand hygiene and therefore there is, as a consequence, the potential to 
contaminate the infusate. By considering the procedure as interrupted, and by 
colour-coding steps as either aseptic or non-aseptic, the nurse can be 
logically guided to perform hand hygiene as required. [This is not required for 
2-person non-interrupted procedures]. 
 
Gloves are routinely used by many nurses who prepare drugs, but there is 
confusion regarding why the gloves are used and what they are achieving. 
Gloves can prevent asepsis as effective hand hygiene cannot be achieved 
with gloved hands. 
 
At present low priority is given to preventing asepsis failures by the use of 
redundancy checks; this is evidenced by asepsis redundancy checks being 
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performed, less frequently than the mandatory checks of right drug, right 
dose, right diluent and right patient. 
 
10.4 Conclusions related to the safety culture 
Measuring the nurses’ opinions of safety gives a more complete systems 
analysis of this procedure. The data gathered in this project can be used 
locally to identify what is needed to enhance safety, for example, feedback on 
performance and increasing knowledge regarding the capability to detect 
asepsis failure.   
 
The nurses’ perceptions of the risk of infusate contamination and of their 
ability to detect it should it occur are at variance with reality; for example, they 
are more likely to believe they can prevent and detect asepsis failure when 
this is not the case. 
 
Aseptic preparation of drugs is not a well-liked procedure and some nurses 
find it stressful. Nurses work where they work not because they like to 
undertake intravenous drug preparation procedures, but in spite of the fact 
they have to prepare them. Why this is so is yet to be determined. 
 
The nurses’ commitment to safety was demonstrated by a stated willingness 
to report errors should they occur. 
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There is no drug that can be considered immune to contamination and thus 
any drug can potentially cause IR-BSI. Necessary equipment, environments 
and procedures that minimise the risk of contamination from occurring are 
required. Training is needed to alert nurses to the risks associated with 
preparing intravenous drugs and how to minimise these risks. Additionally, 
training should include how to look for and recognise IR-BSI and what to do 
should it be suspected.   
 
10.5 Conclusions as to why the system is as it is 
The lack of a reliable error-free procedure performed, with quality control, in 
hospitals in NHSScotland relates directly to a chain of external influences as 
highlighted below: 
• Infusate contamination causing IR-BSI is considered rare, although 
there is evidence in the literature to suggest the problem occurs more 
frequently than is recognised. Additionally, the clinical presentations of 
IR-BSI, which can occur during the infusion, a short time after the 
infusion, or many months after the infusion, leads to difficulties in 
relating IR-BSI back to a contaminated infusate. Reports such as exist 
in the scientific literature are not uniformly indexed, making systematic 
searches difficult to achieve. Therefore, at present, IR-BSI is under-
recognised and under-reported. 
• IR-BSI is also difficult to quantify and to survey because it is not a 
disease caused by a single micro-organism or even a single group of 
micro-organisms.  
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10.6 Conclusions related to the study methods 
If other researchers decide to undertake a systems’ analysis of intravenous 
drug preparation then it should be done, as in this study, at the level of 
individual units, inclusive of all system elements and not at a divisional or 
board level. This study has shown that there are significant variations in 
environments, resources and procedures and thus significant variations in risk 
of contamination.  
 
Examination of any intravenous drug preparation system must also take place 
from the perspective of both the patient and the individual who must prepare 
the infusate. The procedure which the nurse is asked to perform must itself be 
capable of producing a sterile infusate. The nurse must be afforded all the 
required resources to complete the procedure as required, including most 
importantly, sufficient time.  This is imperative because even though systems 
may be at fault, it is individuals who are held to account. 
 
This research has investigated the procedure of intravenous drug preparation 
in clinical care settings principally to determine if the system is patient-safe. At 
present the system is error-prone, some environments are poor and safety 
equipment is not always available. Consequently, from an aseptic perspective, 
this frequently performed procedure cannot be considered safe and reliable. 
The system lacks asepsis quality control. As long as the perception of IR-BSI 
is that it is a rare problem, and specific guidance and surveillance to prevent 
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and detect it are absent, then infusate contamination and IR-BSI will remain 
under-diagnosed, under-investigated and under-reported. However, patients 
requiring drugs prepared in clinical areas will continue to be exposed to 
possible infusate contamination and potentially to IR-BSI. 
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11  Recommendations 
Based on the conclusions from the data in this research project, 
recommendations are offered to improve the system of aseptic preparation of 
intravenous drugs in clinical care settings. These recommendations focus on 
improving systems by reducing risks. These recommendations have been 
divided into local and national categories. 
 
11.1 Local Recommendations 
To render the local system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs more 
reliable and less error-prone, the following recommendations are made:  
o The board should undertake a risk-assessment of all clinical areas 
where drugs are prepared.  
o There is a need for the environmental risk-assessment to involve 
experts in environmental microbiological risks. It must be 
acknowledged that some clinical areas as currently configured may not 
be suitable for intravenous drug preparation procedures. 
o Local procedures should be optimised to ensure that any interruptions 
in aseptic technique are followed by recommencement of the 
procedure by hand hygiene. 
o Each clinical area should have a written procedure of what should be 
done, wherever possible using pictures to illustrate clearly how and in 
what order the steps should be performed. This written procedure 
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should be reviewed and amended each time new equipment is 
purchased. 
o There is need for a risk-assessment of the exposure of nurses to drug 
contamination during this procedure. As a consequence of this 
assessment, the requirement for gloves and other personal protective 
equipment should be reassessed. 
o The risk-assessment should ensure that the procedure is capable of 
achieving a sterile infusate and the nurses have the resources required 
to achieve this. 
o There is a need for better local guidance which can make it easier for 
the nurses to do the right thing. 
o The risk of IR-BSI and how it manifests clinically needs to be brought to 
the attention of all staff. 
o IR-BSI should be a listed adverse event and recognised as a drug 
error. 
o All those who prepare infusates must be made aware what is sterile at 
the start of the procedure and how sterility is best maintained 
throughout.  
o The need to decontaminate vial tops must be made clear in all written 
procedures. 
o Drugs at high-risk of infusate contamination need to be identified on all 
wards; replacements to reduce risk should be purchased where 
possible.  
o Use of multi-dose vials should cease. 
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o Equipment that can reduce the risk of infusate contamination should be 
identified and utilised based on expert advice.  
o Wherever possible reconstitution devices should be used. 
o Infection control teams should add environmental Gram negative 
micro-organisms, isolated from blood, to the list of alert organisms 
requiring specific investigations.  
o Some level of quality control should commence. 
o A review of the education and training needs should be undertaken to 
ensure patient safety through the production of sterile infusates.  
 
11.2 National recommendations 
To make the system of aseptic preparation of intravenous drugs locally more 
reliable and less error-prone nationally, the following recommendations are 
made:  
o Environment specifications, including the minimum standards for safe 
preparation of IR-BSI must be set. 
o The risk of infusate contamination from long-term infusions, lipid drugs, 
multi-dose vials should be reappraised. 
o There should be greater recognition of the problem of IR-BSI in 
national guidance, including methods to be used to identify and to 
report it. 
o The burden put on nurses by this task needs to be understood by those 
who prepare national guidance and those who ask them to perform it.  
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o The procedures and steps advocated in national guidance should be 
tested for their utility and resource requirement before being 
advocated.  
o There should be recognised MESH terms for infusate contamination 
reports. 
o Those producing evidence-based guidance should be alert to the 
difficulties of identifying infusate contamination reports in the literature. 
o There should be recommendations within national guidance of what the 
system must provide to ensure that the organisation and the culture 
and the current conditions of work do not engender error-provoking 
weaknesses. 
o The problem of IR-BSI needs to be better recognised by the infection 
control community. 
o Surveillance of IR-BSI should be tested. 
o Drug information should include the infection risks in readable text. 
o Antiseptic information must be more comprehensive and should include 
application times and recommended modes of application. 
o Drug packaging should clearly identify what is sterile and what is not 
sterile with regard to the drug and the drug container. 
o A validated aseptic procedure to prepare intravenous drugs in clinical 
settings requires to be developed. This procedure must take account of 
all the potential contamination sources.   
These recommendations include the making the problem of IR-BSI more well 
known. To that end a paper has been submitted to the British Journal of 
 443 
Nursing entitled ‘Intravenous drugs prepared in near-patient areas pose 
significant, but insufficiently recognised, infection risks. This paper is included 
as Appendix 12. 
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11.3 Research agenda 
As a consequence of this research project, the following research questions 
should be considered as necessary to the safety of patients in Scotland:  
 
o How can safe intravenous drug preparation procedures be achieved 
and demonstrated in Scotland? 
o Are the environmental standards in the US essential for patient safety? 
o What are the most cost-effective methods of IR-BSI surveillance? 
o Are nurses exposed to drug contamination during preparation and, if 
present, how can this exposure risk be minimised? 
o How useful are safety culture assessments for individual procedures? 
o What are the optimal training and competency requirements for safe 
intravenous drug preparation procedures? 
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12 Glossary  
Term Definition 
Adverse event Unintended outcome caused by medical management 
rather than the disease process and which is sufficiently 
serious to lead to prolongation of hospitalisation, or to 
temporary or permanent impairment, or disability to the 
patient. 
Ampoule A small sealed glass container for drugs used mainly for 
parenteral administration. 
Antibiotic lock An antibiotic that is injected into the catheter but not flushed 
through to reduce the proliferation of biofilm. 
Aseptic non-
touch 
technique  
ANTT™ 
A trademarked procedure for various aseptic techniques 
advocated as a means to achieve standardisation of 
process. 
Aseptic 
technique 
A method of performing a procedure without introducing a 
risk of infection to the patient. 
Biofilm The development on the surface of a vascular access 
device (but any surface in contact with moisture) of micro-
organisms and polymers producing a sticky substance that 
protects and enables micro-organisms to flourish. 
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Term Definition 
Endotoxin  A toxin liberated on the death of micro-organisms, particular 
the Gram-negative bacilli. Endotoxin in the blood stream 
can give rise to a severe life-threatening condition – 
endotoxic shock. The patient experiences fever, blood 
pressure is reduced and coagulation of blood can be 
interrupted. 
Extrinsic 
contamination 
Contamination occurring after manufacture. 
Gram stain in 
relation to 
Gram 
negative and 
Gram positive 
organisms 
All micro-organisms are colourless and difficult to see, even 
under a microscope, without application of stains. Gram’s 
stain differentiates between micro-organisms of a similar 
shape but with different cell wall thickness. Bacteria with 
thin cell walls do not retain the stain (Gram negative) and 
those with thicker cell walls retain the stain (Gram positive). 
The difference in cell wall thickness has implications for 
antibiotic therapy and can aid in the preliminary ‘best guess’ 
identification of the organism. 
Intravenous 
administration 
The giving of a drug directly into the blood stream via a 
vein. 
Intravenous 
infusate 
Any intravenous drug prepared in clinical areas by nurses 
for intravenous administration.   
Infusate The contamination of an infusate with any micro-organism 
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Term Definition 
contamination or endotoxin that could potentially cause a blood stream 
infection or vascular device infection. 
Intrinsic 
contamination 
Contamination occurring at the manufacturers. 
Plasmodium 
falciparum 
The parasite that causes malaria. 
Scrub sink A deep metal washing facility which enables the arm from 
finger tips to elbow to be rinsed. 
Sentinel event Unanticipated death or serious injury related to healthcare. 
Sp and Spp Accepted abbreviations for species  
Sp species singular; Spp species pleural 
Vascular 
catheters 
A cannula which facilitates a temporary direct access to the 
blood stream via a plastic tube.  
Vial  A small rubber sealed glass container containing a drug. 
Violation An intended action which can be caused by an individual 
intending to cause harm or intending to enhance safety. 
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Drug Glossary 
ACE inhibitors Drugs used in the treatment of hypertension 
Aminophylline Drugs used to aid patient breathing (broncho-dilator) 
Analgesia Drugs used to relieve pain 
Antibiotics Drugs used to prevent multiplication of micro-
organisms within the body. 
Propofol Diprivan® An anaesthetic agent prepared in lipid emulsion, 
known for its ability to promote microbial growth. 
Heparin  A drug used to reduce clotting (anticoagulant)  
Inotropes Drugs used to strengthen the heart contraction. 
Protein pump 
inhibitors 
Drugs used to reduce gastric acid and thereby 
heartburn. 
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Appendix 1 Location Assessment Tool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To be completed by the nurse in charge of the clinical area and the researcher
Location  
Ward  
Specialty  
Date  
Regularity framework 
 
What are the rules regarding who can prepare IV drugs on this ward 
 
 How it IV drug administration monitored at an institutional level 
 
 
 
Has a risk assessment been performed on the locations where drugs 
are prepared on this ward? 
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Category Study Profile Response  
Patient factors • What clinical conditions are patients on this ward admitted 
with? 
 
 • Through what type of vascular devices are drugs infused 
in this unit?  
PVC: 
CVC: 
(Tunnelled / not) 
PICC 
 • What types of drugs are infused on this unit? Include flush 
 
 • What is the typical duration of the vascular devices in: 
o short-term <72 hours;  
o medium term > 72 hrs < 1 week 
o long-term >1 week 
o Permcath - months 
PVC: 
CVC: 
(Tunnelled / not) 
PICC 
The Infusion Team • Who can prepare IV drugs in this unit?  
 • Is the team who prepare IV drugs stable or are there often 
new members who can prepare / infuse drugs, e.g. when 
new doctors arrive in February / August? 
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Category Study Profile Response  
 • What education and training is required before a HCW is 
deemed competent to prepare IV drugs 
o initial training,  
o experience,  
o competency assessment  
Initial Training: 
Experience 
Competency Assessment: 
 • What if any post-initial training experience competency 
assessments are required for HCWs to retain their 
competency status for preparing IV drugs? 
Post initial training (required / invitation) 
 
Competency reassessment 
 • Are the team familiar with all the IV preparing procedures 
on the ward? List of drugs can be done by individuals 
 
 
 • What if any preparing limits are imposed? , e.g. no 
intrathecal drugs, no chemotherapy 
 
 
Processes and 
Procedures 
• How often on average are intravenous drugs prepared on 
this ward in a day 
 
 • Are there written procedures? (get copies) include  
 
 
 • Where are the written procedures kept in terms of 
accessibility to the operator whilst preparing? 
 
 • How often are the written procedures referred to?  
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Category Study Profile Response  
 • Are the written procedures 
o Generic 
o Drug Specific 
o Both  
 
 • Do the procedures include problem identification and 
actions - if <this> then <that> action? 
 
 • Are there checklists? 
 
 
 • What aspects of the procedure do the checklists cover? 
 
 
 • Where are the checklists in terms of accessibility to the 
operator? 
 
 
 • How variable are the procedures that are done 
o Same drugs diluents 
o Lots of variations 
 
Team support for 
the operator 
• Is there support for the infusion team 
o Within the team 
o From outside the team 
 pharmacist; 
 general managers 
 
The Preparation 
Environment/ 
equipment 
• Has the area been risk assessed as suitable (get copy)? 
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Category Study Profile Response  
 • What other procedures are done where drugs are 
prepared? 
 
 
 
 • Is the equipment required close at hand? 
 
 
 • Is equipment stored free from possible splash 
contamination? 
 
 
 • Is the equipment adequate – fit for purpose? 
 
 
 • Is it easy to see to read - light? 
 
 
 • Are concurrent procedures permitted during preparing? 
 
 
Evaluation of 
performance 
• What if any performance measures for the procedure are 
available? (formal, informal) 
 
 
 • Is the end product evaluated for sterility? 
 
 
 • What in-ward operator performance monitoring is done  
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Category Study Profile Response  
 • What in-ward clinical team performance monitoring is 
done 
 
 
 • What monitoring of the system outside of the ward is done 
of in ward performance (study procedure) 
 
 
 • What if any self assessment of performance occurs 
formally or informally? 
 
 
 • What if any buddy monitoring occurs formally or 
informally? 
 
 • What is the procedure should an error occur?  
 • How frequently are errors reported?  
 
 
 • Is there any error feedback? 
 
 
Plan of the area where drugs are prepared:
  
 - 498 - 
Appendix 2 Observation of intravenous drug preparation 
Date                          Location                      Ward                Designation 
Criteria Particulars Observations 
Clean / clutter Visible inspection  
What area cleaned   Cleaning environment 
before start What cleaned with  
Hand hygiene 
 
How done ;  How often;  When done  
 
Jewellery Stoned rings; Wrist watches  
PPE 
 
Sterile 
Single-use 
 
Drug 
 
Type 
ID cause of infusate sepsis 
 
Drug purpose Flush 
Therapy / Inv 
 
Diluent  (SU MU) 
 
Designated single-use 
Used singly 
Double dipping with patient needle 
 
Planned duration of 
infusion 
Bolus; < 10hours; >10 hours  
Single or batched 
procedure 
Making more than one drug for more than one 
patient 
 
Container (MDV; SDV 
ampoule) 
  
Aseptic access to drug With what   
Aseptic access to 
diluent 
With what  
Unexpected events Precipitation 
Deviations from procedures 
 
Delays  From preparing to infusion 
Planned / unplanned 
 
Information flow Before the procedure 
During the procedure 
 
Communication 
(opportunities and 
performance* 
Occasion 
Content 
Audience 
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Purpose 
Supervision (non-redundancy checks)  
Technical skills Deviations from procedures 
Practice as per procedure 
 
Asepsis failure 
prevention 
Non touch of critical points (needle; syringe hub)  
 Non touch contaminated sites  
Catheter type CVC; PCV  
Interruptions Examples: 
Phone calls 
Change to other procedures 
Opinion requested 
 
Distractions Examples: 
Noise 
Patient activities 
 
Location traffic 
 
Examples 
People in the space 
Workarounds 
 
In procedure QC / 
feedback/monitoring 
Observations of infusate for precipitation / 
cloudiness / particulates /  
 
Filters (defence)   
Redundancy checks Right drug  
 Right dose  
 Aseptic ampoule access  
 Diluent correct  
 Aseptic diluent access  
 Aseptic procedure total  
 No particulates  
 No precipitation  
 Aseptic catheter hub access  
 HH & use of PPE  
 Right patient   
 Infusion pump settings  
 Infusion rate (no pump)  
Ongoing patient 
monitoring 
4 hourly temp / inf duration 
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Categories of communication error that could occur during aseptic preparing. 
Adapted from (Lingard et al. 2004) 
Type of failure Explanation Example 
Occasion Failure Problem in the situation or 
context of the communication 
Asking if a safety check has been 
done after subsequent actions have 
occurred, for example asking if 
asepsis was maintained after a drug 
has been infused. 
Content Failure Insufficient or inaccuracy in the 
information being transferred. 
Asking for a drug to be given without 
detailing the dose or the route or 
infusion time.  
Audience Failure Gaps in the composition of the 
group engaged in the 
communication. 
Discussions between the doctor and 
nurse on how to prepare a drug that 
had not been prepared before, and 
omitting to include the pharmacist in 
the discussions.  
Purpose Failure Communication events in which 
the purpose is unclear, not 
achieved or incomplete. 
Two nurses discuss that drugs need 
preparing for a specific time. No one 
confirms that they will take 
responsibility for it. 
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Appendix 3(a) Operator opinions on safety;  3(b) Redundancy checks 
Please read each statement and circle the number that most accurately denotes 
the degree to which you agree with the statement. 
 Strongly disagree                                             Strongly agree 
When preparing IV drugs it is easy 
to prevent asepsis failure 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
When preparing IV drugs it is easy 
to detect asepsis failure  
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
The procedures for preparing IV 
drugs on this ward are simple 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
The resources on this ward makes 
it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
The environment on this ward 
makes it easy to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
On this ward distractions and 
interruptions make it difficult to 
prepare IV drugs safely. 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
I get feedback on the quality of my 
IV drug preparation performance 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
I would feel uncomfortable raising 
safety concerns regarding the 
preparing of IV drugs on this ward 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
I can mix drugs on this ward without 
distraction or interruption 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
Asepsis failure when preparing IV 
drugs is a safety priority on this 
ward 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
If I recognised an error in my IV 
drug preparation, I would report it 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
There is good support to those who 
have to prepare IV drugs. 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
To improve patient safety I am 
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encouraged to report errors. 1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
 
I find preparing IV drugs is stressful.  
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
Preparing IV drugs give me job 
satisfaction 
 
1                      2                        3                       4                      5 
 
Some steps in a procedure are more error prone, or more hazardous for patients if they are 
missed/not done correctly.  Double-checking with a colleague is a frequent procedural 
requirement to make sure that such steps are done, and have been done correctly. For 
which steps in the mixing and administering drugs do you perform double checks? 
I perform a double check with a colleague…. 
to check the correct drug is used Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the correct drug dosage  Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the ampoules/drug bungs 
have been accessed aseptically  
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the correct diluent has 
been used, e.g. saline, water, 
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the diluent has been 
accessed aseptically  
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the overall procedure was 
performed aseptically  
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the drug in the syringe / 
Infusion was free of particulates  
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the drug in the syringe / 
Infusion was free of precipitation  
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the catheter hubs were 
aseptically accessed 
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check hand hygiene and the use 
of gloves was appropriate 
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the drug is given to the 
right patient 
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
to check the settings on the infusion 
pump were correct 
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
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to check the infusion was 
administered at the right rate  (no 
pump) 
Always                    Never               Sometimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please comment if you wish on any aspect of drug mixing / administration: 
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Appendix 4    Ethics Permission and R&D Management Approval  
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Appendix 5     Participant Information Leaflet 
 
 
Information about the 
research – preparing 
intravenous drugs in 
clinical care settings 
 
 
 
 
I am a student of Stirling University undertaking a research project for a Nursing 
Doctorate and would like to ask you to take part in the study.  You need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you, before 
you decide whether to take part.  (All information gathered in this study will be treated 
in confidence).  Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to 
your colleagues about the study if you wish.  The leaflet tells you the purpose of the 
study and what will happen if you take part.    Please take time to decide if you wish 
to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The research project is a study to describe the system of preparing intravenous 
drugs in ward areas.  The system includes looking at the environment, the 
equipment, the methods and the people – in short everything involved in preparing 
intravenous drugs at ward level. The overall objective is to assess the reliability in the 
system and find out where errors could occur for the purposes of optimising patient 
safety. 
 
Why have I been invited?  
In order to examine the system, as well as observing the environment, the methods 
and the equipment, I need to observe people preparing drugs for intravenous 
infusions.  Your ward has been chosen because it has a high use of drugs prepared 
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in the ward.  And you have been invited to be observed as you are one of the people 
qualified to prepare drugs for intravenous administration. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide.  I will describe the study and go through this information 
sheet which I will then give you.  You will then be asked to sign a consent form to 
show you have agreed to being observed preparing intravenous drugs.  You can ask 
me to stop observing at any time. 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
With agreement of the ward manager, I will visit the ward for one day shift and find 
out from the nurse in charge that day some basic information about the ward, the 
patients, the intravenous drugs used on the ward, all the equipment available for 
preparing drugs and where they are prepared.  This will be done once and should 
take about 30 minutes. 
 
With consent I will watch – but not interrupt – healthcare workers preparing 
intravenous drugs, from the collection of equipment until the drug is ready for 
administration.  I will be available to watch all drugs prepared in a single shift – for 
which the healthcare workers give permission. 
 
I will ask all healthcare workers who prepare intravenous drugs on the ward to 
complete a questionnaire on their opinions of safety and on where they normally 
perform a double-check in the procedure.  The questionnaire is on 2 sides of A4 
paper and should take about 10 minutes to complete. 
 
I will review all written materials available to healthcare workers who prepare drugs, 
e.g. policies, procedures and checklists. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise the study will help you but the information gathered will help 
advance patient safety when receiving intravenous drugs.  The study will give the 
ward an objective opinion on the safety of intravenous drugs preparation and you the 
opportunity to share your opinions on patient safety on this topic. 
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What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study will be 
addressed. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes.  
 
No identifiable details of any individual will be recorded or communicated in any way. 
Data will be collected at a systems level, e.g. data will be collected on the process of 
preparing intravenous drugs but not the individual who prepared them.  Likewise data 
will be collected on the training provided to healthcare workers who prepare 
intravenous drugs but not on the training provided to an individual. 
 
Data will be collected from 6 different clinical settings including a pilot ward. 
 
All information collected during the course of this study will be held securely and 
discarded after use. 
 
Who is organising this research? 
The research is being undertaken as part of my clinical doctorate study. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been reviewed by: 
My supervisors at the University of Stirling 
The Ethics Committee at NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde 
 
Are there any risks to your participation? 
It can be very nerve-racking knowing that you are being watched doing what you do.  
But this study is about the system and not individuals. 
 
What if bad practice is observed? 
The study is not designed to catch anyone out but to identify the current system. 
There is, however, a duty on all nurses to do all they can to prevent patient harm. If 
bad practice is observed then there is a duty of care to report this. This is no different 
to the duty of care placed on all nurses through the (Nursing and Midwifery Council) 
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NMC Code – Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics for Nurses and 
Midwives. To reassure those who may wish to take part in this study, bad practice 
would not for instance cover a nurse forgetting a step in a procedure, but, for 
example, would cover a deliberate intention to violate procedures and harm a patient. 
 
What happens afterwards? 
I would be happy to come back to the ward when the project is complete to explain 
any findings. 
 
 
 
Further Information: 
More detailed information is available from me at: 
 
Evonne Curran 
Doctorate Student 
Department of Nursing and Midwifery  
University of Stirling 
0141 300 1151 
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Appendix 6     Consent Form 
 
 
 
Preparing intravenous 
drugs in clinical care 
settings 
 
 
 
 
Researcher:  Evonne Curran 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated  
September 2008  Version  1 for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and have had 
these questions answered. 
Yes 
 
 
r
 
No 
 
 
r
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to stop 
the researcher observing at any time without giving any reason. 
 
 
 
r
 
 
 
r
 
 
I agree to being observed while preparing intravenous drugs. 
 
 
r
 
 
r
 
 
_____________________         ________ _________________ 
Name of healthcare worker Date   Signature 
 
_____________________         ________ _________________ 
Name of person taking consent       Date            Signature
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Appendix 7      Responses to Opinions of Safety Statements from the pilot ward 
* numbers differ due to a non-response to a statement 
 Pilot Ward Safety Opinions Summary 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 0 0 6 8 3 17 
2 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 0 3 8 5 1 17 
3 The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 2 2 5 5 3 17 
4 The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 0 1 1 13 2 17 
5 The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 0 2 6 7 2 17 
6 On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
0 3 4 6 4 17 
7 I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 7 4 3 2 1 17 
8 I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding the preparing of 
IV drugs on this ward 
6 5 2 2 2 17 
9 I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 4 8 4 1 0 17 
10 Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this ward 1 2 1 7 4 17 
11 If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 1 0 3 6 7 17 
12 There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs 0 2 3 8 4 17 
13 To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 0 0 1 7 8 16* 
14  I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 3 5 6 2 0 16* 
15 Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 4 3 6 3 1 17 
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Appendix 8      Responses to Opinions of Safety Statements from the Second Ward 
 
 2nd Study Ward Safety Opinions Summary 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 0 0 2 2 3 7 
2 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 1 1 2 2 1 7 
3 The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 0 1 4 2 0 7 
4 The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 0 0 4 2 1 7 
5 The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 0 1 2 4 0 7 
6 On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
0 1 4.5 1.5 0 7 
7 I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 1 4 1 1 0 7 
8 I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding the preparing of 
IV drugs on this ward 
4 3 0 0 0 7 
9 I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 3 0 3 1 0 7 
10 Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this ward 0 1 1 0 5 7 
11 If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 0 0 1 3 3 7 
12 There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs 0 0 3 2 2 7 
13 To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 1 0 0 3 3 7 
14  I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 1 2 1 3 0 7 
15 Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 2 2 1 1 1 7 
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Appendix 9     Responses to Opinions of Safety Statements from the Third Ward 
 3rd Study Ward Safety Opinions Summary 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 1 1 2 10 5 19 
2 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 2 4 4 3 6 19 
3 The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 1 0 3 9 6 19 
4 The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 1 0 3 6 9 19 
5 The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 1 0 5 5 8 19 
6 On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
3 3 7 6 0 19 
7 I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 5 5 2 5 2 19 
8 I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding the preparing of 
IV drugs on this ward 
8 5 2 3 1 19 
9 I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 3 5 6 1 4 19 
10 Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this ward 2 1 4 5 7 19 
11 If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 2 0 4 4 9 19 
12 There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs 1 0 3 8 7 19 
13 To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 0 0 3 5 11 19 
14  I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 5 8 4 1 1 19 
15 Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 0 4 8 4 2 18* 
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Appendix 10     Responses to Opinions of Safety Statements from the Fourth Ward 
 
 4th Study Ward Safety Opinions Summary 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 0 0 1 5 2 8 
2 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 0 2 4 0 2 8 
3 The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 0 0 1 4 3 8 
4 The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 0 0 0 6 2 8 
5 The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 0 2 4 2 0 8 
6 On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare IV drugs 
safely 
0 4 0 2 2 8 
7 I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 6 2 0 0 0 8 
8 I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding the preparing of 
IV drugs on this ward 
4 3 1 0 0 8 
9 I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 4 0 2 2 0 8 
10 Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this ward 0 1 4 2 1 8 
11 If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 0 0 0 2 6 8 
12 There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs 0 0 3 4 1 8 
13 To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 0 0 1 3 4 8 
14  I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 2 1 3 1 1 8 
15 Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 1 2 5 0 0 8 
  
 - 517 - 
Appendix 11      Responses to Opinions of Safety Statements from the 5th study ward 
 5th Study Ward Safety Opinions Summary 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to prevent asepsis failure 0 1 2 11 4 18 
2 When preparing IV drugs it is easy to detect asepsis failure 1 0 4 8 5 18 
3 The procedures for preparing IV drugs on this ward are simple 1 2 7 5 3 18 
4 The resources on this ward make it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 0 1 7 7 2 17* 
5 The environment on this ward makes it easy to prepare IV drugs safely 1 3 8 5 1 18 
6 On this ward distractions and interruptions make it difficult to prepare IV 
drugs safely 
0 3 8 6 1 18 
7 I get feedback on the quality of my IV drug preparation 10 6 2 0 0 18 
8 I would feel uncomfortable raising safety concerns regarding the 
preparing of IV drugs on this ward 
8 6 0 3 1 18 
9 I can mix drugs on this ward without distraction or interruption 4 6 5 3 0 18 
10 Asepsis failure when preparing IV drugs is a safety priority on this ward 0 0 3 8 7 18 
11 If I recognised an error in my IV drug preparation I would report it 0 2 2 1 13 18 
12 There is good support to those who have to prepare IV drugs 1 2 7 5 3 18 
13 To improve patient safety I am encouraged to report errors 0 2 5 5 6 18 
14  I find preparing IV drugs is stressful 2 8 6 1 1 18 
15 Preparing IV drugs gives me job satisfaction 3 3 7 3 2 18 
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Abstract 
The preparation of intravenous drugs is a common, yet inherently dangerous nursing 
procedure. The many potential errors associated with this procedure include wrong 
drug, wrong dose and wrong route of administration. As a consequence of these 
known risks a variety of checks are used to optimise safety. This paper explores the 
literature around another intravenous drug preparation problem, that of infusate 
contamination, which can cause infusate related-blood stream infection (IR-BSI). In 
this paper, the mechanisms of infusate contamination are discussed, details of the 
types of micro-organisms that cause contamination are given and the types of drugs 
that enable proliferation of micro-organisms are explained. Additionally, deficits within 
current guidance are revealed. The paper concludes that IR-BSI is a significant but 
under-recognised risk to patients. As microbial contamination sufficient to cause IR-
BSI is not detectable to the naked eye, those who prepare intravenous drugs must be 
more cognisant of the contamination risks and how to reduce them. 
 
Key words: Infusate contamination; microbial contamination, intravenous drugs 
 
Introduction 
Preparation of intravenous drugs is a common nursing procedure performed most 
frequently in near-patient areas. The procedure can involve simply drawing up a drug 
from a glass ampoule, or more complicatedly, drawing up a drug, drawing up a 
diluent, mixing the drug and diluent, discarding any excess and then aseptically 
administering the infusate to the patient. During the procedure the infusate can be 
exposed to microbial contamination from a variety of sources. Infusate contamination 
can cause infusate related blood-stream infection (IR-BSI) as well as microbial 
  
 - 521 - 
contamination of the catheter with infection manifesting at a later time through the 
development of biofilm (Lindsay and von Holy 2006).  Key to understanding IR-BSI is 
an understanding of how micro-organisms gain access to the infusates.  
 
How micro-organisms gain access to infusates 
Micro-organisms gain access to infusates either intrinsically, during the drugs’ 
manufacture, or extrinsically, during drug preparation in near-patient areas. This 
paper is about the extrinsic contamination risks; however, where the lessons learned 
from intrinsic IR-BSI outbreaks are relevant they will be discussed. Table 1 lists the 
three routes of cross-transmission for extrinsic infusate contamination. 
 
Table 1 Routes of cross-transmission for extrinsic infusate contamination:  
o Healthcare worker (HCW)-to-patient  
o Patient-to-patient via HCW (related to equipment use/misuse) 
o Environment-to-patient (usually related to unrecognised risks) 
 
HCW to patient cross-transmission could arise when, for example, a HCW with a 
blood borne virus (BBV) cuts a finger when opening a glass ampoule and minute 
droplets of blood (and BBV) contaminate the infusate (Parker 1995). The infusate 
and BBV is then inadvertently administered to the patient. Basic hand hygiene failure 
causing HCW-to-patient cross-transmission was clearly demonstrated when an 
organism was found in patients’ blood and a nurse’s artificial nail: the nail was used 
to flip off drug vial lids  (Gordin et al. 2007).  
 
Patient-to-patient via HCW cross-transmission occurs when a HCW (knowingly or 
unknowingly) reuses contaminated equipment or drug vials. Such breaches in basic 
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infection control have resulted in cross-transmission of BBVs, bacteria and  parasites 
(Al-Saigul et al. 2000, Centers for Disease Control 2003, Jain et al. 2005). One 
recent review estimated that as a consequence of a failure to perform safe injection 
practices, in 35 reported outbreaks, more than 100,000 patients had been exposed to 
BBVs (Dolan et al. 2010).  
 
Environment-to-patient cross-transmission arises when small aerosols containing 
micro-organisms are liberated, e.g. during any procedure involving a tap. The 
aerosols land on the equipment preparation area and are subsequently transferred 
into the infusate. The micro-organisms arising from this route are usually 
opportunistic environmental pathogens, e.g., Burkholderia capecia (Hsueh et al. 
1998, Doit et al. 2004). Having explained the routes of cross-transmission, the 
properties of specific types of micro-organisms and infusates that promote IR-BSI will 
now be described. 
 
Properties of micro-organisms and infusates that increase the risk of IR-BSI 
Some micro-organisms such as the BBVs and parasites do not multiply in the 
infusate but cause infection by direct infusion of a minimal (invisible to the naked eye) 
inoculum. Gram-positive micro-organisms such as Staphylococci spp, which are the 
main cause of catheter-related BSIs, (Coello et al. 2003) can, and do contaminate 
infusates (van Grafhorst et al. 2002). However, possibly because of their inability to 
grow rapidly in the infusates they have been implicated less as a source of IR-BSI. 
These organisms can seed the catheter lumen and cause infection, through biofilm 
development, at a later date. The time from infusion to catheter infection in these 
situations can be so delayed that retrospective detection of infusate contamination 
becomes impossible. 
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Gram-negative micro-organisms are renowned for their ability to grow well in 
nutritionally poor intravenous solutions. Of paramount importance for those preparing 
infusions is the fact that heavily contaminated infusates (106 micro-organisms per ml) 
do not appear cloudy to the naked eye (Gilat et al. 1958, Felts et al. 1972, Maki and 
Martin 1975).  
 
Drugs associated with IR-BSI 
Although any drug can become contaminated lipids and heparin contamination is 
more widely reported. Drugs containing lipids, such as propofol, have been 
implicated in several outbreaks (Bennett et al. 1995, Halkes and Snow 2003, 
Trepanier and Lessard 2003). Heparin (as an infusion or flush) has been implicated 
in IR-BSI outbreaks (Al-Saigul et al. 2000, Siegman-Igra et al. 2005, Gershman et al. 
2008, Blossom et al. 2009). There have even been reports of heparinsed antibiotic 
lock solutions being microbially contaminated (Safdar and Maki 2006). 
 
The time from infusion to IR-BSI developing 
Symptoms of an IR-BSI can arise immediately a contaminated infusion is 
commenced, over the life-time of the infusion or shortly thereafter, or as a delayed-
onset presentation, days, weeks or even months after an infusion is completed. 
Delayed-onset IR-BSI was eloquently illustrated during a multi-state Pseudomonas 
fluorescens outbreak caused by contaminated heparinised saline. With 47 cases 
indentified the outbreak control team instigated a product recall. The product recall 
was successful, however, a further 33 cases were identified post-product recall.  
These delayed-onset IR-BSIs, which were caused by biofilm proliferation on the  
catheter lumen; were identified between 84 and 421 days after their last exposure to 
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the contaminated heparinised saline (Gershman et al. 2008).  The above report 
shows clearly that no level of contamination can be considered safe. The infusates at 
highest risk of contamination are shown in the table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 The infusates at the highest risk of causing IR-BSI by environmental sources 
are those where: 
o The procedure is open to environmental contamination 
o The drug supports microbial growth  
o The infusate is infused over 12hours enabling small numbers of micro-
organisms present to proliferate exponentially.  
 
The size of the IR-BSI problem  
A systematic review of worldwide drug-related outbreaks between 1990 and 2005, 
identified 128 reports of non-blood product related outbreaks involving 2,250 patients 
(Vonberg and Gastmeier 2007): the majority occurred by drugs prepared in near-
patient areas. A significant number of these outbreaks 64/128 involved multi-dose 
vials (or vials that were designated single-use used more than once).  
 
The potential for IR-BSI was revealed in another study of 1,093 ward prepared 
infusates, which found a contamination rate of 0.9%; and two cases of IR-BSIs 
(Macias et al. 2008). The authors concluded that ‘endemic infusate contamination 
may be a present danger’ Macias et al., (2008: 48).  
 
IR-BSI outbreaks are the most visible consequence of infusate contamination, 
because an infection control alert would be recognised when the same organism 
occurred in more than one patient. However, single IR-BSI episodes, of which there 
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are probably many more than outbreaks, may not create an alert signal and may go 
undetected. Vonberg and Gastmeier (2007: 19) agree that IR-BSI ‘might not even be 
noticed if only a few patients are affected on the ward’. It does not seem intuitive that 
IR-BSIs could be undetected. However, many of the patients who require intravenous 
infusates are already sick and are generally vulnerable to infections; the majority of 
BSIs occur in intensive care units, haematology or renal units (Edgeworth et al. 1999, 
Coello et al. 2003, Gulati et al. 2003). It seems that something exceptional has to 
happen to alert staff to a possible contaminated infusate. A 4-year review of BSIs and 
risk factors was undertaken when a cluster of BSIs was found to be associated with 
heparin pumps (Siegman-Igra et al. 2005). These researchers found that 6% (96 
patients) had a BSI for which the only identified risk factor was an intravenous 
catheter. 
 
It is difficult to estimate precisely how much contamination occurs; however, several 
studies that examined different parts of the procedure found that asepsis failures are 
common. In a small environmental study, which followed standard microbiology 
methods (using air sampling and contact plates), researchers found that 10/10 
surfaces where drugs were prepared in near patient areas were contaminated 
(Beaney and Goode 2003). In a systematic review of published studies on all errors 
in intravenous drug preparation and administration, poor aseptic technique, and 
environmental contamination, were noted to be frequently found (Crowley et al. 
2004). A microbiological contamination rate of 0.9% was found in a study of in-use of 
227 multi-dose vials (Mattner and Gastmeier 2004).  
 
In another study Worthington et al., (2001) observed 100 nurses preparing infusates 
drawing up fluids, and a further 100 nurses preparing infusates with several 
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manipulations. These researchers demonstrated considerable variation in aseptic 
technique and significant contamination rates (8%). Higher infusate contamination 
rates were associated with greater required manipulations in the procedure 
(Worthington et al. 2001). A systematic review of microbial contamination of infusates 
prepared in clinical areas identified an overall 5% contamination rate (95% CI; 0.8% 
to 13.1%) (Austin and Elia 2009)  found at least one deviation from aseptic technique 
in each of 299 observations. Therefore, not only are the opportunities for asepsis 
failure, subsequent infusate contamination and IR-BSI as a consequence immense, 
whenever aseptic practice has been observed the performed procedures was less 
than optimal to prevent contamination. 
 
What guidance and regulations is there to help nurses recognise and prevent IR-
BSI? 
The Nursing and Midwifery Council sets and updates standards related to medicines 
management (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2010). With regard to intravenous 
medications, the relevant standard relates to a two-person checking procedure. 
Registrants are referred to other agencies (National Patient Safety Agency [NPSA], 
and the Royal College of Nursing) for other aspects of this procedure (Nursing and 
Midwifery Council 2010).   
 
The NPSA in a work competence statement for the preparation of injectable 
medicines details a complex procedure. As for hand hygiene, it merely advocates 
compliance with local policy (NPSA 2007).  Apart from the complexity of the 
procedure, there appears to be a good deal of advocating aseptic technique without 
clarification of what it is – though this has been specified out with a national guideline 
(Rowley 2001, Rowley and Sinclair 2004). The aseptic non-touch technique 
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advocated by Rowley (2001) also focuses the procedure on non-contamination of 
‘key parts’. However, as already discussed, contamination can occur with an aseptic 
non-touch technique if the antiseptic or drug is already contaminated or if splash 
contamination occurs during the preparation of the procedure – regardless of a non-
touch technique. 
 
The Royal College of Nursing has produced detailed advice on intravenous 
procedures (RCN IV Therapy Forum 2010). However, this guidance is not 
systematically produced and a lot of the advice therein refers the reader back to local 
policy. There is insufficient weighting of the evidence with which to guide those 
having to write local procedures. Despite the risks demonstrated in this paper there 
are as yet no minimal environmental standards for the preparation of infusates in the 
UK.   
 
The US Centres for Disease Control guidelines, states that infusate contamination is 
a rare cause of blood stream infection (O'Grady et al. 2002). Although the guideline 
cites 293 references in total, there is only one reference provided to support this 
statement: and this is to a book published in 1982. The United Kingdom’s Dept of 
Health epic2 guidelines on the prevention of central venous catheter infections does 
not include infusate contamination in its synopsis of the causes of central line 
infections (Pratt et al. 2007).  
 
Although the risk IR-BSI is not recognised by everyone, it certainly is recognised by 
some. In an overly concise summary of one outbreak investigation report, which hints 
that all investigations reveal similar causes, one editor wrote of the cause of infusate 
contamination akin to a game of Cluedo®: “The nurse unwittingly did it, in the pre-
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induction room, with a contaminated infusate” (Horlocker et al. 2008: 1095). 
Unwittingly or not, this situation is not acceptable to either the nurse or the patient. 
 
Conclusions 
The evidence from outbreak reports, prospective evaluation of infusates and 
procedure observations combined, indicate that IR-BSI is a real risk to patients but at 
present it is under-recognised as such. 
 
What is required now to optimise patient safety is: 
o The sources of infusate contamination and the risk of IR-BSI must become 
more widely recognised. 
o Aseptic technique related to the preparation of infusates needs amended to 
negate contamination risks.  
o National guidance and standards are required so that HCWs who follow 
procedures do not unwittingly cause their patients harm. 
 
Key phrases 
Infusates can be contaminated from the HCW themselves, from the misuse of 
equipment and from environmental sources. 
 
IR-BSI is an under-recognised risk to patients and current guidance is insufficiently 
focused on its cause, its recognition and its prevention.  
 
There are at present no extant environmental standards in the UK, no requirement 
for quality assurance of prepared drugs and no ongoing surveillance of the outcome 
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